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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation presents results from studies that empirically examine incentives, 
values and provision of ecosystem services and restoration employing both real-
money field experiments and hypothetical stated preference mail surveys. 
 Manuscript I reports on a real-money discrete choice experiment (DCE) to 
assess values for ecosystem restoration efforts focused on non-native plants 
management in a nature reserve in southern California, USA. Employing a split 
sample design, participants’ values and preferences for ecosystem restoration projects 
are compared under a theoretically incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a single 
decision-maker’s choice, against a non-incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a 
plurality vote using three-option choices for restoring native habitats and birds. A 
provision rule is a rule or process by which an environmental good is provided and 
provides an explicit nexus between participants’ choices and actual policy outcomes. 
In the field experimental settings, participants contributed actual dollars to deliver 
actual ecosystem restoration projects on the ground. Results from these field 
experiments suggest that the two provision rules produce statistically equivalent 
preference functions irrespective of theoretical prediction of incentive compatibility 
properties of such provision rules. These results may imply that participants in 
consequential DCE surveys may respond truthfully to the choices despite the absence 
of a provision rule that is theoretically incentive compatible.  
Manuscript II reports on a hypothetical DCE survey, which asks survey 
participants about their values and preferences for attributes of forested wetland 
parcels. A split sample approach is employed to examine survey participants’ values 
  
and preferences for attributes of protecting wooded wetlands using two survey 
formats. The first survey format asks a group of survey participants two choice tasks 
and the second survey format asks a different group of participants a series of twelve 
choice tasks. This manuscript empirically examines whether the alternative choice 
formats produce consistent responses and thus similar value estimates using 
trichotomous choices (or three alternatives in each choice task) of wetland parcels 
protection. Our results suggest that the alternative choice formats produce statistically 
different underlying preference functions as well as significantly different estimates of 
scale parameters related to error terms. Further explorations of the participants’ 
choices from the repeated survey format (or the responses from twelve choice tasks) 
suggest evidence of precedent-dependent effects relating to a potential to retain higher 
net surplus from the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the most-
valued alternative in the preceding task may induce participants to be less cost 
sensitive and thus have a higher WTP across the sequence.  
Manuscript III reports on a real-money field experiment designed to generate 
revenues through experiment participants’ offers to implement manure management 
projects that improve water quality in local watershed system. The field experiments 
employ a voluntary donation elicitation as well as a newly established public good 
institution called individualized price auction (IPA). Participants offers are empirically 
compared between the two public good institutions both incorporating the incentive 
mechanisms from experimental economics literature including provision point (PP) 
with a money back guarantee (MBG) and proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds 
beyond the PP. Using a split sample design in a field experimental setting, we ask 
  
participants to contribute real dollars towards ecosystem-service public good projects 
focused on water quality improvements from implementing best manure management 
practices in local livestock farms in the local watershed system. Our results suggest 
that voluntary donation elicitation generated higher offers, on average, than those 
under an IPA approach for all available range of water quality improvements (or 
quantities of the ecosystem-service public good). Even though participants under both 
public good institutions made approximately constant offers across the available range 
of quantities of the good, they showed a statistically different pattern of contribution 
across the public good treatments. A two-limit tobit model results suggest a 
statistically significant heterogeneity in offers generated across the public good 
treatments based on socio-demographic profiles of participants. 
.   
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PREFACE 
This dissertation uses Manuscript Format to report the results of three research 
projects with interconnected themes to assess values of ecosystem services and 
restoration. All the procedures for the field experiments and surveys reported in this 
dissertation were approved by Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of 
Rhode Island.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Environmental economists have used stated preference or survey-based methods to 
learn about the values of environmental goods and services. Under stated-preference 
methods, researchers develop choice scenarios regarding the goods under 
consideration and ask individuals to “state” their values for the goods. Because these 
environmental goods and services cannot be traded in common commodity markets, 
environmental economists have relied on these methods to create market-like 
scenarios to learn about values of these goods. Also, many environmental goods and 
services possess non-use values and these methods may be the only way to learn about 
those values. Learning about the values of non-market goods is important because 
these values are an integral part of many government-mandated benefit-cost analysis. 
These values have also been used as evidence in legal proceedings over environmental 
damages, e.g., after an oil-spill event. Overall, these values can be crucial to evaluate 
public policies affecting the use and management of natural resources that produce 
these goods and services for better environmental decision-making. Therefore, 
creating an incentive compatible scenario, i.e., developing the scenario such that 
individuals state their utility-maximizing choices, may be crucial in order to interpret 
those values based on standard economic theory.  
One of the popular stated-preference valuation methods is a discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) method in which environmental goods are described by a bundle of 
attributes or characteristics and individuals are asked to choose their preferred 
alternative or option from a set of alternatives. There exist divergent views among 
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economists regarding interpreting the results of DCE studies due to “stated” nature of 
the choices rather than “revealed” market transactions. However, there is also a 
consensus among economists that if the choices are obtained from incentive 
compatible scenarios, where individuals are stating their utility-maximizing choices, 
the responses from DCE studies can be interpreted in terms of the standard economic 
theory. 
There are various elements or dimensions that may affect incentive structures 
of choice scenarios in a DCE study. One important dimension often ignored in most 
previous studies is an explicit description of a provision rule by which an 
environmental good under consideration is provided based on participants’ choices. 
Manuscript 1 of this dissertation empirically examines this aspect of incentive 
compatibility of DCE studies. Employing real-money in-person field experiments, I 
empirically examined whether the type of provision rule affects value estimates for 
ecosystem restoration attributes. That is I compared estimated values produced by a 
DCE employing a single decision-maker’s choice rule, an incentive compatible 
provision rule, and the corresponding estimates from a DCE using a plurality vote, a 
non-incentive compatible provision rule under trichotomous elicitation format. Our 
results suggest that value estimates are statistically equivalent across the provision 
rules, implying that consequential DCE studies may produce value estimates that are 
robust to the weaknesses in incentives of the DCE (particularly the absence of 
incentive compatibility).   
 A DCE study elicits values for multi-attribute environmental goods and 
services by asking survey participants a repeated series of choice scenarios consisting 
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of two or more alternatives. This repeated response format in DCE studies has been 
questioned in terms of truthfulness of responses across the sequence based on both 
theoretical prediction as well as empirical evidence of a systematic change in stated 
preferences across the sequence. Manuscript 2 of this dissertation examines this issue 
in DCE by empirically comparing value estimates produced by a DCE study using two 
choice scenarios and a DCE with a repeated series of twelve choice scenarios. 
Employing a split-sample design, participants were asked about their preferred 
wetland preservation parcels in local towns of Rhode Island, USA. Our results suggest 
evidence of precedent-dependent effects relating to a potential to retain higher net 
surplus from the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the most-valued 
alternative in the preceding task may induce participants to be less sensitive to cost 
and thus appear to have a higher WTP across the sequence.   
Valuing public goods and their efficient provision have posed a fundamental 
challenge to both economists and fundraisers because the providers of the public 
goods can not exclude potential beneficiaries who do not contribute toward the cost of 
provision. This non-excludability nature creates a natural incentive for individuals to 
“free-ride” on others’ contribution. Thus, public goods institutions often result in 
under-provision of the good. Economists have been using modifications in public 
goods institutions through experiments to mitigate the “free-riding” behavior. One 
such pragmatic institution is a public good institution motivated by Lindahl’s 
framework, called the Individualized Price Auction (IPA) implemented with incentive 
mechanisms from experimental economics literature. In Manuscript 3 of this 
dissertation, I empirically examined participants’ offers in terms of willingness-to-
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contribute for ecosystem-service publics goods under the IPA approach against the 
corresponding offers under a standard voluntary donation mechanism both 
implemented using incentive mechanisms including a provision point (PP) with a 
money-back guarantee (MBG) and a proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds 
beyond the PP. Our results from real-money in-person field experiments suggest that a 
less-structured voluntary donation elicitation generated higher offers compared to a 
more-structured IPA approach. 
The major goal of this dissertation research is to contribute to both DCE 
literature as well as the public good experiments literature to further our understanding 
in terms of examining ways to assess better estimates of values for the goods and 
services that cannot be traded in common commodity markets and important insights 
towards creating novel markets for the ecosystem services. This dissertation is 
composed in Manuscript Format and I present results of three research projects with 
interconnected themes as individual manuscripts. Finally, I complete the dissertation 
with concluding remarks.  
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1.1 Abstract 
Although investigating incentive properties of stated preference surveys has been 
a central topic in the non-market valuation literature, economic incentives defined by 
the inclusion of a provision rule in the discrete choice experiments (DCE) framework 
have not been adequately examined. We examine whether incentive compatibility of 
provision rules likely affects responses from DCE surveys.  We compare participants’ 
marginal values, and marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) estimates from DCE 
surveys under a theoretically incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a single 
decision-maker’s choice, against a non-incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a 
plurality vote. We compared estimated preference functions that may be derived from 
modeling trichotomous choices under the assumption of utility maximization. The 
choices included ecosystem restoration projects focused on non-native plants 
management in the Nature Reserve of Orange County (NROC), California. We 
employed a split sample design in a consequential DCE framework, which involved 
choices that require both actual cash payment and resulted in the actual 
implementation of ecosystem restoration projects.  We also compare those choices to 
responses to a set of hypothetical choices. Results from a panel mixed logit model 
suggest that the two provision rules produce statistically similar preference functions 
in terms of marginal values as well as statistically equivalent marginal willingness to 
pay (mWTP) for ecosystem restoration attributes, irrespective of the theoretical 
prediction regarding incentive compatibility properties of the provision rules. These 
results suggest that participants in consequential DCE surveys may respond truthfully 
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to the choices despite the absence of a provision rule that is theoretically incentive 
compatible. 
Key words Consequentiality, discrete choice experiment, ecosystem restoration, 
mixed logit model, provision rule, public goods  
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1.2 Introduction 
Participants’ responses from survey-based methods of eliciting preferences for the 
valuation of non-market public goods are often questioned on the grounds of 
truthfulness, although the stated preference methods have been widely used by many 
government and private institutions for benefit cost analysis. Among economists, there 
are divergent beliefs when it comes to interpreting the responses from such survey-
based methods because the economic incentives that define these responses remain 
poorly understood (Vossler, Doyon, & Rondeau, 2012). Many previous empirical 
studies have tended to focus on examining the incentive properties of responses from 
stated preference surveys compared to responses from such surveys which have direct 
financial consequences (e.g., Mozumder & Berrens, 2007; Johnston, 2006; Brown, 
Ajzen, & Hrubes, 2003; Taylor, McKee, Laury, & Cummings, 2001; Cummings & 
Taylor, 1999). This comparison suggests that stated preference surveys that have 
hypothetical choices frequently have higher willingness to pay (WTP) than from the 
surveys that have choices requiring actual payment and bearing direct financial 
consequences.1 However, Carson & Groves (2007) argue that responses from 
consequential surveys2 can be interpreted in terms of standard economic theory such 
as a mechanism design theory concerning incentive structures.  
                                                
1 We also recognize literature on the convergent validity of stated preferences, such as 
Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright (1996), Murphy, Stevens, & Yadav (2010), Murphy, 
 
2 Carson & Groves (2007) define surveys as being consequential if the results are seen 
by survey participants as potentially influencing the surveying agency’s actions and 
participants care about the outcomes of those actions. Carson, Groves, & List (2006) 
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An important aspect of consequentiality in DCE surveys relates to an explicit 
description of a provision rule, a mechanism or process by which participants’ 
responses determine a collective policy outcome. The provision rule is therefore 
considered important information bearing on incentive structures. When a provision 
rule is not explicitly described, survey participants may be uncertain about how their 
choices determine actual outcomes and this uncertainty may affect the incentives to 
truthfully reveal their values. An explicit description of a provision rule may present 
survey participants with specific incentives to respond to valuation questions. 
Relatively little is known about how survey participants respond to the incentives 
presented through including a provision rule in discrete choice experiments and how 
these incentives shape the responses to the valuation questions. Using a split-sample 
approach, this study empirically compares marginal values and marginal willingness 
to pay (mWTP) estimates for ecosystem restoration attributes focused on invasive 
plants management under a theoretically incentive-compatible provision rule, i.e., a 
single decision-maker’s choice, against a non-incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., 
a plurality vote. In mechanism design theory, a single decision-maker’s choice rule is 
called a dictatorship rule and is an incentive compatible mechanism for choice 
situations with three or more alternatives as in our study. We referred to this rule in 
our field experiment as “Single decision-maker’s choice” to avoid any negative 
connotation of ‘dictatorship’ terminology. The plurality rule has been well established 
in the literature as being incentive compatible for single binary choice situations. For 
                                                                                                                                       
showed that neoclassical theory is applicable except when the influence of 
participants’ choices on the agency’s actions or decisions, either deterministic or 
probabilistic, is considered zero. 
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choice situations involving three or more alternatives like our study, this rule is not 
generally incentive compatible because there may exist strategic reasons to 
misrepresent true values. For example, the individual’s beliefs relating to the 
distribution of preferences within the voting group may alter the incentives for truthful 
responses (Taylor, Morrison, & Boyle, 2010).  
We compared participants’ values and preferences from consequential DCEs under 
these alternative provision rules, which require actual payment and bear direct 
financial consequences, and which result in actual implementation of ecosystem 
restoration projects. Our results suggest that the preference functions and value 
estimates are statistically similar across the provision rules and suggest that regardless 
of whether the provision rule is theoretically incentive compatible or not, participants 
may respond truthfully to the choices in consequential DCE surveys.   
Advancements in mechanism design theory3 (Brams & Fishburn, 2000; Moulin, 
1991; Satterthwaite, 1975; Gibbard, 1973) have attracted researchers’ attention to 
empirically examining economic incentives in DCE surveys that motivate survey 
participants to disclose their privately held information, particularly the values for 
public goods under alternative provision rules or mechanisms (Carson & Groves, 
2007). In mechanism design theory, an incentive compatible mechanism is one in 
which group or collective preferences align with individual preferences such that an 
                                                
3 Mechanism design theory is a field in game theory studying solution concepts for a 
class of private information games and usually involves motivating agents to disclose 
their private information. It relates to designing a voting rule or mechanism to 
truthfully identify a consistent collective outcome, from a fixed set of alternatives, on 
the basis of voters’ privately held preferences.  
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individual can always do at least as well by choosing consistently with truthful 
revelation of personal values as by any other choice. For example, when participants 
are choosing between two alternative restoration plans in a single4 binary choice, the 
majority (or plurality) vote provision rule (the alternative that receives the most votes 
wins) is incentive compatible (Arrow et al., 1999). However, when participants are 
choosing among three or more alternatives, the plurality vote rule may no longer be 
incentive compatible as the voting strategies may depend on individual’s subjective 
beliefs about the distribution of preferences within the voting group. Also a participant 
may simply select the status quo option to avoid placing an undue burden on others, 
when in fact the status quo option is not that participant’s most preferred alternative; 
such an altuistic motivation is often called other-regarding behavior (Taylor, 
Morrison, & Boyle, 2010). Since many stated preference studies have multinomial 
choice situations (three or more alternatives in each choice task), the plurality vote 
does not serve as an incentive compatible mechanism. In order to examine incentive 
properties of multinomial choice situations, we establish a single decision-maker’s 
choice as the incentive compatible base rule against which to compare a model of 
values and preferences based on data generated under the plurality vote.  
There are few previous studies that have examined the responses to choices in 
DCE surveys where a provision rule is explicitly described to the participants. Collins 
& Vossler (2009), in their laboratory induced-value experiments, have examined 
provision rules using two-alternative and three-alternative choice situations and found 
                                                
4 Carson & Groves (2007) argued about the independence of choices and Vossler, 
Doyon, & Rondeau (2012) formally proved that independence among repeated choices 
should be maintained.  
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more deviations from induced preferences for two-alternative choices and for 
alternatives to a single plurality vote as compared to results under the rule in which the 
outcome was determined by both participants’ and “regulator” votes. They also found 
a statistically significant but modest degree of bias towards selecting the status-quo 
option. Taylor, Morrison, & Boyle (2010) compared participants’ values under 
alternative provision rules using hypothetical choices as well as choices that require 
actual payment and bear direct financial consequences for both private and public 
goods. For private goods, mWTP estimates from hypothetical choices are not 
significantly different than those estimates from the choices that require actual 
payment. However, for public goods they found a statistically higher mWTP from 
hypothetical choices than corresponding value estimates from choices bearing direct 
financial consequences. They also concluded that the bias in value estimates is the 
largest when no provision rule was included and found no significant difference in 
value estimates across included provision rules for public goods treatments. Vossler et 
al. (2012) developed an explicit game-theoretic model of individual decisions and 
formalized conditions under which DCE surveys with a single binary choice question 
or a series of binary choice questions are incentive compatible following Carson & 
Groves (2007). They complemented their theoretical model with field experiments and 
concluded that truthful revelation may be possible if participants perceived that they 
have more than a weak chance of influencing policy outcomes.  
Using a split-sample approach, our study empirically compares marginal values 
and mWTP for ecosystem restoration projects focused on non-native plants 
management from consequential DCE surveys under two provision rules – a single 
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decision-maker’s choice and a plurality vote – using three-alternative choices. Our 
study employed three-option choices because trichotomous choice is a common value 
elicitation format in DCE survey for stated preference valuation studies. A single 
decision-maker’s choice provision rule is the base incentive compatible rule in our 
study, against which the plurality vote rule is compared. We employed the plurality 
vote rule because a natural assumption may be that the alternative receiving the 
greatest support or votes will be implemented for the provision of public goods, even 
though a DCE survey often does not explicitly describe a provision rule (Taylor et al., 
2010).  
Our field application involved ecosystem restoration choices with more attributes 
than those in previous studies examining provision rules, as well as a unique situation 
that allows us to identify potential sub-interest groups representing various 
motivations for supporting ecosystem restoration which could lead to strategic voting 
or behavior. We produced an experimental design utilizing a state-of-the-art efficient 
design approach, which uniquely produced a set of choices that are potentially 
implementable from a pool of real, implementable scenarios and also produced a set of 
hypothetical choices that extended the range of levels of attributes covered in 
implementable choices. Our results suggest that the preference function is statistically 
similar across the provision rules irrespective of the incentive compatibility, at least 
theoretically, of the provision rule, which is consistent with the findings from DCE 
studies using dichotomous choices. We broaden this conclusion to a DCE study 
involving trichotomous choices. The results suggest that the value estimates produced 
 14 
 
by multinomial choice experiment surveys may be consistent with estimates of the 
true Hicksian values.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 discusses the theoretical framework 
to model responses from a DCE survey in relation to incentive compatibility based in 
mechanism design theory. Section 1.4 details the field application. Section 1.5 
presents the results of hypothesis tests. Section 1.6 concludes and discusses the 
implications of the results. 
  
1.3 The conceptual model 
1.3.1 Discrete choice experiments and provision rules 
We model participants' responses to ecosystem restoration choices using a standard 
economic model, the Random Utility Model (RUM) (McFadden, 1974). The RUM 
assumes a sample of N participants with the choice of J ecosystem restoration 
alternatives on T choice sets or choice tasks. The utility that participant n derives from 
choosing restoration alternative j on choice set t is given by Unjt = Vnjt + εnjt, where 
Vnjt is an estimable component of the utility estimated from observed attributes 
relating to ecosystem restoration alternatives and participants, and where εnjt is a 
portion of utility relating to unknown randomness from the researcher’s perspective. 
The probability that participant n chooses alternative j in choice task t denoted by Pnjt 
is given by: 
(1) Pnjt = Pr ( Unjt > Unkt ∀ j≠k) =  Pr (Vnjt + εnjt > Vnkt + εnkt ∀ j≠k)  
      = Pr (εnjt - εnkt  > Vnkt - Vnjt ∀ j≠k) 
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According to expression (1), a participant compares utilities received from available 
alternatives in each choice set and chooses the alternative that provides him or her the 
highest utility. The appropriate assumption about the distribution of random error 
terms (εnjt) will yield a corresponding empirical choice model. This expression, 
however, does not typically consider any influence of a provision rule on participant’s 
utilities from available alternatives and thus choices.  We will test whether choices 
under different provision rules produce similar estimates of the preference function 
that presumably underlies individuals’ choices. 
 Our survey participants responded to two sets of ecosystem restoration 
choices- the first set includes choices representing real-world scenarios and 
immediately implementable projects and the second set involves choices representing 
future candidate projects (or hypothetical choices) for restoration. In our 
questionnaire, we interspersed the real, implementable choice opportunities between 
choices involving candidate projects as explained below. Each survey participant 
received both sets of choices. We will also examine whether the value estimates 
significantly differ between the two sets of choices.  
 
1.3.2 Experimental plan 
First we examine the influence of including a single decision-maker’s choice rule on 
the estimated utilities from alternatives and how this influence may affect participants’ 
responses. Under this rule, the researchers will randomly draw a choice task from 
among a series of implementable, real choice tasks. This random draw is required to 
maintain the independence between choice tasks and one-to-one correspondence 
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between choices and the outcomes as noted in Vossler et al. (2012). Under our 
incentive-compatible decision rule, the researchers will also randomly select a 
participant who will be the “single decision-maker,” whose response on the randomly 
selected choice task will be the ecosystem restoration project that will be 
implemented. Under this single decision-maker’s choice rule, each participant has an 
equal chance of being the single decision-maker and, given that she is chosen as the 
single decision-maker, she cannot do better than choosing the true utility-maximizing 
alternative based on her preferences in each choice set or task. Thus, a single decision-
maker’s choice rule is a theoretically incentive compatible rule.5   In comparison, we 
also examine how the inclusion of a plurality vote provision rule may impact utilities 
from alternatives and thus affect the responses. Under this rule, the researchers 
randomly selected a choice task and the project that receives the most votes is selected 
for implementation. In our ecosystem restoration application participants are asked to 
choose among two alternative restoration projects, labeled “Project A” and “Project 
B” or to retain the status quo, a “no action” alternative.  
The plurality vote rule is not generally incentive compatible in multinomial 
choice situations like our study, as the voting strategies may depend on subjective 
beliefs about the distribution of preferences within the voting group. For example, 
there may be a sub-interest group that may have a favorable, or “pro,” attitude for 
restoration projects that involve community members as trained volunteers or specific 
                                                
5 This rule may not be very appealing in actual decision-making applications, because 
many participants would expect something like a voting rule, but we set up this rule as 
a "base rule" to compare preferences with plurality vote rule. This rule is the only 
incentive compatible rule in case of three-option choice situations. 
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preferences regarding the level of public access to restoration sites. In addition, 
participants may simply select a status quo option to avoid placing a burden on others 6 
when, in fact, the status quo option is not the utility-maximizing alternative. The 
potential for the other-regarding behavior may further complicate the incentive 
properties of a plurality vote provision rule (Taylor et al., 2010). Thus a plurality vote 
rule in case of three-alternative choice situations is not incentive compatible.  
 
1.3.3 Empirical model  
We employed a panel mixed logit (Hole, 2008; Train, 2003; Revelt & Train, 1998; 
Train, 1998) specification to model participants’ choices of ecosystem restoration 
projects. The panel mixed logit model allows the utility coefficients to vary across 
participants to incorporate heterogeneity in preferences and does not impose the 
assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) which is imposed in a 
conditional logit model. Following Revelt & Train, 1998, we assume that a sample of 
N survey participants face J alternatives in T choice tasks. The utility derived by 
participant n by choosing alternative j in choice task t can be written Unjt=βn’Xnjt+εnjt 
where βn is a participant-specific vector of utility parameters, Xnjt is the vector of 
observed characteristics relating to survey participant n and attributes relating to 
alternative j on choice task t, and εnjt is an IID extreme value distributed error term. 
The density for β is represented as f(β|θ) where θ denote the parameters of the 
assumed distribution, such as βn ~ N (mean β, σ) for normally distributed parameters. 
                                                
6 The status quo avoids imposing payments on others in a voting rule. 
 18 
 
The probability of participant n choosing alternative j on choice set t, conditional on 
knowing βn, is given by the conditional logit formula (McFadden, 1974): 
(2)  Pnjt (βn)= exp (βn’Xnjt) / Σj’ exp (βn’Xnj’t) 
The probability of the observed choices, conditional on knowing βn, is given by:  Sn 
(βn)=Πt{Pnj(n, t)t (βn)}where j(n, t) indicates the alternative participant n chooses in choice 
task t. The unconditional probability of the observed choices is given by the 
conditional probability integrated over the distribution of β: Pn(θ)=∫Sn(β) f(β|θ)dβ. 
Thus, the unconditional probability is a weighted average of a product of logit 
formulas evaluated at different values of β where the weights are given by the density 
f. The log-likelihood then is given by: LL (θ)=Σn lnPn(θ). This expression cannot be 
solved analytically, but can be approximated using simulated log-likelihood: 
SLL(θ)=Σn ln{(1/R) Σr Sn(βr)}, where R is the number of replications and βr is the rth 
draw from f(β|θ). The empirical utility function involving attributes of ecosystem 
restoration alternatives as well as participant-specific characteristics employed in the 
study will be discussed later.  
 
1.3.4 Hypothesis testing   
In order to examine whether the decision rule affects the set of mean estimates of 
marginal utility parameters and mean estimates of mWTP values for ecosystem 
restoration, we formally express the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 1: The type of provision rule does not significantly influence a set of 
mean estimates of marginal utility parameters, denoted by β. 
HO: β singleDC = β pVOTE and HA: β singleDC ≠ β pVOTE , 
where βrule represents a set of mean marginal utility parameters in the population 
estimated using responses from a sample of participants making choices under the 
single decision-maker’s choice (rule=singleDC) or the plurality vote rule 
(rule=pVOTE).  
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we will conduct a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test by 
imposing restrictions on a set of mean marginal utility parameters for one of the 
subsamples to examine whether the restrictions are true. Based on our earlier 
discussion on the theoretical predictions regarding the incentive compatibility of the 
two provision rules under trichotomous choice scenarios, we expect to reject the null 
hypothesis of no significant difference in marginal utility estimates across the rules.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The type of provision rule does not significantly alter mean marginal 
willingness to pay (mWTP) estimates for ecosystem restoration attribute X.  
HO: mWTPX singleDC = mWTPX pVOTE and HA: mWTPX singleDC ≠ mWTPX pVOTE ,  
where mWTPX= -1*(βruleX/ βruleCost) represents the ratio of the mean marginal utility 
parameter of an attribute X (βX) and the mean marginal utility of income (negative of 
βCost) estimated from the two subsamples, “rule”=singleDC, pVOTE. Since both 
numerator (non-monetary restoration attribute X) and denominator (Cost attribute) of 
mWTP values will be randomly distributed coefficients from a mixed logit model 
(described below), these mWTP estimates can be calculated by using simulation. The 
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simulated mWTP distributions can be obtained by dividing the draws from the 
distributions of non-monetary coefficients by draws from the distribution of the cost 
coefficient.    
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we will conduct an empirical numeric procedure, 
known as complete combinatorial convolutions, to determine whether simulated 
mWTP distributions for restoration attributes are statistically different across the rules 
(Poe et al., 2005; Poe et al., 1997; Poe et al., 1994). Based on our earlier discussion on 
the theoretical predictions regarding the incentive compatibility of the two provision 
rules under trichotomous choice scenarios, we expect to reject the null hypothesis of 
no significant difference in simulated mWTP distributions across the rules. 
 We will also examine whether potential subgroups of participants, representing 
specific strategic interests or motivations for certain aspects of restoration, have 
significantly different preference functions, by examining significance of relevant 
interaction terms (defined below) in the utility function. Furthermore, we will compare 
participants’ responses for the potentially implementable, real choices and 
hypothetical choices to examine whether participants have similar preferences 
irrespective of financial consequences of restoration choices. 
 
1.4 A field application to NROC’s native ecosystem restoration  
1.4.1 Study context, restoration attributes and experimental design  
We examined the hypotheses using two in-person field experiments employing the 
discrete choice experiments (DCEs) framework. The choice surveys were part of a 
broader study, which aimed at assessing the effectiveness of alternative management 
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techniques to control non-native or invasive plants in order to restore native habitats, 
particularly for target bird species. The choice experiments, within the broader project 
objectives, were to assess public values and priorities for ecosystem restoration 
attributes focused on the native habitats and target bird species and incorporate such 
values and priorities into a decision support tool to be used by environmental 
managers for prioritizing future restoration efforts. The study site is the Nature 
Reserve of Orange County (NROC), which is a 37,000-acre nature reserve in southern 
California established in 1996 to restore native habitats and natural processes 
supporting grasslands and Cactus Wren and California Gnatcatcher bird species. 
Interviews with ecosystem restoration experts from the NROC, Irvine Ranch 
Conservancy (IRC), and other local conservation groups and a series of seven focus 
groups (Johnston, Weaver, Smith, & Swallow, 1995) with local citizens were 
employed to identify relevant project attributes and to develop, revise and pretest 
survey instruments for overall clarity, salience of attributes, and comprehensiveness of 
ecosystem restoration choices and general instructions. Participants in our focus group 
discussions expressed an interest in multiple dimensions of ecosystem restoration in 
the NROC. Some examples include favorable attitudes towards involving community 
members as trained volunteers in the restoration process7 or preferences regarding the 
level of public access sites for various activities. Based on these observations during 
focus group discussions, we hypothesize that there may exist subgroup(s) of 
participants representing those interests or motivations which may lead those groups to 
                                                
7 Individuals expressed the belief that volunteers become experienced and educated 
advocates for NROC and ecosystem restoration generally.  
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respond strategically to the restoration choices. Table 1.1 presents identified project 
attributes and their corresponding levels, namely restoration effort, habitat and bird 
species focus, size of restoration site, public access, involvement of trained volunteers, 
likelihood of success of a restoration project, and cost to the participants.  
 
Table 1.1 Ecosystem restoration project attributes and levels 
Attribute Variablea  Levels 
Restoration 
Effort 
High_Effortb: a dummy variable; 
=1 if high effort; 
=0 if low effort 
1. High effort: Project 
restores 0-30% native cover 
up to 51-75%. 
2. Low effort: Project 
restores 30-50% native cover 
up to 51-75%. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus  
Habitat_Cactusb: effects-coded 
variable, 
=1 if restoration in coastal cactus scrub; 
=0 if restoration in native grasslands  
=-1 if restoration in coastal sage scrub 
 
Habitat_Ngrassb: effects-coded 
variable, 
=1 if restoration in native grasslands; 
=0 if restoration in coastal cactus scrub;  
=-1 if restoration in coastal sage scrub 
1. Coastal Cactus Scrub: 
Restoration is implemented 
in native cactus scrub 
habitat, which supports 
Cactus wren c, and often 
supports California 
gnatcatcherd.  
2. Native Grasslands: 
Restoration is implemented 
in native grasslands habitat, 
which supports other native 
wildlife.  
3. Coastal Sage Scrub: 
Restoration is implemented 
in native sage scrub habitat, 
which supports California 
gnatcatcher. 
Public 
Access 
High_Access: effects-coded variable; 
=1 if area allows high public access; 
=0 if area allows medium public 
access; 
=-1 if area allows low public access 
 
Medium_Access: effects-coded 
variable; 
=1 if area allows medium public 
access; 
1. High Public Access: Area 
allows access for running, 
hiking, mountain biking, 
with designated areas for 
dogs and horse-back riding 
when ecologically feasible.  
2. Medium Public Access: 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking. 
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=0 if area allows high public access; 
=-1 if area allows low public access 
3. Low Public Access: Area 
allows access for research 
with permits and guided 
tours only.  
Trained 
Volunteers 
Volunteers: a dummy variable; 
=1 if project involves trained 
volunteers; 
=0 if project does not involve 
volunteers.  
1. Yes: Project involves 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals. 
2. No: Project does not 
involve trained volunteers in 
addition to restoration 
professionals. 
Likelihood 
of Success  
High_Success: a dummy variable; 
=1 if project has high likelihood of 
success; 
=0 if project has medium likelihood of 
success. 
 
1. High Likelihood of 
Success: Due to easy access 
for maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape. 
2. Medium Likelihood of 
Success: Due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape. 
Size of 
Restoration 
Sizeb: Size of candidate restoration 
sites, in acres 
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 
Cost to 
participant 
Costb: Cost to participant from 
personal budget of $150 
$40, $60, $75, $90, $105, 
and $110 
Status quo 
option 
SQb: A dummy variable equals 1 for the status quo option or “neither 
project”, and equals 0 for a parcel (Project A or Project B).  
aNon-monetary ecosystem restoration attributes in vector Xnjt were assumed to follow 
normal distribution and the cost attribute (Costnjt) was assumed to follow log-normal 
distribution while estimating the utility function in Eq. (3).  
bEcosystem restoration attributes included in vector X^njt were specified as fixed 
parameters in Eq. (3). 
cCactus Wren is listed as California State Species of Special Concern and was selected 
as one of the “Target Species” in Orange County’s Central and Coastal Natural 
Community Conservation Plan/Habitat Conservation Plan (NCCP/HCP) in 1993 and a 
surrogate for conservation of coastal cactus scrub habitat. 
dCalifornia Gnatcatcher is listed as a federally-threatened species by the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). The gnatcatcher is also a focus of the California 
Department of Fish and Game’s Natural Community Conservation Planning Act, and 
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is one of the three “Target Species” in Orange County’s Central and Coastal 
NCCP/HCP. 
 
We employed an efficient design8 because a full factorial design using 
attributes and levels in Table 1.1 will result in a very large number of choice sets, 
which is not practical. We used responses to draft surveys, obtained through focus 
group pretests, to support priors on the parameters of ecosystem restoration attributes 
to produce the final design.  Our efficient design process was unique because we 
created 14 choice sets or tasks covering the attribute levels in Table 1.1, but the 
efficient design was chosen to include 6 choice sets for which projects fit the 
description of real, implementable ecosystem restoration projects and the remaining 8 
choice sets for which project descriptions represent hypothetical, candidate projects 
for future consideration. Experts from NROC and IRC provided a description of a 
total of 18 real-world scenarios, which were fed into Ngene to produce a set of 6 
potentially implementable choice tasks.  The printed survey distinguished the 6 real, 
and potentially implementable, choice sets from the 8 hypothetical choice sets using 
an explicit label, stating "Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice 
“[L],” where L represents one of the following unique letters: P, Q, R, X, Y, and Z. 
All 14 choice tasks were efficiently blocked into two groups of 7 tasks to control for 
ordering effects, if any, which could produce noise in our analysis.  Each participant in 
                                                
8 This is a design that yields data enabling estimation of the preference parameters 
with standard errors as low as possible. Ngene 1.1 (ChoiceMetrics, 2011), a software 
specifically designed to produce experimental design for DCE surveys, was used to 
produce this design. We are thankful to the technical experts from Ngene software, 
who developed a separate software module to accommodate our unique design need. 
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our experiments received all 14 choice tasks. In each survey booklet, the 14 choice 
questions were arranged beginning with a hypothetical question and alternating with 
real, implementable questions. Manuscript 1- Appendix A1 provides the complete 14 
choice questions.  
 
Figure 1.1 An example of real, implementable ecosystem restoration choice task 
 
Note: Choices that were not implementable in the 2012 NROC field season did not 
have the box shown above the choice question. 
 
Each choice task, real and potentially implementable (or hypothetical), 
included two ecosystem restoration projects, labeled “Project A” and “Project B” and 
the status quo as a “no action” alternative (Figure 1.1). We developed a choice survey 
entitled "Ecosystem Auctions for Decision Support (EADS): Economic Choices for 
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Ecosystem Restoration for Environmental Decision-Making in the Nature Reserve of 
Orange County (NROC), California". The choice survey consisted of a total of 3 
sections. The first section used a 7 point Agree-Disagree scale and asked participants 
about their general opinion towards ecosystem restoration, their perspectives on 
involving volunteers or public access near restoration sites, and incorporating public 
values and priorities in future restoration decisions. The second section presented 
participants with the 14 choice tasks along with information and instructions on the 
corresponding provision rule. We also included a subsection that asked participants 
follow up questions, on a 5-point Likert-scale, about how they answered choice tasks. 
The third section asked participants about their socio-demographic characteristics. 
Manuscript 1- Appendix A3 provides a complete survey booklet.   
  
1.4.2 Participants, procedures, and the provision rules  
Participants for in-person field experiments were recruited through local 
environmental organizations, namely Nature Reserve of Orange County (NROC); 
Irvine Ranch Conservancy (IRC); Back to Natives Restoration; Laguna Greenbelt; 
Newport Bay Conservancy; Laguna Canyon Foundation; Friends of Harbors, Beaches 
and Parks; and Sea and Sage Audubon Society. An email invitation was sent to the 
email lists of these organizations and individuals were asked to register voluntarily in 
one of the two in-person field experiments, called “Ecosystem Restoration Decision-
Making Workshop”, held at an educational facility of Orange County Parks, at the 
Peter and Mary Muth Interpretive Center. At least two rounds of email reminders were 
sent during the recruitment period, offering a $40 participation fee. The first workshop 
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was on Wednesday, May 16, 2012, from 5:30 -7:30 pm and had 57 volunteers sign up, 
and the second workshop was on Thursday, May 17, 2012, at the same time and had 
53 individuals sign up. Twenty-three individuals who were available for both 
workshops were randomly assigned to one.    
 For field experiments, a PowerPoint presentation about the project in general, 
experimental instructions, information about the project attributes, and description of 
the corresponding provision rule, was made by the same experiment moderator 
(Manuscript 1- Appendix A2). The information provided through the presentation was 
kept as similar as possible across the two experiment nights. The only difference in 
information provided across the two nights is the description of the corresponding 
provision rule. For the field experiments, each participant was provided with a budget 
of $150 from the research grant9, of which $40 was guaranteed for participants to take 
                                                
9 The authors recognize the literature on house money effect, a term coined by Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) based on “mental accounting” theory proposed by Thaler (1980), 
to describe behavioral discrepancies due to an initial endowment given to participants 
to make decisions in economic experiments. They found that participants in risky 
lottery experiments who have experienced monetary gains or profit are often willing to 
take more risk because they do not treat those gains as their own money. There is 
mixed evidence on the presence of the house money effect in a variety of experimental 
settings suggesting that the effect may be specific to the environment being tested. 
While this effect has been found in dictator game experiments (Cherry et al., 2002; 
Engel, 2011), public good experiments (Harrison, 2007), experimental auctions 
(Ackert et al., 2006) and capital expenditures (Keasy and Moon, 1996), Clark (2002) 
and Cherry et al. (2005) did not find such effect in their public goods experiments. 
Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) reported a negative effect of the “windfall gain” on 
contribution in their public goods experiment. In our field experiments, the research 
 28 
 
home as a participation fee and participants could spend the remaining $110 on the 
projects or take it home, depending on the decision-outcome for the evenings’ 
experiment. Participants were encouraged to consider the budget provided as their out 
of pocket money which they can spend on the projects or take home to spend on utility 
bills, family gifts, and donations to charities or any other purposes important to them. 
For example, the following excerpt is from the introduction section of the survey: 
“…Recall that any money you keep can be used for other personal priorities, 
including family expenses, gifts, donations to conservation or important 
charities, or any other purpose…” 
Participants were also reminded about what they could do with the money not 
spent on restoration projects, right before they faced choice tasks, with the following 
paragraph: 
“…We request that you consider restoration projects in each choice question in 
terms of what each project might or might not accomplish, how it matters 
to you, whether it is worth the money cost to you, and how your vote 
might influence the group outcome for tonight. Recall money not spent on 
these projects may be used by you at home for other priority expenses or 
charities…” (Emphasis in original) 
 
                                                                                                                                       
moderator repeatedly emphasized and encouraged participants to consider money 
given to them as their “out of pocket” money by highlighting the personal priorities 
they can spend money on if they decided to take the money home in both PowerPoint 
presentation and the instructions in the survey booklet; these reminders included the 
potential to use retained funds for philanthropic or other conservation organizations.   
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At the end of each session, one ecosystem restoration project was determined 
as the project to be implemented based on the corresponding rule in force for the 
evening and the payment to the participants was made based on the selected project. 
Participants were told that NROC and IRC would be implementing the chosen projects 
determined by their choices.  
Participants were presented with the exact same project background 
information, example choices, choice tasks and other questions except the description 
of the provision rule used. The following is an excerpt from the instructions of a 
plurality vote rule:  
“Determining the group outcome at the end of tonight’s workshop 
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one choice 
question number will be selected randomly from the group of choice 
questions labeled as Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, 
Choice-…”. Each participant’s response on this choice question will be 
counted as a vote. The project that gets the most votes will be chosen as the 
group outcome of tonight’s decisions and will be implemented in this 
(2012/2013) NROC field season. Your payment will be determined based on 
the group outcome chosen according to majority vote (or plurality vote) rule 
as described above.” (Emphasis in original) 
As the single decision-maker's choice rule involved two stages- (i) randomly 
choosing a choice task, and (ii) also randomly choosing a single decision-maker whose 
response on the selected choice task becomes the project to be implemented, the 
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following excerpt was presented to participants to describe how the single decision-
maker's choice rule will be implemented: 
“Determining the group outcome at the end of tonight’s workshop 
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one choice 
question number will be selected randomly from the group of choice 
questions labeled as “Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012 
Choice-…” .One Survey ID number will also be selected randomly. The 
project, chosen by the person holding the randomly selected Survey ID 
number on the randomly selected choice question, will be chosen as the 
group outcome of tonight’s decisions and will be implemented in this 
(2012/13) NROC field season. Your payment will be determined based on the 
group outcome chosen according to the randomly chosen single decision-
maker’s choice as described above.” (Emphasis in original) 
 
1.4.3 Outcome of the decision-making Workshops  
After all participants completed their surveys, the survey booklets were collected to 
implement the corresponding provision rule on each night of the Workshops. On each 
night, the experiment moderator randomly picked a choice task number (or 
corresponding letter) on which the corresponding provision rule was implemented. By 
random chance, both Workshop nights resulted in drawing the same real, 
implementable choice question (“Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 
2012 Choice-Q”) and the outcome based on the implementation of corresponding rule 
was the same (“Project A”), meaning both nights resulted in selecting the same 
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restoration project10. Thus, the decision-making workshops resulted in restoration 
projects described as “Low” level of restoration in Cactus Scrub habitat in 2 acres (1 
acre from each night) in an area that allows for medium level of public access without 
involving volunteers and is expected to result in high likelihood of success. 
Participants in both Workshops nights were told that the Nature Reserve of Orange 
County (NROC) and Irvine Ranch Conservancy will be responsible for implementing 
the selected ecosystem restoration projects and interested experiment participants can 
learn more about the projects through these organizations.  
 
1.4.3 Descriptive statistics  
Of 57 volunteers for the first workshop, 43 actually arrived on time and participated in 
the plurality vote rule. Of 53 for the second workshop, 38 arrived on time and 
participated in the single decision-maker’s choice rule.  Of these participants, twenty-
three had been available for either evening and assigned randomly to a workshop. 
 We utilized responses to seven-point Likert scale statements, varying from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, regarding participants’ views and attitudes 
towards various aspects of ecosystem restoration in the NROC to construct continuous 
factor variables using a factor analysis approach (Kaiser, 1958); (Harman, 1976). We 
employed a principal component factor (PCF) with varimax rotation to construct four 
                                                
10 NROC and IRC confirmed that that two projects fitting same description were 
feasible, so, in fact, the same project was implemented twice but on slightly different 
locations; the precise location within NROC lands was not part of the descriptions in 
the choice questions. 
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continuous-valued factors from participants’ responses to the statements. The rotated 
factor loadings were then used to convert responses to the statements from each 
individual participant to “standardized scores” using the regression scores method 
(Milan & Whittaker, 1995) in the Stata statistical package. The details of the 
statements used and rotated factor loadings are presented in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2 Rotated factor loadings on Likert-scale statements 
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I would prefer restoration be 
completed quickly utilizing 
park staff and contractors or 
professionals with higher 
expected success rates but 
higher costs, than completed 
over a greater length of time 
(years) utilizing park staff 
and volunteers at much 
lower cost but more variable 
success rate. 
-0.7215 0.1425     0.2974     0.0713    -0.0025 0.0638 
I value restoration actions 
more when I have access to 
information about the 
project and its goals.  
0.0686  0.0054 0.0025 0.0730 0.9133     0.0425 
I personally believe that 
preservation of the full 
ecosystem is the most 
effective means of 
preserving individual 
sensitive species.  
-0.4753  -0.0728 0.6912 -0.1337 0.2013     0.0175 
I personally believe that 
conservation or stewardship 
actions are essential parts of 
-0.0005  -0.2312 0.1836 0.6384 0.4017     0.1991 
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managing the reserve lands. 
Seeing restoration projects 
and their associated flagging 
or markers detracts from my 
outdoor experience. 
-0.0089  0.6501 -0.1016 -0.2335 0.2229    -0.2338 
I personally believe that 
restoration of habitat that is 
most suitable to native 
wildlife is more important 
than vegetation 
management focused 
around aesthetics or other 
public priorities.  
-0.0775  -0.6169 0.2233     0.0454 -0.0038 -0.3835 
I would rather have public 
access to all areas of open 
space on a standardized 
rotation cycle than 
unlimited public access in 
some areas and restricted or 
no public access to others. 
0.1014  0.7324 0.1066 0.1736 -0.1530 -0.0976 
For the same cost, I would 
rather have less area 
restored, but involve 
underprivileged groups, 
students or other community 
members, than more area 
restored with contractors or 
professionals.  
0.6602  0.1053 0.1572 -0.2916 -0.0652 0.1092 
It is important to me 
personally that land 
managers incorporate public 
values or priorities as an 
input to ecosystem 
restoration decisions. 
0.7694  0.1695 0.1012 0.0378 0.2140    -0.0810 
I personally believe that 
restorations within public 
view should utilize 
educational signage.  
0.2289  0.0294 0.7452 0.2290 -0.1409 0.2759 
I personally believe that 
restoration projects should 
incorporate restoration, 
monitoring and maintenance 
methods that ensure a 
sustainable restoration.  
-0.0137  -0.4559 0.5404 0.1614 0.0659    -0.2454 
I personally believe that 
ecosystem restoration 
-0.0909  0.0657 0.0352 0.8682 -0.0062 -0.0373 
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efforts or activities in the 
NROC positively affect the 
quality of life of the local 
communities around the 
reserve.  
I personally believe that 
restoration projects should 
incorporate restoration, 
monitoring and maintenance 
methods that address 
potential long-term issues of 
stochastic events (drought, 
fire) and climate change. 
-0.0564  -0.0380 0.1171 0.0290 0.0674     0.8747 
a Survey participants rated each statement using a seven-point Likert-scale varying from 
Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7). Numbers in bold represent varimax rotated 
highest factor loading (normalized to mean 0 and SD 1) for a given statement indicating 
agreement for positive coefficient and vice versa. Total variation explained by the six 
factors is 68.54%. 
 
Table 1.3 reports some basic socio-demographic characteristics of the 
participants across the two provision rules. A chi-squared test of independence for 
categorical variables and two-sample t-test between the means of continuous variables 
between the decision rules are reported in Table 1.3. These test results suggest that the 
two participant groups are not significantly different in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics and environmental attitudes, except participants in the two workshops 
displayed a statistically significant difference between the means of the factor 
indicating a favorable attitude for “Comprehensive and Sustainable Restoration.” We 
also compared participants’ socio-demographic characteristics to available data on the 
population of Orange County, California (US Census Bureau, 2010). These 
comparisons suggest that the distribution of the proportion of male and female 
participants (Pearson χ2=1.457, df=2, p=0.4826), homeowners and renters (Pearson 
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χ2=2.205, df=2, p=0.3320), high ($75,000 or more a year) and low income (<$75,000 
a year) (Pearson χ2=3.617, df=2, p=0.1639) are not significantly different from that of 
the population of Orange County. However, both field experiments had significantly 
higher percentages of individuals with graduate degrees (Pearson χ2=22.927, df=2, 
p<0.0001) than that of the population of the county. 
 
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics about participants across provision rules 
 
Categorical 
variables 
 
Description 
Provision rules 
 
Plurality 
Vote 
(pVOTE, 
N=43) 
Single 
Decision-
Maker’s  
Choice 
(singleDC, 
N=38) 
Pearson 
χ2, 1df 
(p) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Male  1 if a participant is male;  
0 otherwise 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.52 (0.50) 0.5763 
(0.448) 
Home owner 1 if a participant owns a 
home; 0 otherwise 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.68 (0.47) 0.0089 
(0.925) 
Graduate 
degree 
1 if a participant has a 
graduate degree;  
0 otherwise 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.39 (0.49) 0.0000 
(0.996) 
 
Low income 1 if a participant’s 
household income is less 
than $75,000; 0 otherwise 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.55 (0.50) 1.4515 
(0.228) 
 
Donate  1 if a participant donates 
money to an 
environmental group;  
0 otherwise 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.63 (0.48) 0.0337 
(0.854) 
 
Participated in 
restoration 
1 if a participant has ever 
participated in any 
ecosystem restoration 
projects; 0 otherwise 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.73 (0.44) 2.1551 
(0.142) 
 
Hiker  1 if a participant has 
ranked “hiking” as the 
most important 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.44 (0.50) 0.9903 
(0.32) 
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recreational activity 
around the NROC;  
0 otherwise 
Education tour 
(“EduTour”) 
1 if a participant has 
ranked “educational 
tours” as the most 
important recreational 
activity around the 
NROC; 0 otherwise 
0.23 
(0.43) 
0.26 (0.45) 0.1016 
(0.75) 
 
“Public” 
aspect 
1 if a participant has 
ranked “public aspects of 
restoration i.e., public 
access and trained 
volunteers” as the most 
influential attributes in 
their decisions; 0 
otherwise 
0.30 
(0.46) 
 
0.34 (0.48) 0.1465 
(0.702) 
 
Continuous 
variables 
Description Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
t-stat, 79 
df 
(p) 
Resident 
(years) 
Number of years a 
participant lived in or 
around Orange County 
27.30  
(16.84) 
31.22  
(17.14) 
1.0368 
(0.303) 
 
“Involve 
Community”  
A continuous factor score 
indicating pro-attitude for 
involving community 
members in the 
restoration 
0.06 
(1.00) 
-0.07 (1.00) 0.5933 
(0.5547) 
 
“Standardized 
Public 
Access”  
A continuous factor score 
favoring standardized 
public access on the areas 
of open space in the 
NROC 
0.06 
(1.06) 
-0.07  (0.92) 0.6562 
(0.5136) 
 
“Comprehensi
ve and 
Sustainable 
Restoration”  
A continuous factor score 
indicating a favor for 
methods to ensure 
comprehensive and 
sustainable restoration 
0.20 
(0.79) 
-0.23 (1.15) 2.0261 
(0.0461) 
 
“Conservation 
for Quality of 
Life” 
A continuous factor score 
indicating a belief that 
conservation actions in 
the NROC affect the 
quality of life around it. 
-0.001  
(1.01) 
0.001 (0.99) 0.0131 
(0.9896) 
 
 
"Value 
Information” 
A continuous factor score 
indicating that 
participants value 
-0.003 
(0.96) 
0.003 (1.04) 0.032 
(0.9746) 
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conservation actions more 
when they have access to 
information  
“Restoration 
for Long-term 
Events”  
A continuous factor score 
indicating a pro-attitude 
for restoration actions that 
address long-term issues 
of stochastic events like 
drought, fire and climate 
change 
0.06 
(0.89) 
-0.06 (1.11) 0.5803 
(0.5634) 
 
 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Empirical model specification 
We assume that the indirect utility is a linear function of ecosystem restoration 
attributes, the cost to participants, and selected interactions. First we established an 
unrestricted specification of the utility for a project, as represented below, and 
estimated using a panel mixed logit model11 (Hole, 2008; Haan & Uhlendorff, 2006; 
Train, 2003; Train, 1998; Revelt & Train, 1998) with the pooled data, and then tested 
the parameter restrictions of interest against the unrestricted model. Thus, we defined:  
(3) Vnjt=βSQSQj+βXXnjt+βCostCostnjt+(βHikerSQSQj+βHikerXXnjt+βHikerCostCostnjt)!Hikern  
                                                
11 A Likelihood Ratio (LR) test suggests that a mixed logit model is a better fit than 
the corresponding standard conditional logit model (χ2=439.3132, df=10, p-
value<0.0001). We employed the mixlogit module in Stata (Hole, 2007) to estimate 
our models with “id (participant id)” option to adjust for the potential non-
independence of responses to 14 choice tasks from a survey participant. Only SQj, 
Xnjt, and Costnjt and their interactions with the dummy variable, DP, for a total of 20 
variables, were specified as random variables because the software module cannot 
accommodate all interactions as random variables. Since the focus of our LR test is on 
comparing the significance of coefficients on the SQj, Xnjt, and Costnjt across the rules, 
we treated other interactions as fixed parameters.  
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+(βEduTourSQSQj+βEduTourXXnjt+βEduTourCostCostnjt)!EduTourn+(βDRealSQSQj 
+βDRealX^X^njt+βDRealCostCostnjt)!DRealt+(βSQPSQj+βXPXnjt+βCostPCostnjt)!DP 
+(βHikerSQPSQj+βHikerXPXnjt+βHikerCostPCostnj)!Hikern!DP+(βEduTourSQPSQj 
+βEduTourXPXnjt+βEduTourCostPCostnjt)!EduTourn!DP+(βDRealSQPSQj+βDRealX^PX^njt+
βDRealCostPCostnjt)!DRealt!DP  
where βSQ represents the coefficient measuring the utility of the status quo option 
(SQj); SQj represents a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the status quo option or 
“no action” alternative and the value of 0 for an ecosystem restoration project; βHikerSQ 
βEduTourSQ βDRealSQ adjusts (or adds) the utility of the status quo option due to dummy 
variables “Hikern”, “EduTourn” and “DRealt” for participants under a single decision-
maker’s rule (DP=0); “Hikern” is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for a 
participant who has ranked “hiking” as the most important recreational activity around 
the NROC and a value of 0 otherwise; “EduTourn” is a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 for a participant who has ranked “educational tours” as the most important 
recreational activity around the NROC and a value of 0 otherwise; “DRealt” is a 
dummy variable equals 1 for real, immediately implementable choice task and equal 0 
otherwise; βX represents the vector of coefficients measuring the mean marginal utility 
parameters of non-monetary restoration attributes (Xnjt); Xnjt represents a vector of 
non-monetary attributes of restoration projects; βHikerX βEduTourX adjusts (or adds) the 
fixed marginal utility parameters for the non-monetary restoration attributes due to the 
dummy variables “Hikern”, “EduTourn”; βDRealX  adjust (or adds) the marginal utility 
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parameters for the selected non-monetary restoration attributes (X^njt)12 due to the 
dummy variable “DRealt”; βCost represents the coefficient measuring the mean 
marginal utility parameter of cost to participants (Costnjt; negative of which is known 
as marginal utility of income); Costnjt represents the cost to participants; βHikerCost 
βEduTourCost, βDRealCost adjusts (or adds) the fixed marginal utility parameters to the mean 
marginal utility of the cost to participants (Costnjt) due to the dummy variables 
“Hikern”, “EduTourn” and “DRealt”; DP represents a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 for the subsample of participants making choices under a plurality vote provision 
rule and the value of 0 for the subsample of participants making choices under a single 
decision-maker’s choice provision rule. Our model specification in Eq. (3) sets up the 
base case as the utility under the single decision-maker’s choice rule (DP=0) and the 
corresponding parameters with the last subscript “P” represent the corresponding 
adjustments (additions to the utility parameters) under the plurality vote decision rule 
(DP=1).  
 
                                                
12 Ecosystem restoration attributes defined in Table 1.1 were included in the X^njt, but 
“High_Access”, “Medium_Access”, “Volunteers”, and “High_Success” were 
excluded in the estimation because the levels of these attributes in real, implementable 
ecosystem restoration projects for the 2012 field season were constrained by the 
availability of real-world scenarios, thus creating colinearity. This reality limits our 
ability to compare the utility parameters for these specific attributes across the real, 
implementable and hypothetical choices but does not affect other estimations 
otherwise.     
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1.5.2 Hypothesis test results 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we estimated a panel mixed logit model of the indirect 
utility specification in Eq. (3) from the pooled data and examined the significance of a 
set of parameter restrictions on the unrestricted model using a likelihood ratio (LR) 
test. The LR test failed to reject the null of no significant difference, meaning a set of 
mean utility parameters, i.e., the mean marginal utilities of non-monetary restoration 
attributes, the mean marginal utility of income, and the mean utility of the status quo 
option, are statistically equivalent across the subsamples (across the two workshops) 
(LR Test: βSQP=βXP=βCostP=0; χ2=14.77, df=20, p=0.7894)13. This result suggests that 
the two provision rules produce statistically equivalent underlying preference 
functions.   
 We also conducted a LR test to examine whether the set of fixed marginal 
utility parameters is statistically different for a group of participants characterized by 
different interests or motivations.14 For example, a group of participants who has 
                                                
13 One may question about the “power” of the test in terms of avoiding Type II error. 
Type II error is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis, meaning inability of a 
statistical test to detect the significant effect when, in fact, the difference exists. The 
LR tests reported here are based on the data from 81 individuals each responding to 14 
potentially independent choices, totaling 1134 observations. The authors present the 
results of the tests on the assumption that 1134 observations will be sufficient to detect 
the difference, if there is any, as determining the “power” for already computationally-
complex mixed logit model is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
14 In an effort to identify individuals who might be more or less likely to respond 
strategically to choice opportunities favoring a particular interest, we created one 
additional choice task, the 15th choice task, consisting of the status quo and three 
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ranked “hiking” as the most important recreational activity around the NROC (see 
“Hiker” in Table 1.3) may have a statistically different preference function compared 
to the participants who do not represent that interest or motivation. Also this distinct, 
if any, preference function may be affected by the type of provision rule, such as under 
a plurality vote due to its incentive structure to allow for potential strategic responses. 
Similarly, participants who have ranked “educational tours” as the most important 
activity around NROC may have such strategic motivations to have a distinct 
preference function relative to the participants who do not share those interests or 
motivations (see “EduTour” in Table 1.3), for example, under the plurality vote that 
allows for strategic opportunities as predicted by the theory. We examined whether 
these distinct groups of participants have statistically different functions using a LR 
test by imposing the restrictions on the appropriate interactions in Eq. (3). LR tests 
suggest that none of these distinct groups have statistically different preference 
functions and also these preference functions are statistically equivalent across the 
provision rules (LR Test: βHikerSQ=βHikerX=βHikerCost=βHikerSQP=βHikerXP=βHikerCostP=0;  
χ2=24.3751, df=20, p=0.2264 and LR Test: βEduTourSQ=βEduTourX=βEduTourCost= 
βEduTourSQP=βEduTourXP=βEduTourCostP=0; χ2=13.1761, df=20, p=0.8697). These LR tests 
                                                                                                                                       
restoration projects using a separate orthogonal design. The three restoration projects 
represented a specific focus on the public access, size of candidate sites, and the 
involvement of community members as trained volunteers by allowing the attributes 
indicating these dimensions in options A, B, and C respectively to vary and keeping 
all other attributes, as defined in Table 1.1, constant across the three options. We did 
not find significant results of using participants’ response to this 15th choice task in 
identifying potential strategic voters in our preliminary models and thus these data are 
excluded in the further discussions.     
 42 
 
suggest that these distinct groups of participants, who we expected may have 
statistically different preference functions due to their distinct interests or motivations, 
have statistically equivalent preference functions and further their underlying 
preference functions are not altered by the type of the provision rule. 
 We further examined whether participants’ marginal utility parameters are 
significantly different across the real, implementable and hypothetical choices of 
ecosystem restoration. A LR test implies that participants have statistically equivalent 
marginal utility parameters between the real and hypothetical choices and the type of 
provision rule does not significantly alter these marginal utility parameters (LR Test: 
βDRealSQ=βDRealX^=βDRealCost=βDRealSQP=βDRealX^P=βDRealCostP=0; χ2=9.6117, df=12, p= 
0.6499).    
 Since our empirical model specified the coefficients on the attributes of 
ecosystem restoration (βX, βXP) as well as the coefficient on the cost to participants 
(βCost, βCostP) as random variables, we employed a Monte-Carlo simulation15 to 
estimate the mean marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) values for restoration 
attributes. These values across the decision rules are reported in Table 1.4. We used 
parameter estimates of the unrestricted model presented in Eq. (3) to simulate the 
mWTP distributions. In order to test Hypothesis 2, we conducted pair-wise 
convolution tests (Poe et al., 2005; Poe et al., 1997) to empirically determine the 
significance of the difference in mWTP distributions for restoration attributes across 
the provision rules. mWTP distributions and the results of the pair-wise convolution 
                                                
15 We used simulate command in Stata (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010) to perform Monte-
Carlo simulations with 105 replications. 
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tests are presented in Table 1.4. The results of these tests suggest that mWTP 
distributions for restoration attributes are statistically equivalent across the provision 
rules, implying similar value estimates for restoration attributes across the rules.  
 
Table 1.4 mWTP values for attributes of restoration across the provision rules 
Variablea Provision rules Convolutions 
test (p)c   Single Decision-
Maker’s Choice 
(singleDC)b  
[95% C.I.] 
Plurality vote 
(pVOTE)b  
[95% C.I.] 
High_Effort 79.35 
[77.23, 81.49] 
335.73 
[313.61, 359.95] 
0.4355 
Habitat_Cactus -6.55 
[-6.69, -6.41] 
-28.91 
[-38.07, -20.07] 
0.4861 
Habitat_Ngrass 7.12 
[6.24, 7.99] 
105.11 
[97.43, 113.48] 
0.4032 
High_Access -5.38 
[-7.24, -3.51] 
43.15 
[29.92, 56,73] 
0.4661 
Medium_Access 21.99 
[21.23, 22.75] 
154.54 
[144.01, 166.08] 
0.3992 
Volunteers 78.40 
[76.82, 80.01] 
377.40 
[359.59, 396.83] 
0.378 
High_Success 83.26 
[81.12, 85.42] 
591.45 
[561.32, 624.61] 
0.3695 
Size 23.77 
[23.11, 24.45] 
101.76 
[96.01, 108.04] 
0.4243 
amWTP for a variable is calculated as the ratio of the mean marginal utility of that 
variable (i.e., βX) and the marginal utility of income (βCost multiplied by -1). The mean 
marginal utility for a continuous variable is the estimated coefficient on that variable 
using the indirect utility in Eq. (3). For dummy or effects-coded variables, it is the 
difference in the utility of altering an attribute from the level represented by the 
omitted and the base category to the level represented by the particular dummy and 
effects-coded variable respectively. Table 1.1 defines these variables. 
 
bThese values were calculated by using simulation in Stata’s (version 12)  “simulate” 
module. The simulated WTP distributions were obtained by dividing draws from the 
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corresponding non-monetary restoration attribute (normal distribution assumed) by 
draws from the distribution of the “Cost” coefficient (log-normal distribution 
assumed) with 105 replications. 95% confidence interval of the mWTP distributions 
are reported in squared brackets and were calculated using Krinsky & Robb (1986) 
method.  
 
cP-values from the Convolutions test for difference in mWTP distributions across the 
rules, i.e., Ho: mWTPXsingleDC = mWTPXpVOTE, where mWTPXsingleDC is mWTP 
distribution for an attribute X for the subsample of participants facing the choices with 
the single decision-maker’s choice rule (DP=0) and  mWTPXpVOTE is the 
corresponding mWTP distribution under the plurality vote rule (DP=1). 
 
1.5.3 Panel mixed logit model results  
The estimation results of the panel mixed logit model of the utility model specification 
in Eq. (3) are presented in Manuscript 1-Appendix A.4. Table 1.5 reports the restricted 
model after imposing restrictions on statistically insignificant interactions, 
i.e.,βHikerSQ=βHikerX=βHikerCost=βHikerSQP=βHikerXP=βHikerCostP=βEduTourSQ=βEduTourX 
=βEduTourCost=βEduTourSQP=βEduTourXP=βEduTourCostP=βDRealSQ=βDRealX^=βDRealCost=βDRealSQP=
βDRealX^P=βDRealCostP=0. The estimation results (in Table 1.5) show that the status quo 
option, on average, decreases participants’ utility, all other things holding fixed (when 
DP=0).  Participants have a significant positive marginal utility of income (see Cost in 
Table 1.5), meaning the more costly an ecosystem restoration project becomes, the 
lower will be participants’ utility, all other things holding constant (when DP=0). A 
high level of restoration effort, medium level of public access, involving trained 
volunteers in restoration projects, high likelihood of success of restoration projects, 
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and the size of the restoration sites all significantly increased participants’ utility and 
high significance on the corresponding standard deviation (SD) estimates suggest 
heterogeneity in preferences in relation to these attributes (Table 1.5) (when DP=0). 
However, the corresponding adjustments (or additions) to the mean marginal utility 
parameters for participants facing choices under the plurality vote are not statistically 
significant when DP=1. 
 
Table 1.5 Panel mixed logit model results 
Variable Coefficient  
(se) [p-value] 
Std. Dev.  
(se of Std. Dev.) [p-value] 
Random parameters 
  SQ (n) -1.4346  (0.6443)  [0.026] 2.3307  (0.4629)  [0.0001] 
  High_Effort (n) 1.3392  (0.2785)  [0.0001] 1.1588  (0.2343)  [0.0001] 
  Habitat_Cactus (n) -0.1106  (0.1197)  [0.355] 0.0649  (0.1364)  [0.634] 
  Habitat_Ngrass (n) 0.1201  (0.1749)  [0.492] -0.5836  (0.1810) [0.001] 
  High_Access (n) -0.0906  (0.2530)  [0.72] 1.2508  (0.1683)  [0.0001] 
  Medium_Access (n) 0.3711  (0.1575)  [0.018] 0.4486  (0.1560)  [0.004] 
  Volunteers (n) 1.3234  (0.2732)  [0.0001] 0.6737  (0.2447)  [0.006] 
  High_Success (n) 1.4053  (0.3322)  [0.0001] 1.1311  (0.2212)  [0.0001] 
  Size (n) 0.4013  (0.1032)  [0.0001] 0.3712  (0.0957)  [0.001] 
  Costa   -0.0279  (0.0058)  [0.0001] 0.0225  (0.0037)  [0.0001] 
  SQ!DP (n) -1.6581  (1.1274)  [0.141] 5.1163  (0.7086)  [0.0001] 
  High_Effort!DP (n) 0.2006  (0.4057)  [0.621] 1.2111  (0.3531)  [0.001] 
  Habitat_Cactus!DP (n) -0.0220  (0.2102)  [0.917] 0.8352  (0.1864)  [0.497] 
  Habitat_Ngrass!DP (n) 0.3621  (0.2745)  [0.187] 0.2006  (0.2129)  [0.346] 
  High_Access!DP (n) 0.2884  (0.3349)  [0.389] 0.0477  (0.2847)  [0.867] 
  Medium_Access!DP (n) 0.3379  (0.2371)  [0.154] 0.6798  (0.1804)  [0.0001] 
  Volunteers!DP (n) 0.4081  (0.3767)  [0.279] 0.3463  (0.2488)  [0.164] 
  High_Success!DP (n) 1.3080  (0.8723)  [0.134] 1.2203  (0.3401)  [0.0001] 
  Size!DP (n) 0.0655  (0.1451)  [0.652] 0.0214  (0.0944)  [0.821] 
  Cost!DPa   -0.0004  (0.0084)  [0.967] 0.0601  (0.0079)  [0.0001] 
Model statistics  
  Number of observations 3402 
  Number of participants  81 
  Number of parameters 40 
  Log-likelihood (LL) -734.10824 
  AIC 1548.216 
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  BIC 1793.501 
  Wald χ2, 20 df (p) 541.41 (p<0.0001) 
aThe reported values are parameters (mean and sd) of the underlying normal 
distributions of log-normally distributed cost variables.  
1.5.4 Additional analysis   
Table 1.6 presents follow-up questions asked to participants about how they responded 
to choices of ecosystem restoration projects. Results suggest that participants thought 
the choices were somewhat difficult and were “almost always” to “often times” 
relevant to their concerns about the management of the NROC’s conservation lands. 
More than 85% of participants in both subsamples thought that their responses were 
never influenced by their perception about what others in the room (the corresponding 
experiment group) would do. More than 75% of participants in both subsamples 
responded that the proportion of implementable choices presented to them influenced 
their responses from “occasionally” to “never at all”. More than 70% of participants in 
both subsamples responded that their responses were never influenced by the 
corresponding provision rule used to determine the restoration projects for 
implementation. Although the follow-up questions may not be incentive compatible, 
these results also indicate that the participants’ responses to restoration choices were 
neither influenced by the corresponding provision rule used nor by participants’ 
perception about what other participants in the group would do.  
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Table 1.6 Responses to follow up questions across the provision rules 
 
How often did you feel 
that… 
Degree to which participants perceived each of the 
statements belowa 
[% pVOTE participants] {% singleDC participants} 
Almost 
always 
(%) 
Very 
often 
(%) 
Often 
times  
(%) 
Occasionally 
(%) 
Never at 
al (%) 
(1) …the choice questions 
were difficult? 
 [2.33]  
{2.63} 
[13.95] 
{7.89} 
[18.60] 
{26.32} 
[55.81] 
{47.37} 
[9.30] 
{15.79} 
(2) …the choice questions 
were relevant to your 
concerns about the 
management of the NROC 
conservation lands? 
[27.91]  
{36.84} 
 
[37.21]  
{28.95} 
[25.58] 
{21.05} 
[9.30] 
{10.53} 
[0.00] 
{2.63} 
(3) …your responses to 
the choice questions were 
influenced by the 
perception about what 
others in the room would 
do? 
[2.33]  
{0.00} 
[2.33]  
{0.00} 
 
[0.00] 
{2.63} 
[9.30] 
{0.00} 
[86.05] 
{97.37} 
(4) …your responses to 
the choice questions were 
influenced by the fact that 
only a proportion of the 
choice questions is a pool 
of feasible choices for 
implementation in 2012? 
[4.65]  
{2.63} 
[2.33]  
{15.79} 
[16.28] 
{2.63} 
[37.21] 
{10.53} 
[39.53] 
{68.42} 
(5) …your responses to 
the choice questions were 
influenced by the fact that 
the group outcome 
tonight, from all feasible 
choices, will be 
determined by  randomly 
chosen decision-maker’s 
choice on randomly 
selected feasible choice 
question ? (Emphasis in 
original)b 
[0.00]  
{2.63} 
[2.33]  
{2.63} 
[6.98] 
{2.63} 
[13.95] 
{18.42} 
[76.74] 
{73.68} 
aWe conducted chi-squared test of independence between the responses of participants 
to these qualitative attitude statements across the subsamples (DP=1,0) and found no 
significant difference on above statements except for the (4th) statement above 
(Pearson χ2=17.25, df=4, p=0.002). 
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bThe emphasized text (bold and underlined) was replaced by “the majority vote on 
randomly selected feasible choice question”  in the survey booklet that included the 
plurality vote provision rule. 
 
1.6 Conclusions and implications 
In this paper, we empirically examined how incentives presented through including 
provision rules in consequential discrete choice experiments affect the responses to the 
valuation questions. Using a split sample approach, we compared the marginal utilities 
and mWTP values for ecosystem restoration attributes focused on non-native plants 
management in the NROC under two alternative provision rules: a single decision-
maker’s choice and a plurality vote. A single decision-maker’s choice has been well 
established as an incentive compatible provision rule, whereas a plurality vote is 
generally not an incentive compatible provision rule for three-option choice situations. 
We employed consequential DCE surveys, designed to assess values of ecosystem 
restoration focused on non-native plants management, which involved direct financial 
consequences for participants, resulting in actual implementation of ecosystem 
restoration projects. A panel mixed logit model suggests that marginal utility 
parameters and mWTP estimates for restoration attributes are statistically equivalent 
across the provision rules.  
Of few previous studies that examined provision rules in a DCE study, Collins 
& Vossler (2009) examined provision rules using two-alternative and three-alternative 
choice situations in a laboratory experimental setting and found more deviations from 
induced preferences for two-alternative choices and for alternatives to a single 
plurality vote as compared to results under the rule in which the outcome was 
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determined by both participants and “regulator” votes. They also found a statistically 
significant but modest degree of bias towards selecting the status-quo option. While 
the results of no significant difference in marginal utility parameters and mWTP 
estimates for restoration attributes across the provision rules, irrespective of theoretical 
incentive compatibility properties, are consistent with Taylor et al. (2010) and Vossler 
et al. (2012), this study expands the result to the trichotomous choice experiment, 
which is widely used in environmental valuation research.  In stated preferences 
studies, the trichotomous format has likely been the most common choice experiment 
format, and it has been favored because it focuses respondents’ attention on the need 
to make tradeoffs across attributes in various scenarios (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 
2000). Our results here suggest that the absence of incentive compatibility in 
trichotomous choice questions may not be a caveat of concern in such stated 
preference studies generally. Our descriptive results on the follow-up questions also 
suggested that more than two-thirds of participants stated that their decisions were 
neither influenced by their perception about what others in the group would do nor by 
the corresponding provision rule used, although there is no way to ensure incentive 
properties of the responses to these perception statements. Yet these self-reported 
perceptions are consistent with our preference model results.   
Although participants in our focus group discussions expressed and indicated 
some degree of interest or motivation towards specific aspects or dimensions of 
ecosystem restoration in the NROC, which led us to hypothesize the potential 
existence of strategic voting behavior in the field experiments, we did not find 
evidence of the existence of any such behavior. We may not have a clear 
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understanding on why participants did not seem to behave strategically as predicted by 
the theory under a plurality vote rule, although the strategic motivations may come out 
sharply when the participants have highly polarized views, politically motivated or 
otherwise, on the public goods under consideration, as noted by Vossler et al. (2012). 
Although the attributes included in the restoration choices represented different 
aspects or dimensions of restoration efforts and were explained clearly in the 
presentation, the strategic effect or bias in case of a novel choice situation may be 
arguably a second-order effect and may require higher-level think. The relevance of 
strategic effect or bias may depend on the level of familiarity of the good and the 
choice setting. Such consideration could explain the outcome from our field 
experiment that suggests participants in a three-option choice experiment may 
nonetheless make choices in a manner that is statistically equivalent to a choice model 
estimated from data produced in an incentive compatible setting. Our results also may 
support the idea of “cognitive dissonance” as suggested by Akerlof and Dickens 
(1982), a behavior by which individuals facing complex and somewhat unfamiliar 
choices may adopt a truth-telling strategy rather than risking sending misleading 
signals that may harm the individual’s self-interest.  
Furthermore, we found no significant difference in the marginal utilities of 
restoration attributes between potentially implementable, real choice tasks and 
hypothetical choice tasks, meaning results suggest that participants treated the 
attributes between real, implementable and hypothetical choices equivalently. This 
result contrasts with previous empirical results of significantly higher WTP estimates 
from hypothetical payment compared to real payment situations. This finding may be 
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related to spillover effects (Cherry, Crocker, & Shogren, 2003) from real, 
implementable choices to the hypothetical choices, suggesting that a mixed survey 
involving at least some real choices might deserve consideration when stated 
preference researchers have an opportunity to use at least some consequential 
scenarios.  This approach is analogous to past efforts to integrate revealed and stated 
preferences (e.g., Adamowicz, Louviere, & Williams, 1994), by using the availability 
of real choice scenarios to establish a consequential context for survey participants 
while using hypothetical scenarios to expand the range and mix of attributes evaluated.  
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MANUSCRIPT 1–APPENDIX A 
This appendix provides details about the experimental design of ecosystem restoration 
choices, background presentation for field experiments participants, a sample survey 
booklet and estimation results of the unrestricted model. 
 
A1. Efficient experimental design of ecosystem restoration choices 
 Our efficient experimental design utilized both real-world scenarios of candidate 
restoration projects provided by the experts from NROC and IRC as well as the 
hypothetical combinations of levels of ecosystem restoration attributes presented in 
Table 1.1. We employed d-efficiency measure in Ngene 1.1 to produce the following 
restoration choices for our field experiments.       
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1.  Project A Low Cactus 1 acre Medium No High 40 
     Project B Low Coastal Sage 2 acres High No High 90 
2.  Project A Low Cactus 1 acre Medium No High 40 
     Project B Low Coastal Sage 2 acres High No High 90 
3.  Project A Low Native Grassland 3 acres Medium Yes Medium 60 
     Project B High Cactus Scrub 2 acres Low Yes High 75 
4.  Project A Low Coastal Sage 1 acre Medium No High 110 
     Project B High Cactus Scrub 1 acre Low Yes High 110 
5.  Project A Low Native Grassland 3 acres Medium Yes Medium 60 
     Project B High Cactus Scrub 2 acres Low Yes High 105 
6.  Project A High Cactus Scrub 1 acre Low Yes High 105 
     Project B Low Coastal Sage 1 acre High No High 90 
7.  Project A High Coastal Sage 9 acres Low No High 110 
     Project B Low Cactus Scrub 3 acres High Yes Medium 40 
8.  Project A Low Coastal Sage 3 acres Medium Yes Medium 110 
     Project B High Naïve Grassland 3 acres Low No High 40 
9.  Project A Low Native Grassland 2 acres Low No Medium 110 
     Project B High Coastal Sage 2 acres  High Yes High 40 
10. Project A High Coastal Sage 5 acres Low Yes Medium 75 
      Project B Low Cactus Scrub 9 acres High No High 110 
11. Project A High Native Grassland 9 acres High No Medium 110 
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      Project B Low Cactus Scrub 7 acres Medium Yes High 60 
12. Project A Low Native Grassland 5 acres Low Yes High 105 
      Project B High Cactus Scrub 1 acre Medium No High 60 
13. Project A Low Coastal Sage 7 acres Low No Medium 110 
      Project B High Native Grassland 7 acres Medium Yes High 40 
14. Project A Low Cactus Scrub 5 acres High Yes Medium 90 
      Project B High Coastal Sage 5 acres Medium No High 60 
      
  Please note that Design Question # 1-6 represent immediately implementable 
restoration choices (or ‘real’ scenarios explicitly labeled as “Feasible, potentially 
implementable projects, Choice-L” where L represents one of the letters- P, Q, R, X, 
Y, and Z respectively) whereas the remaining 8 combinations (Design Question # 7-
14) represent future restoration projects (or ‘hypothetical’ scenarios). In order to avoid 
potential order effects, two groups (first group- Design Question # 12, 1, 13, 3, 9, 4, 
14 and the second group- Design Question # 8, 6, 7, 2, 10, 5, 11) of 7 choice questions 
were blocked into two orders- the first group followed by the second group and the 
vice versa. Each participant was randomly assigned to a survey booklet consisting of 
only one of the two orders.  
 
A2. Background presentation to field experiment participants 
In order to present participants with same set of information on the ecosystem 
restoration in the NROC, inform about what they will be asked to do, and how their 
decisions or choices influence the outcomes (or which ecosystem restoration projects 
get implemented on the ground), the experiment moderator used the following 
PowerPoint presentation slides.  
 In Slide # 2, the experiment moderator briefly discussed the broader goals of 
the project entitled “Orange County Invasive Management (OCIM)” and introduced 
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this component of the OCIM called “Ecosystem Auctions for Decision Support 
(EADS)” and its main objectives. The moderator gave an overview of major activities 
under the OCIM and briefly introduced about the science of ecosystem restoration 
through the removal or management of invasive plants in slides # 3-8. The remaining 
slides were designed to provide participants with information on the content of the 
survey, description of the ecosystem restoration attributes, example choice question, 
and how their responses determine the outcomes of the workshops or the 
corresponding provision rule.  
The presentation also made clear that each participant was provided with a 
personal budget of $150 of which $40 was guaranteed as the participation fee and the 
participants could decide whether they want to spend the remaining $110 on the 
ecosystem restoration projects of their choice or take home for their other priorities 
more important than the restoration efforts in the NROC. Participants were also 
encouraged to consider their decisions carefully regarding what their personal values 
and priorities are, what each project can or can not accomplish, how it matters to them 
and whether it is worth the money they pay for the projects while making choices or 
decisions. The moderator tried to keep the information and content of the description 
as similar as possible across the two groups. The only difference in the background 
presentation across the groups of participants was the description of the corresponding 
provision rule for each night as shown in slide # 20. The example slides shown below 
were presented for the participants’ group that considered single decision-maker’s 
choice provision rule.   
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A3. A sample survey booklet (Single Decision-Maker’s Choice) 
The content of the survey was exactly same across the subsamples except the 
description of the corresponding provision rule and necessary corrections accordingly.  
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Section 2: Ecosystem Restoration Choices 
For choice questions in this section, you will make a series of decisions, choosing 
between ecosystem restoration projects that differ in levels of restoration effort, native 
habitat and bird species focus, size (acreage), public access and involvement of 
volunteers, likelihood of success and cost to you. Within each choice question, you 
may choose to contribute to one of restoration projects, Projects A or B, or you may 
choose Project C, which is the “no action” option. Your task in each question is to 
choose the project you prefer most, based on your personal preferences or 
priorities and how your choices could influence the group outcome.  
 
For each of the choice questions in this section, each participant will be given a 
personal budget of $150 to contribute a portion of it to the restoration project of his 
or her choice and a portion he or she keeps for other priorities. The “Cost to you” 
attribute describes what you would need to contribute from your personal budget of 
$150 if the group outcome at the end of tonight is the project described. The overall 
cost of the project will be covered by contributions from the group and our grant 
budget. Recall that any money you keep can be used for other personal priorities, 
including family expenses, gifts, donations to conservation or important charities, or 
any other purpose. "  Please check this box. 
 
Section 2.1: Determining the group outcome at the end of tonight’ 
workshop 
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one choice question 
number will be selected randomly from the group of choice questions labeled as 
“Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-…..”. One Survey 
ID number will also be selected randomly. The project, chosen by the person 
holding the randomly selected Survey ID number on the randomly selected 
choice question, will be chosen as the group outcome of tonight’s decisions and will 
be implemented in this (2012/13) NROC field season. Your payment will be 
determined based on the group outcome chosen according to randomly chosen 
single decision-maker’s choice as described above. 
 
Please read the instructions carefully before making any decision. It is very important 
that you understand the instructions to make informed decisions. If you have any 
questions as we proceed through this session, please do not talk to your friends or 
neighbors. Rather, please raise your hand so that the workshop moderator can come to 
you and address your question.   
 
 
Section 2.2: Example Choice Question 
Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, B, and C, how 
would you choose? 
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Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
2 acres 3 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / or 
surrounded by mixed native-
nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $110, from my $150. I will pay $60, from my 
$150. 
I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose  
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose  
 PROJECT C 
 
 
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one question number 
among choice questions labeled as “Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 
2012-Choice….” will be selected randomly. Suppose, the example question above is 
chosen by this random process. One Survey ID number will also be selected 
randomly. Suppose, your Survey ID number was selected by this random process. 
Suppose you chose Project A. In this scenario, project A will be chosen as the group 
outcome for implementation in this (2012/2013) NROC field season as it is chosen by 
the person holding the randomly selected Survey ID number on the randomly 
selected choice question.  You will get paid $40 ($150-$110) as Project A was chosen 
as the group outcome. 
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Note: We will not reveal the person whose Survey ID number is chosen. After all 
surveys are collected, we will randomly choose the Survey ID number. Then we will 
ask for 3 volunteers to help us find the correct Survey ID number and the choice 
recorded on the randomly chosen feasible choice question of that Survey ID. Then 
we will announce the result. We request that you do not show or talk about your 
Survey ID number to others in the room. 
 
Section 2.3: Economic Choice Questions 
 
We provide you a personal budget of $150 with which to make decisions in each 
choice question below, and we ask that you decide on contributing a portion of this 
to the restoration project of your choice and a portion you keep. Please recall that 
the group outcome of all these choices for tonight will be based on random selection 
of a choice question among choice questions labeled as  “Feasible, potentially 
implementable projects in 2012-Choice….” and the randomly chosen single 
decision maker’s choice on the selected random question as described above. We 
request that you consider restoration projects in each choice question in terms of what 
each project might or might not accomplish, how it matters to you, whether it is 
worth the money cost to you, and how your choice might influence the group 
outcome for tonight. Please recall money not spent on these projects may be used by 
you at home for other priority expenses or charities. "  Please check this box. 
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Question 1. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
3 acres 5 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / or 
surrounded by mixed native-
nonnative landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $60, from my $150. I will pay $110, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Feasible, potentially implementable 
projects in 2012, Choice-P 
 
Question 2. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
1 acre 2 acres 
 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible. 
 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $40, from my $150. I will pay $90, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Question 3. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Size of 
Restoration 
7 acres 7 acres 
 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $40, from my $150. I will pay $110, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Feasible, potentially implementable 
projects in 2012, Choice-R 
 
Question 4. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
3 acres 2 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $60, from my $150. I will pay $75, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Question 5. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat 
and Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
2 acres 2 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / or 
surrounded by mixed native-
nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to 
You 
I will pay $110, from my $150. I will pay $40, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Feasible, potentially implementable 
projects in 2012, Choice-X 
 
Question 6. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
1 acre 1 acre 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $110, from my 
$150. 
I will pay $110, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Question 7. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
5 acres 5 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated 
areas for dogs and horse-
back riding when 
ecologically feasible 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and mountain 
biking 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $90, from my $150. I will pay $60, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Question 8. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Size of 
Restoration 
3 acres 3 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $110, from my 
$150. 
I will pay $40, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Feasible, potentially implementable 
projects in 2012, Choice-Z 
 
Question 9. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
1 acre 1 acre 
 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible 
 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $105, from my 
$150. 
I will pay $90, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Question 10. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
9 acres 3 acres 
 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible 
 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / or 
surrounded by mixed native-
nonnative landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $110, from my 
$150. 
I will pay $40, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Feasible, potentially implementable 
projects in 2012, Choice-Q 
 
Question 11. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
1 acre 2 acres 
 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible 
 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition 
to restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $40, from my $150. I will pay $110, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
 
 
Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-Q 
 
 
 81 
 
 
Question 12. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration in Coastal Sage 
Scrub, supports California 
Gnatcatcher 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
5 acres 9 acres 
 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking, mountain 
biking, with designated areas 
for dogs and horse-back 
riding when ecologically 
feasible 
 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $75, from my $150. I will pay $110, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Feasible, potentially implementable 
projects in 2012, Choice-Y 
 
Question 13. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than 
paying my cost 
for either Project 
A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
3 acres 2 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Area allows access for 
research with permits and 
guided tours only 
Trained 
Volunteers 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / 
or surrounded by mixed 
native-nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $60, from my $150. I will pay $105, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Question 14. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, 
B, and C, how would you choose? 
 
Project 
Attributes 
Project A Project B Project C 
 
 
 
 
 
Restoration 
Effort 
        
 
      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither of these 
projects.  
I choose to keep 
my $150 for my 
other priorities 
rather than paying 
my cost for either 
Project A or B. 
Habitat and 
Bird 
Species 
Focus 
Restoration to Native 
Grassland, needed to support 
other native wildlife 
Restoration in Cactus Scrub, 
supports Cactus Wren, and 
often California 
Gnatcatcher 
Size of 
Restoration 
9 acres 7 acres 
Public 
Access 
Area allows access for running, 
hiking, mountain biking, with 
designated areas for dogs and 
horse-back riding when 
ecologically feasible 
Area allows access for 
running, hiking and 
mountain biking 
Trained 
Volunteers 
No, project does not involve 
trained volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Yes, project involves trained 
volunteers in addition to 
restoration professionals 
Likelihood 
of Success 
Medium due to moderate 
access for maintenance and / or 
surrounded by mixed native-
nonnative landscape 
High due to easy access for 
maintenance and / or 
surrounded by native 
landscape 
Cost to You I will pay $110, from my $150. I will pay $60, from my $150. I keep my $150. 
HOW 
WOULD 
YOU 
CHOOSE? 
(CHOOSE 
ONLY 
ONE) 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT A 
 
"  
I choose  
PROJECT B 
 
"  
I choose 
 PROJECT C 
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Section 2.4: Follow-Up on Ecosystem Restoration Choices 
Please indicate, by placing (X) under the column, the degree to which you 
perceived each of the statements below. 
 
Please rank the following project attributes, that influenced your choices or 
decisions most. Please put “1” for most influential and “7” for least influential to 
you and so on. 
 
1. Restoration Effort    ……………. 
2. Habitat and Bird Species Focus ……………. 
3. Size of Restoration   ……………. 
4. Public Access    ……………. 
5. Trained Volunteers   ……………. 
6. Likelihood of Success  ……………. 
7. Cost to You    ……………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How often did you feel that… 
A
lm
os
t 
al
w
ay
s 
V
er
y 
of
te
n 
O
fte
n 
tim
es
 
O
cc
as
io
na
lly
 
N
ev
er
 a
t a
ll 
the choice questions were difficult?      
the choice questions were relevant to 
your concerns about management of the 
NROC conservation lands? 
     
your responses to the choice questions 
were influenced by your perception 
about what others in the room would do?  
     
your responses to the choice questions 
were influenced by the fact that only a 
proportion of the choice questions is a 
pool of feasible choices for 
implementation in 2012? 
     
your responses to the choice questions 
were influenced by the fact that the 
group outcome for tonight,  from all 
feasible, choices  will be determined by 
randomly chosen decision-maker’s 
choice on randomly selected feasible 
choice question ? 
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Section 3.0: About your background 
 
This section is to help us understand our participants’ characteristics. These questions 
are also very important to us for interpreting and predicting our results out of sample, 
in order to help this research better benefit everyone in society. Recall, after the 
session ends, we will never link you to your answers and all information will be kept 
strictly confidential.  
 
1. What is your gender?   Male  Female 
2. How long have you been lived around Orange County? …………….years 
3. Do you own or rent your primary residence?   Own 
 Rent 
4. What is your highest level of education?  
a. High school or less 
b. Bachelor’s degree or some college 
c. Graduate degree (Masters or Ph.D.) or some graduate school 
5. What type of recreational activity, if any, are you engaged in around NROC? 
Rank recreational activity below in order of importance to you. Please put “1” 
for the most important, “7” for least important, and so on. (Put “N/A” if you 
don’t do the activity) 
a. Mountain biking    ……………. 
b. Horse-back riding    ……………. 
c. Walking with leashed dogs   ……………. 
d. Running     ……………. 
e. Hiking      ……………. 
f. Educational tours 
g. Other; please describe…………………………… 
6. With which of the following groups, if any, are you most closely affiliated 
(Circle One)?  
a. Irvine Ranch Conservancy (IRC) 
b. Back to NativesRESTORATION  
c. Laguna Greenbelt 
d. Newport Bay Conservancy 
e. Laguna Canyon Foundation 
f. Friends of Harbor, Beaches and Parks 
g. Sea and Sage Audubon Society 
h. Other ………………………………. 
7. In most years do you donate money to an environmental group? 
a. Yes ⇒  approximately how much do you donate in total each year? 
 $……………. 
b. No 
8. Have you ever participated in any ecosystem restoration projects voluntarily or 
otherwise? 
a. Yes ⇒  approximately how many days per year?  …………….days 
b. No 
9. What category best describes your annual household income before taxes? 
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a. <$25,000 
b. $25,000-$50,000 
c. $50,000-$75,000 
d. $75,000-$100,000 
e. $100,000-$150,000 
f. > $150,000 
 
Thank you for participating in the economic choices of ecosystem restoration for 
environmental decision-making. We appreciate your valuable time and input to 
this project. Please add any additional comments you may have.  
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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A4. Unrestricted mixed logit model of the utility specification in Eq. (3) 
 
Variable Coefficient  
(se) [p] 
Std. Dev.  
(se of Std. Dev.) [p] 
Non-random parameters 
Base parameters (βHikerSQ, βHikerX, βHikerCost) when Hiker=1 and DP=0  
  SQ!Hiker  0.1684 (1.5248) [0.912] 
 
N/A 
  High_Effort!Hiker 1.3420 (0.7355) [0.068] N/A 
  Habitat_Cactus!Hiker -0.3071 (0.3751) [0.413] N/A 
  Habitat_Ngrass!Hiker 0.4223 (0.5015) [0.4] N/A 
  High_Access!Hiker 0.3213 (0.6263) [0.608] N/A 
  Medium_Access!Hiker 0.1363 (0.4039) [0.736] N/A 
  Volunteers!Hiker 0.0895 (0.6782) [0.895] N/A 
  High_Success!Hiker 1.6809 (0.9064) [0.064] N/A 
  Size!Hiker 0.8976 (0.2648)  [0.001] N/A 
  Cost!Hiker 0.0046 (0.0158) [0.769] N/A 
Additions to base parameters (βHikerSQP, βHikerXP, βHikerCostP) when Hiker=1 and DP=1  
  SQ!Hiker  1.7695 (1.9715) [0.369] N/A 
  High_Effort!Hiker -0.1695 (1.2993) [0.896] N/A 
  Habitat_Cactus!Hiker 1.3894 (0.5496) [0.011] N/A 
  Habitat_Ngrass!Hiker -1.2465 (0.8078) [0.123] N/A 
  High_Access!Hiker -0.1395 (0.8423) [0.868] N/A 
  Medium_Access!Hiker 0.3239 (0.6029) [0.591] N/A 
  Volunteers!Hiker 1.2759 (0.9988) [0.201] N/A 
  High_Success!Hiker -2.7282 (1.4033) [0.052] N/A 
  Size!Hiker -0.7290 (0.3351) [0.03] N/A 
  Cost!Hiker 0.0013 (0.0205) [0.951] N/A 
Base parameters (βEduTourSQ, βEduTourX, βEduTourCost) when EduTour=1 and DP=0  
  SQ!EduTour  -2.5629 (1.3338) [0.055] N/A 
  High_Effort!EduTour 0.7867 (0.7351) [0.285] N/A 
  Habitat_Cactus!EduTour -0.0739 (0.3899) [0.85] N/A 
  Habitat_Ngrass!EduTour 0.2304 (0.4806) [0.632] N/A 
  High_Access! EduTour -0.3844 (0.5469) [0.482] N/A 
  Medium_Access! EduTour -0.5687 (0.4042) [0.159] N/A 
  Volunteers! EduTour -1.0234 (0.6980) [0.143] N/A 
  High_Success! EduTour -0.1108 (0.7248) [0.878] N/A 
  Size! EduTour 0.2024 (0.2321) [0.383] N/A 
  Cost! EduTour -0.0138 (0.0133) [0.299] N/A 
Additions to base parameters (βEduTourSQP, βEduTourXP, βEduTourCostP) when EduTour=1 and 
DP=1  
  SQ!EduTour!DP  3.9187 (2.3669) [0.098] N/A 
  High_Effort! EduTour!DP -0.0884 (1.1079) [0.936] N/A 
  Habitat_Cactus! EduTour!DP 0.2199 (0.5873) [0.708] N/A 
  Habitat_Ngrass! EduTour!DP 0.6128 (0.9394) [0.514] N/A 
 88 
 
  High_Access! EduTour!DP 0.0651 (0.7613) [0.932] N/A 
  Medium_Access! EduTour!DP 0.3955 (0.7126) [0.579] N/A 
  Volunteers! EduTour!DP -0.5968 (1.0283) [0.562] N/A 
  High_Success! EduTour!DP -0.3835 (1.1938) [0.748] N/A 
  Size! EduTour!DP -0.2046 (0.3374) [0.544] N/A 
  Cost! EduTour!DP -0.0161 (0.0200) [0.42] N/A 
Base parameters (βDRealSQ, βDRealX^, βDRealCost) when DReal=1 and DP=0  
  SQ!DReal  -0.9596 (2.3199) [0.679] N/A 
  High_Effort!DReal 0.1369 (2.0957) [0.948] N/A 
  Habitat_Cactus!DReal -0.8039 (1.1180) [0.472] N/A 
  Habitat_Ngrass!DReal 0.5886 (1.2855) [0.647] N/A 
  Size!DReal 0.4940 (0.7501) [0.51] N/A 
  Cost!DReal -0.0259 (0.0220) [0.238] N/A 
Additions to base parameters (βDRealSQP, βDRealX^P, βDRealCostP) when DReal=1 and DP=1  
  SQ!DReal!DP  2.6022 (3.4962) [0.457] N/A 
  High_Effort!DReal!DP -0.6749 (3.0820) [0.827] N/A 
  Habitat_Cactus!DReal!DP 1.6147 (1.6913) [0.34] N/A 
  Habitat_Ngrass!DReal!DP -1.4263 (1.8915) [0.451] N/A 
  Size!DReal!DP 0.2434 (1.1267) [0.829] N/A 
  Cost!DReal!DP 0.0387 (0.0328) [0.237] N/A 
Random parameters 
  SQ (n) -1.2403 (1.4384) [0.389] 2.7863 (0.4298) [0.0001] 
  High_Effort (n) 1.1470 (0.5712) [0.045] 1.5481 (0.3191) [0.0001] 
  Habitat_Cactus (n) 0.3717 (0.4507) [0.41] -0.5986 (0.2683) [0.026] 
  Habitat_Ngrass (n) -0.4455 (0.5229) [0.394] 0.9866 (0.3083)[0.001] 
  High_Access (n) 0.1896 (0.5036) [0.707] 1.7918 (0.3364) [0.0001] 
  Medium_Access (n) 0.3936 (0.4377) [0.369] -0.9079 (0.2494) [0.0001] 
  Volunteers (n) 2.2449 (0.6344)[0.0001] -1.1389 (0.2921) [0.0001] 
  High_Success (n) 1.8765 (0.7505) [0.012] 1.7229 (0.3854) [0.0001] 
  Size (n) -0.0199 (0.2265) [0.93] 0.2407 (0.0698) [0.001] 
  Costa -0.0253 (0.0143) [0.078] 0.0380 (0.0057) [0.0001] 
  SQ!DP  -2.4774 (2.2896) [0.279] -4.8679 (0.8065) [0.0001] 
  High_Effort!DP (n) -0.0721 (0.8653) [0.934] -1.0598 (0.3178) [0.001] 
  Habitat_Cactus!DP (n) -1.2293 (0.6995) [0.079] 0.2388 (0.3514) [0.497] 
  Habitat_Ngrass!DP (n) 1.4158 (0.8413) [0.092] -1.0701 (0.3535) [0.002] 
  High_Access!DP (n) 0.5819 (0.7461) [0.435] 1.3096 (0.3011) [0.0001] 
  Medium_Access!DP (n) -0.0033 (0.6822) [0.996] -1.1762 (0.2430) [0.0001] 
  Volunteers!DP (n) -0.2823 (0.8455) [0.738] 
 
0.2484 (0.1080) [0.664] 
  High_Success!DP (n) 1.9599 (1.3949) [0.16] 3.7768 (0.8078) [0.0001] 
  Size!DP (n) 0.6063 (0.3777) [0.108] 0.1674 (0.0681) [0.014] 
  Cost!DPa -0.0188 (0.0223) [0.398] 0.0464 (0.0069) [0.0001] 
Model statistics 
Number of observations 3402 
Number of participants  81 
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Log-likelihood (LL) -710.17241 
AIC 1604.345 
BIC 2168.5 
Wald χ2, 20 df (p) 522.54 (p<0.0001) 
aThe reported values are parameters (mean and sd) of the underlying normal 
distributions of log-normally distributed cost variables. 
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2.1 Abstract  
The Discrete choice experiment (DCE) method often asks survey participants a series 
of choice tasks to elicit values for multi-attribute environmental goods and services. 
Asking a repeated sequence reduces data collection cost because the cost of recruiting 
the participants is high and getting more data from each person is cost effective. 
Although the repeated choice format increases the preference information obtained 
from each survey participant, the stated preference literature raises questions, in theory 
and with empirical evidence, of order effects regarding the truthfulness and thus 
usefulness of such additional preference information, and to what extent these 
concerns affect the validity of valuation estimates. Order effects refer to various 
behavioral phenomena that create a systematic change in expressed preferences across 
a series of choice tasks. Employing a split sample approach, this paper empirically 
compares survey participants’ marginal values and marginal willingness to pay 
(mWTP) for attributes of protecting wooded wetlands using two survey lengths or 
formats. The first survey format asks a group of survey participants only two choice 
tasks and the second format asks a different group of participants a series of twelve 
choice tasks. Both survey formats involve trichotomous choices regarding protection 
of wetlands. Our results suggest that the alternative survey formats produce 
statistically different underlying preference functions as well as statistically different 
estimates of scale parameters related to the uncertainty in participants’ responses. We 
further examined participants’ choices from a series of twelve choice tasks, by 
creating a set of variables or interactions representing the corresponding effects, to 
investigate potential heterogeneity (or effect) in the mean of the cost parameter and the 
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utility of the status quo option across the sequence. We discovered no evidence of 
position-dependent order effects in our application. But, our results produce evidence 
of precedent-dependent effects relating to a potential to retain higher net surplus from 
the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the most-valued alternative in 
the preceding task may induce participants to be less cost- sensitive and thus appear to 
have a higher WTP across the sequence.  
 
Key words: Discrete choice experiment, order effects, precedent-dependent effects, 
repeated choice tasks, strategic responses, wooded wetland protection
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2.2 Introduction 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) elicit values for multi-attribute environmental 
goods and services by asking survey participants a series of choice tasks consisting of 
two or more alternatives. DCE studies using the repeated format assume that survey 
participants have stable preferences across the repeated sequence of choice tasks, 
meaning there is no systematic change in stated preferences along the series of 
valuation scenarios. Even though participants are told to consider each choice task as 
an independent scenario, the repeated format may confound the incentive structures of 
the choice task and thus may produce responses that may not be truthful or may suffer 
from strategic or other biases. Participants' responses on a series of repeated choices 
may depend on their own preferences, expectations or  beliefs about other participants' 
preferences, as well as an assumed rule or process by which preference information 
from the repeated choices will be aggregated across the sequence of choices (Carson 
& Groves, 2007; Moulin, 1994). Moreover, empirical evidence of systematic change 
in stated preferences observed along the sequence of valuation scenarios also 
strengthens the theoretical predictions (Day et al., 2012). Therefore, the truthfulness of 
additional preference information obtained from such repeated choice format has been 
challenged.  
In this paper, we empirically examine whether the two survey formats, the first 
format involving two choices tasks and the second format involving a series of twelve 
choice tasks, yield statistically equivalent underlying preference functions by 
comparing marginal values and mWTP estimates for wetland parcel attributes. We 
employed a split sample approach where one group of participants faced two choice 
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tasks and a different group of participants faced a series of twelve choice tasks. Both 
groups faced trichotomous choices, two wetland parcels that differ in the levels of 
attributes representing various characteristics of forested wetlands and a “conserve 
neither parcel” option as the status quo alternative. Our results suggest that the 
alternative survey formats yield statistically different preference functions as well as 
scale parameters relating to the uncertainty in responses. We further explored whether 
the responses from the survey format involving twelve choice tasks suggest any form 
of systematic alterations of stated preferences along the sequence of choice tasks, 
broadly termed as order effects in the stated preference literature. This exploration 
suggests that our data display evidence of precedent-dependent order effects relating 
to a potential to retain higher net surplus from the most-valued alternative in the 
current task relative to the most-valued alternative in the preceding task may induce 
participants to be less sensitive to cost and thus appear to have a higher WTP across 
the sequence.   
 A well-known result from mechanism design theory (Gibbard, 1973; 
Satterthwaite, 1975) is that a single binary discrete choice question, one alternative 
usually being the status quo option, with majority provision rule16 is an incentive 
                                                
16A provision rule is a rule or process by which participants’ responses determine 
choice outcomes, and thus provides an explicit nexus between survey choices and 
outcomes. Explicit description of a provision rule may give participants certain 
incentives to truthfully respond to, and thereby identify their most preferred option in 
choice tasks. Previous studies examining responses under alternative provision rules 
suggest that participants may still make consistent choices irrespective of incentive 
compatible provision rules as defined by mechanism design theory (Vossler, Doyon, 
& Rondeau, 2012; Manuscript 1 in this dissertation). 
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compatible mechanism, meaning truthful responses are dominant choices and 
participants would do no better by choosing alternative options (Farquharson, 1969; 
Arrow et al., 1999; Carson & Groves, 2007). A repeated sequence of binary choices is 
often used to improve informational efficiency of preference data relative to a single 
binary choice and the cost of data acquisition.  
This repeated survey format, however, may create incentives for non-truthful 
responses. For example, participants’ beliefs about how their responses or the 
preference information will be aggregated across the sequence of the choices by the 
surveying agency may induce them not to truthfully state their preferences (Carson & 
Groves, 2007). Furthermore, when participants are presented with multiple variants of 
more or less the same environmental good or service at very different prices along the 
sequence of valuation scenarios, uncertainty surrounding the price may create 
incentives not to truthfully respond to the choices in the sequence. In sum, 
participants’ responses to the repeated sequence may depend on their own preferences, 
the person’s experience relating to learning their own preferences through the 
sequence of choices for an unfamiliar choice context, expectations about others’ 
preferences, and also the assumed rule or process by which the preference information 
across the sequence will be aggregated, suggesting that truthful responses may not be 
dominant choices for participants under the repeated survey format (Moulin, 1994).  
Employing an explicit game-theoretic model of individual decisions, Vossler, 
Doyon, & Rondeau (2012) showed that incentive compatibility requires independence 
between the choice tasks and at most one choice task (or a policy option) can be 
implemented or provided from a sequence of binary choices. The incentive properties 
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of repeated survey format involving multinomial choice tasks are further complicated 
by a core result in mechanism design theory that no response format involving more 
than two alternatives can be incentive compatible without substantial additional 
restrictions on participants’ preferences (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). These 
theoretical predictions about the incentive structures of the repeated survey format 
suggest that truthful responses may not always be dominant choices when participants 
are asked a series of choice tasks in a DCE study.    
 There exist a number of studies that show a systematic change in preferences 
along the sequence of valuation scenarios. A number of phenomena of preference 
formation and different explanations for such systematic alterations of stated 
preferences along the sequence of choice tasks have been proposed. Day et al. (2012) 
reviewed the previous studies and broadly categorized order effects, a term 
representing various phenomena of a systematic change in stated preferences along a 
sequence of choice tasks, into two groups. The first relates to a systematic change in 
preferences due to the position of choice task in the sequence, also known as position-
dependent order effects. The second relates to systematic changes in expressed 
preferences along the sequence of valuation scenarios due to the nature of alternatives 
in the previous tasks, also known as precedent-dependent order effects.  
 Position-dependent order effects represent a set of confounding of standard 
choice behaviors, which may result from different forms of learning effects such as 
institutional learning (Braga & Starmer, 2005) or value learning (Plott, 1993) or 
fatigue effects (Bradley & Daly, 1994; Savage & Waldman, 2008) or a lack of 
credibility (Carson & Groves, 2007). The learning effects may arise when participants 
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become more familiar with the environmental good or service under consideration, the 
context, and the choice tasks in early choices and ultimately make choices consistent 
with their preferences later in the sequence. Early choice tasks serve as opportunities 
to learn about less familiar environmental goods or services and the choice context, 
resulting in institutional learning (Braga & Starmer, 2005). Likewise, participants, 
after initial confusion, may be ‘discovering’ features of their own preferences, also 
called value learning (Plott, 1993), while responding to the sequence of choices. These 
learning effects may be characterized by an initial increased randomness17 in early 
choice tasks followed by less random responses in later choice tasks in the sequence. 
Alternatively, participants may become fatigued answering a series of choice tasks, 
resulting in the fatigue effects, which may be characterized when participants 
increasingly favor the status quo option or a particular attribute along with an 
increased randomness in responses in the sequence. Also, participants face a series of 
choice tasks representing more or less the same level of the environmental good at 
varying price levels in the sequence. This presentation may induce a sense of failing 
credibility in the surveying agency or the alternatives as potential options for 
implementation, which could manifest as an increasing tendency to reject costly 
options in favor of the status quo, as well as an increased randomness in responses in 
the sequence, because participants may simply not invest time and effort to make 
choices consistent with their preferences.  
                                                
17 Randomness in choices is represented by an estimate of scale factor using a 
heteroskedastic model and is inversely proportional to the variances of error terms.  
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Precedent-dependent order effects occur when participants systematically 
change their preferences based on the nature of the choice task in the sequence and 
represent a set of non-standard choice behaviors. Participants may compare 
subsequent choice tasks relative to the options or levels of attributes in the “first 
choice task” often referred to starting task effects (Herriges & Shogren, 1996; 
Ladenburg & Olsen, 2008). Participants may take subsequent choice tasks as a ‘good 
deal’ or a ‘bad deal’ relative to the “reference” alternatives or “reference” level of 
attributes developed from observations in previous choice tasks, often termed as 
reference effects (Isoni, 2011; Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). Participants may 
interpret a series of options offering a non-market good at varying prices as an 
opportunity to manipulate the outcome or the optimal level of provision or pricing to 
their advantage or both, and thus may judge subsequent choice tasks relative to the 
“best” alternative or “best” level of attributes presented in previous choice tasks, 
resulting in strategic misrepresentation (Carson & Groves, 2007). 
There are also studies that examined the effect of advanced disclosure or step-
wise disclosure of the repeated survey format on the order effects. Employing a 
contingent valuation (CV) study to value nested levels of environmental improvement, 
Bateman et al. (2004) examined the advanced and stepwise disclosure formats and 
found a significant difference in value estimates due to order of presentation in the 
step-wise disclosure format, but the advanced disclosure response format did not 
produce such a significant difference, implying the advanced disclosure format may 
mitigate position-dependent order effects. Likewise, Scheufele & Bennett (2013) did 
not find any influence of advanced awareness of repeated choices on the implications 
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for order effects in the sequence of choices. However, Bateman, Day, Dupont, & 
Georgiou (2009), in a DCE study involving two binary choice tasks, found statistically 
different preferences in the second choice task relative to the choices in the first task, 
resulting in precedent-dependent order effects relating to starting task effects. 
 Previous studies examining order effects in the repeated response survey 
format employed binary choice elicitation in which participants faced a choice 
between an alternative level of the environmental good or service under investigation 
and the status quo alternative. A recent study by Scheufele & Bennett (2012), using 
repeated binary discrete choice experiments, examined whether strategic opportunities 
provided by the order in which choice sets are presented affect choice decisions and 
found evidence of such effects in terms of participants’ increased cost sensitivity and 
thus lowering willingness to pay (WTP) estimates if the same or similar level of 
provision was offered in the previous choice task at a lower cost than if it was not. 
However, they found that the cost sensitivity and thus WTP remains unaffected if the 
same or similar level of provision was offered in the previous choice task at a higher 
cost. Their results also indicate that the cost sensitivity increases (and WTP decreases) 
as participants progress through the sequence of choice tasks. As noted by Scheufele 
& Bennett (2012), the order effects reported in the SP literature have not been 
adequately examined under multinomial response format. A trichotomous choice 
elicitation format as applied here asks participants about two wetland-parcel 
preservation alternatives and the status quo option. Since each choice task provides 
two non-status quo alternatives at different cost levels across the sequence, this choice 
situation may provide strategic opportunities for participants that may manifest 
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through the effects on the cost parameter estimate as well as on the utility of the status 
quo option. Thus, the major objective of this paper is to examine the effect of a set of 
variables and interactions, representing position-dependent as well as precedent-
dependent effects, on the marginal utility of cost to participants and also on the utility 
of the status quo option. Statistically significant effect of these variables on the cost 
parameter and the utility of the status quo option may subsequently imply effects on 
the marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) for wetland attributes, as well as total WTP 
for alternative wetland parcels, relative to the status quo option across the sequence.  
We employed a split sample approach, meaning one group of participants 
received two choice tasks and a different group of participants received a series of 
twelve choice tasks, to examine whether the alternative survey formats influence 
marginal values as well as marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) for attributes of 
protecting forested wetland parcels. This paper utilized data from a stated preference 
survey using discrete choice experiment (DCE) method to assess values of various 
attributes for protecting forested wetland parcels in the northern towns of Rhode 
Island, USA.  Our results suggest that the alternative survey formats produce 
statistically different preference functions. We further examined participants’ 
responses from the twelve choice tasks (or the repeated survey format) to investigate 
whether these responses suggest any form of order effects discussed in the stated 
preference literature in terms of participants’ cost sensitivity across the sequence. 
Analysis of responses from repeated choice format suggests evidence of precedent-
dependent order effect relating to a potential to retain higher net surplus from the 
most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the same in the preceding task 
 101 
 
may induce participants to be less sensitive to cost and thus appear to have a higher 
WTP across the sequence in our application using trichotomous choice tasks.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 discuses the theoretical 
framework of random utility model (RUM) to model participants’ choices for 
protecting forested wetland parcels. Section 2.4 details identification of relevant 
attributes, experimental design of forested wetland parcels, and implementation of a 
stated preference survey developed in this study. Section 2.5 presents the results of 
hypothesis tests. Section 2.6 concludes the paper by discussing the implications of our 
results.  
 
2.3 The conceptual model 
Following standard practice, we employ a random utility model or the RUM 
framework (McFadden, 1974) to model survey participants' choices for conserving 
wooded wetland parcels. The RUM assumes that participants’ choice is dictated by the 
maximization of the utility. The utility that participant n receives from alternative j in 
choice task t can be represented by: Unjt=V(β, Xnjt)+εnjt, where V(β, Xnjt) represents the 
observed portion of utility estimated from a vector of attributes of wetland parcels 
(Xnjt) with a vector of parameters to be estimated, β, and where εnjt represents the 
portion of utility unobserved or unknown from the researcher’s perspective and is 
assumed to be an iid type 1 extreme value. Given these assumptions, the probability 
that participant n chooses alternative j in choice task t is given by the following logit 
specification: 
(1)   Pnjt=exp(λVnjt) / Σj’exp(λVnj’t) 
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where λ is a scale parameter and is inversely proportional  to the error variance, σε2 
(λ=π/√[6σε2]). Since the preference parameter vector, β, and the scale parameter, λ, 
cannot be identified simultaneously, the scale parameter is often normalized to 1 for 
identification purpose. The assumption of a constant error variance across individuals 
could mislead the results of hypothesis tests while comparing preferences across 
subsamples of participants because the preference vectors, β, are confounded by the 
corresponding scale parameters. A heteroskedastic conditional logit model (DeShazo 
& Fermo, 2002; Hensher, Louviere, & Swait, 1998) allows one to estimate the scale 
parameter as a function of participant-specific characteristics, and thus allows us to 
compare both preference vectors as well as the scale parameters across different 
subsamples of participants. Moreover, estimated scale parameters provide us with an 
indication of uncertainty in responses, in addition to the effect of all unobserved 
factors or variables, across the two response formats.  
 Our comparison of preferences and the scale parameters between the two 
response formats is limited to an estimation of a heteroskedastic conditional logit 
model because two choice observations from each survey participant may not allow us 
to discover statistically different random parameters under our two choice task survey 
format (Rose, Hess, Bliemer, & Daly, 2011). However, we will utilize a mixed logit 
model to further explore the responses under our repeated response format involving 
twelve choice tasks.     
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2.3.1 Hypothesis tests regarding survey formats 
DCE studies using the repeated choice format assume that participants’ preferences do 
not change or are stable across the choice tasks in the sequence. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is related to examining a set of marginal utility parameters to compare 
underlying utility functions, scale parameters, and mWTP estimates for attributes 
across the two survey formats. We formally express the hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A set of marginal utility parameters, β, is not significantly altered by 
the repeated response format. 
HO: βChoice2= βChoice12 and HA: βChoice2≠ βChoice12 
where βC represents a set of marginal utility parameters estimated from a subsample 
facing two choice tasks (C=Choice2) and a different subsample facing twelve choice 
tasks (C= Choice12). 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we will conduct a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test by 
imposing restrictions implied by the null hypothesis (HO) examine whether the 
restrictions are true. Additionally, we will compare the scale parameter estimates to 
examine underlying error variances across the survey formats, i.e., Hypothesis 1a: test 
λChoice12 / λChoice2=1, where the scale parameter (λC) for a subsample facing two choices 
(C=Choice2) is normalized to 1 and the scale parameter for a different subsample 
facing twelve choice tasks (C=Choice12) is estimated relative to 1 for identification 
purpose. Therefore, the test of scale parameters between the subsamples is whether the 
ratio of scale parameters (or the relative values) is equivalent to 1.  
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Hypothesis 2: Marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) values for wetland attributes are 
not significantly affected by the repeated survey format. 
HO: mWTPChoice2= mWTPChoice12 and HA: mWTPChoice2≠ mWTPChoice12 
where mWTPCX represents marginal willingness to pay for an attribute X defined as 
the ratio of the marginal utility of an attribute X (βX) and the marginal utility of 
income (-βCost) or (-1)*(βX/ βCost), using coefficients estimated from a subsample 
facing two choice tasks (C=Choice2) and a different subsample facing twelve choice 
tasks (C= Choice12).  
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we will conduct a series of pair-wise Wald tests 
of equality of mWTP estimates for wetland attributes across the two choice formats.  
 
2.3.2 Exploring order effects under repeated choice format 
Given that Hypothesis 1 and 2 above are rejected, we will further examine responses 
from the repeated survey format. We will estimate a mixed logit model to examine 
both forms of orders effects, position-dependent and precedent-dependent effects, 
under the repeated survey format involving twelve choice tasks. We will specifically 
examine these effects by creating a set of variables or interactions representing the 
corresponding type and examining whether these variables alter marginal utility of 
cost to participants (and thus mWTP) as well as the utility of the status quo option 
across the sequence. The actual empirical model estimated to examine these effects 
will be discussed later.     
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2.4 Empirical application 
2.4.1 Wetland survey design and implementation 
We examined the hypotheses regarding preferences across alternative survey formats 
using stated preference (SP) data to assess values of forested wetlands in Rhode 
Island, USA. The SP data utilized in this paper were part of a larger study involving 
both hypothetical and real-money choices (Newell, 2003; Newell & Swallow, 2013), 
but the present study utilizes responses only from hypothetical choices of wooded 
wetland parcels. Details about the original study can be found in (Newell, 2003). 
Responses from the 12-choice format have not previously been analyzed. 
Personal interviews and a total of eight focus groups (Johnston et al., 1995) 
with the members of Wood Pawcatuck Watershed Association, several school parents’ 
organizations, and members of the general public were conducted during the process 
of identifying relevant attributes to describe various aspects of conserving wooded 
wetland parcels (Newell, 2003). These focus groups and personal interviews were 
primarily concentrated on learning Rhode Island residents’ attitudes and views 
towards different dimensions of forested wetlands and other natural resources in 
general. These discussions also helped to develop, pretest, and revise the survey 
instrument in terms of clarity of instructions and presentation as well as 
comprehensiveness of the content of the survey.  
Table 2.1 presents identified attributes of forested wetland parcels that were 
considered to be relevant by conservation biologists, local residents and the focus 
group participants, including type of road passing by a wetland parcel, character of 
surrounding land, level of wildlife diversity, level of public access, sustainability of 
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habitat quality, role of parcel as conservation area, size of parcel (acres) and one-time 
cost ($) to participants to protect a wetland parcel for a ten-year period. An example 
choice task is presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Wetland parcel attributes and levels 
Attribute Variable and description 
Type of road  Common_Road: An effects-coded variable equals 1 for a 
commonly travelled road adjacent to the wetland parcel, 
equals -1 for a locally traveled road; and equals 0 
otherwise.  
Heavy_Road: An effects-coded variable equals 1 for a 
heavily travelled road adjacent to the wetland parcel, 
equals -1 for a locally traveled road; and equals 0 
otherwise. 
Character of 
surrounding land  
Woodland: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the 
wetland parcel is surrounded by woodland, equals -1 if the 
parcel is surrounded by rural residential land; and equals 0 
otherwise.  
Farmland: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the 
wetland parcel is surrounded by farmland, equals -1 if the 
parcel is surrounded by rural residential land; and equals 0 
otherwise. 
Wildlife diversity Medium_WLDiversity: An effects-coded variable equals 
1 if the wildlife diversity of the parcel is medium, equals -
1 if the diversity is low; and equals 0 otherwise.   
High_WLDiversity: An effects-coded variable equals 1 
if the wildlife diversity of the parcel is high, equals -1 if 
the diversity is low; and equals 0 otherwise.    
Public access  Limited_Access: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if 
limited public access to the parcel is allowed, equals -1 if 
no public access is allowed; and equals 0 otherwise.  
Full_Access: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if full 
public access is allowed to the parcel, equals -1 if no 
public access is allowed; and equals 0 otherwise.  
Sustainability of 
habitat quality 
Medium_Sustain: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if 
the parcel sustains medium level of habitat quality, equals 
-1 if the parcel sustains low level of habitat quality; and 
equals 0 otherwise. 
High_Sustain: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the 
parcel sustains high level of habitat quality, equals -1 if 
the parcel sustains low level of habitat quality; and equals 
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0 otherwise.  
Role as conservation 
area 
Expands: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the parcel 
expands an existing protected areas, equals -1 if the parcel 
is isolated from other protected areas; and equals 0 
otherwise. 
Connects: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the parcel 
connects two protected areas, equals -1 if the parcel is 
isolated from other protected areas; and equals 0 
otherwise.  
Size of parcel Size: The size of wetland parcels (in acres)- 29 acres, 45 
acres and 60 acres 
One-time cost to 
participant’s 
household 
Cost: One-time payment that participant’s household is 
required to make for the conservation of wetland parcel 
for a 10-year period- $5, $10, $15, $20, $25 and $30. 
Status quo option SQ: A dummy variable equals 1 for the status quo option 
or “conserve neither parcel”, and equals 0 for a parcel 
(Parcel A or Parcel B).  
 
Figure 2.1 An example choice task of forested wetland protection 
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  StatDesign Inc.18 provided a fractional factorial design of choice tasks by 
combining levels of eight wetland parcel attributes (see Table 2.1). The fractional 
factorial design of the attribute combinations produced a total of 36 choice tasks. Each 
choice task consisted of two wetland parcels that differ in the levels of the eight 
attributes. Participants were asked to evaluate the attributes of the two parcels and 
indicate their most preferred parcel: Parcel A or Parcel B or “Neither parcel,” making 
each choice task a trichotomous valuation scenario.  
In order to examine whether the survey format or sequence length affected 
modeling of preferences and values, the researchers created two wetland survey 
booklets entitled “Are Rhode Island’s Wetlands Valuable?”. The first survey booklet 
consisted of two different choice tasks (Choice2 subsample), and the second survey 
booklet consisted of a series of twelve different choice tasks (Choice12 subsample), 
from the same pool of original 36 choice tasks produced by the fractional factorial 
design. The two choice tasks were chosen from the pool of 36 choice tasks such that 
the first choice task was picked at an interval of five choice tasks relative to the second 
choice task. For example, if the first choice task is the 6th in the pool of 36 tasks, then 
the second choice task was 1st from the pool of 36 tasks. This was to ensure that the 
two choice tasks were different in the survey booklet. The fractional factorial design 
produced 36 choice tasks that were then efficiently blocked into three sets of twelve 
choice tasks. That is the first set consists of choice tasks 1st through 12th; the second 
set consists of choice tasks 13th through 24th; and the third set consists of choice tasks 
                                                
18 We are indebted to Don A. Anderson of Evergreen, CO, who created the design and 
suggested the 12-choice format be implemented. 
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25th through 36th. Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of the three sets. 
Except for the number of choice tasks faced by participants in the two survey booklets, 
both surveys consisted otherwise of the exact same information on the purpose of the 
survey and the benefits of protecting forested wetlands and the questions regarding 
their socio-demographic characteristics.  
The researchers employed the Dillman method (Dillman, 1978) to distribute 
the surveys to randomly-drawn residents of the towns of North Smithfield and 
Scituate, Rhode Island, USA, in the summer of 2000. The Dillman method, as applied 
in this study, involved sending a cover letter, the survey and a $1 coin as financial 
token of appreciation. For non-respondents, additional mailings were sent, including a 
reminder postcard, followed by a letter with a replacement survey, a second reminder 
postcard, plus a letter with a final post card asking non-respondents about their basic 
(age, gender, and education as described below) socio-demographic information.  
 
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics about survey participants 
A total of 1000 surveys involving two choice tasks were mailed out and 402 were 
returned of the 906 surveys actually delivered, registering a response rate of 44.37%. 
A total of 200 surveys involving twelve choice tasks were mailed out and 82 surveys 
were returned of 180 deliverables providing a response rate of 45.56%.  Table 2.2 
reports summary statistics for the available socio-demographic characteristics of 
participants in the two subsamples. A chi-squared test of independence for categorical 
variables suggests the two subsamples have statistically similar proportions of male 
and female participants (see Table 2.2), but the subsamples who faced a series of 
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twelve choice tasks had significantly higher proportion of participants with a college 
degree or higher than the participants who faced only two choice tasks (see Table 2.2). 
Two-sample t-test shows that the mean age of the participants across the subsamples is 
statistically equivalent (see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 Participants' characteristics across the choice formats 
 
Variables 
 
Description 
Choice formats 
Two choice 
tasks 
(Choice2) 
Twelve 
choice tasks 
(Choice12) 
Pearson 
χ2, 1df 
(p) 
Sample 
mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
mean 
(SD) 
Male =1 if participant is male;  
0 otherwise. 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.066 
(0.7973) 
College =1 if participant has a college 
degree or higher;  
0 otherwise. 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
4.922 
(0.0265) 
 
Age Age of participants  48.95 
(13.64) 
48.99 
(12.19) 
0.0268a 
(0.9786) 
aTwo sample t-stat, 482 df, (p-value) 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Empirical model specification for hypothesis tests regarding choice formats 
We assume the indirect utility (Vnjt) is a linear function of the attributes of wetland 
parcels (Xnjt) including the cost to buy the parcel19 for conservation (Costnjt), as well as 
participant-specific socio-demographic characteristics (Zn). The indirect utility 
function can be expressed as follows: 
                                                
19 The survey asked about paying the cost to secure a 10-year easement preventing 
development; this restriction was related to the broader purpose of the study, such as 
described in (Newell & Swallow, 2013). 
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(2)  Vnjt=βSQSQj+ βXXnjt+ βCostCostnjt+βZSQZn!SQj 
+(βSQC12SQj+ βXC12Xnjt+βCostC12Costnjt+βZSQC12Zn! SQj)!Choice12, 
where20 βSQ , βSQC12 represent the coefficients measuring the utility of the status quo 
option (SQj) across the choice formats as captured by dummy variable Choice12 for 
which 1 indicates the 12-choice presentation, and 0 indicates the 2-choice 
presentation; βX represent the coefficients measuring the marginal utility of the non-
monetary attributes of wetland parcels (Xnjt) in the 2-choice format and, when 
Choice12 =1, the addition of βXC12 captures any addition to the marginal utility due to 
the 12-choice format; similarly  βCost, βCostC12 together represent the marginal utility of 
cost to participants (Costnjt), often known as the negative of the marginal utility of 
income, across the survey formats (Choice12=1,0); βZSQ, βZSQC12 represent the 
coefficients adjusting the utility of the status quo option due to participant-specific 
socio-demographic characteristics (Zn) across the survey formats (Choice12=1,0); SQj 
represents a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the status quo option, or the 
“Neither Parcel” alternative, and the value of 0 for a wetland parcel (Parcel A or 
Parcel B); Xnjt represents the vector of non-monetary attributes of wooded wetland 
parcels (Table 2.1) and the cost to the participant to buy the parcels (Costnjt); Zn 
represents the vector of participants’ socio-demographic characteristics21.   
                                                
20 Note that in Eq. (2), parameters βn relates to the marginal utilities for the 2-Choice 
format (Choice12=0) while (βn+ βnC12) gives the marginal utilities for the 12-Choice 
format (Choice12=1). 
21 Since participants who faced a series of twelve choice tasks had significantly higher 
proportion of participants with a college degree or higher than the participants who 
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2.5.2 Hypothesis test results regarding the choice formats  
We estimated a heteroskedastic conditional logit model of the utility specification 
presented in equation (2) using the pooled data from both survey formats. In order to 
test Hypothesis 1, we conducted a LR test by imposing restrictions on a set of the 
utility parameters, including the utility of the status quo option, the marginal utility 
parameters of the attributes of wetland parcels, and the marginal utility of income. The 
LR test22 suggests that the two survey formats produce statistically different 
underlying preference functions (LR Test: βSQC12=βXC12=βCostC12=0; χ2=60.43, 15 df, 
p<0.0001). We also examined whether the two choice formats produce statistically 
different estimates of the scale parameters representing uncertainty or randomness in 
responses across the formats. The LR test23 suggests that the scale parameter is 
                                                                                                                                       
faced only two choice (see Table 2.2), we examined, in our preliminary models not 
discussed here, whether this difference in education level could affect the potential 
difference in estimated preference functions across the survey formats (Choice12=1,0) 
and found that the effect on wetland attributes was not statistically significant and thus 
excluded from further consideration (χ2=14.1758, 15 df, p=0.5122).  
 
22 The LR test statistic was calculated as 2*(LLU-LLR) with 15 df, is asymptotically 
chi-square distributed. LLU is the log-likelihood value of the unrestricted model 
specified in Eq. (2) and reported in Table 2.3 and LLR is the log-likelihood value of 
the restricted model after imposing a set of restrictions (βSQC12=βXC12=βCostC12=0) 
estimated using the pooled dataset from both survey formats. 
 
23 The LR test statistic was calculated as 2*(LLVS-LLES) with 1df is asymptotically 
chi-square distributed. LLVS is the log-likelihood value of the pooled model allowing 
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significantly lower (or, equivalently, shows higher error variances, and thus higher 
uncertainty or randomness, in choices) for the subsample that faced only two choice 
tasks (Hypothesis 1a- LR Test: [λChoice12 / λChoice2]=1; χ2=17.23, 1 df, p<0.0001).  
The heteroskedastic conditional logit model results of the utility specification 
in Eq. (2) estimated using the pooled data from both response formats are reported in 
Table 2.3. These results suggest that the marginal utility parameters for variables 
representing wetland parcel surrounded by woodland, medium level of wildlife 
diversity, high level of sustainability of habitat quality, wetland parcel connecting two 
protected areas, the size of the parcel and the marginal utility of the cost to participants 
are statistically different across the survey formats (see Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3 Heteroskedastic conditional logit model results 
Variable (n) Coefficient (se) [p-value] 
Base Parameters (βn) when Choice12=0 
  Status quo (SQ) -0.5113   (0.6492)   [0.431] 
  Common_Road .0216   (0.0775)   [0.780] 
  Heavy_Road -0.1072   (0.0776)   [0.167] 
  Woodland 0.3418   (0.0803)   [0.0001] 
  Farmland -0.0037   (0.0804)   [0.963] 
  Medum_WLDiversity 0.0128   (0.0649)   [0.843] 
  High_WLDiversity 0.3767   (0.0644)   [0.0001] 
  Limited_Access -0.0311   (0.0749)   [0.678] 
  Full_Access 0.3141   (0.0802)   [0.0001] 
  Medium_Sustain 0.1337   (0.0676)   [0.048] 
  High_Sustain 0.1746   (0.0699)   [0.012] 
  Expands -0.0253   (0.0765)   [0.740] 
  Connects 0.0535   (0.0742)   [0.471] 
  Size 0.0218   (0.0046)   [0.0001] 
  Cost -0.0119   (0.0055)   [0.031] 
                                                                                                                                       
varying scale parameters across the choice formats and LLES is the log-likelihood 
value of the pooled model assuming equal scale parameters in both response formats.  
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  Male!SQ  0.3067   (0.2633)   [0.244] 
  Age!SQ 0.0178   (0.0094)   [0.059] 
  College!SQ -0.3633   (0.2748)   [0.186] 
Additions to Base Parameters (βnC12) when Choice12=1 
  SQ!Choice12 1.6184   (1.2447)   [0.194] 
  SQ!Choice12 1.6184   (1.2447)   [0.194] 
  Common_Road!Choice12 0.1137   (0.1007)   [0.259] 
  Heavy_Road!Choice12 0.1139   (0.1019)   [0.264] 
  Woodland!Choice12 -0.2896   (0.1173)   [0.014] 
  Farmland!Choice12 0.0256   (0.1173)   [0.827] 
  Medium_WLDiversity!Choice12 0.2097   (0.0921)   [0.023] 
  High_WLDiversity!Choice12 -0.0394   (0.0988)   [0.690] 
  Limited_Access!Choice12 0.1235   (0.1046)   [0.238] 
  Full_Access!Choice12 -0.0851   (0.1275)   [0.504] 
  Medium_Sustain!Choice12 0.1261   (0.0900)   [0.161] 
  High_Sustain!Choice12 0.3637   (0.0981)   [0.0001] 
  Expands!Choice12 -0.1319   (0.1043)   [0.206] 
  Connects!Choice12 0.2685   (0.1046)   [0.010] 
  Size!Choice12 -0.0106   (0.0059)   [0.076] 
  Cost!Choice12 -0.0176   (0.0092   [0.056] 
  Male!SQ!Choice12  -0.5512   (0.4677)   [0.239] 
  Age!SQ!Choice12 -0.0259   (0.0182   [0.153] 
  College!SQ!Choice12 -0.6752   (0.6146   [0.272] 
  
Model statistics  
Log-likelihood value -1682.465 
AIC 3436.93 
BIC 3673.429 
Number of parameters 36 
Wald χ2, 36 df (p)  258.46 (p<0.0001) 
Number of choices 1756 
Number of participants  484 
Relative scale parameter 
(λChoice12/ λChoice2) 
1.8484 (p<0.0001) 
Pseudo R2 0.1279 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we conducted a series of pair-wise Wald tests of 
equality of mWTP values for wetland attributes using estimates from the 
heteroskedastic conditional logit model presented in Table 2.3 across the response 
formats. mWTP estimates and results of the Wald tests are reported in Table 2.4. The 
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test results suggest a very weak statistical significance on the difference of mWTP 
estimates across the survey formats when examined individually; the mWTP estimate 
is statistically different (at the 10% level) for only one of thirteen variables across the 
response formats. A Wald test for only the variables, whose marginal utility 
coefficients for the 12-choice presentations were significantly different (see Table 2.3) 
suggests a statistically different mWTP estimates across the survey formats (χ2=21.56, 
9 df, p= 0.0104). However, that test is biased in favor of rejecting the null, and this 
result did not hold when we conducted a Wald test of equality of mWTP estimates for 
all thirteen variables (χ2= 25.69, 25 df, p= 0.4245). 
 
Table 2.4 Marginal WTP for wetland attributes across the survey formats 
Variablesa  Choice formats Wald test 
p-valuec Two choice tasks  
(Choice12=0)b 
Twelve choice tasks  
(Choice12=1)b 
Common_Road -5.38 
(-27.09, 16.33) 
9.40* 
(-0.39, 19.20) 
0.2238 
Heavy_Road -16.22 
(-41.59, 9.15) 
5.04 
(-3.53, 13.62) 
0.1196 
Woodland 57.21* 
(-0.18, 114.59) 
4.28 
(-5.45, 14.01) 
0.0747 
Farmland 28.14 
(-5.64, 61.93) 
3.26 
(-6.66, 13.17) 
0.1660 
Medium_WDiversity 33.85* 
(-1.94, 69.65 
26.52*** 
(12.35, 40.69) 
0.7089 
High_WDiversity 64.47** 
(2.64, 126.29) 
30.41*** 
(14.46, 46.35) 
0.2958 
Limited_Access 21.19 
(-8.07, 50.46) 
14.02** 
(2.97, 25.08) 
0.6534 
Full_Access 50.24** 
(0.48, 99.99) 
18.66*** 
(6.26, 31.05) 
0.2274 
Medium_Sustain 37.19* 
(-1.04, 75.42) 
35.86*** 
(17.14, 54.59) 
0.9512 
High_Sustain 40.64* 
(-1.11, 82.39) 
45.30*** 
(23.36, 67.24) 
0.8463 
Expands 0.24 0.25 0.9994 
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(-22.06, 22.54) (-7.33, 7.82) 
Connects 6.87 
(-15.47, 29.22) 
16.49*** 
(5.33, 27.66) 
0.4503 
Size 1.84* 
(-0.01, 3.69) 
0.38** 
(0.06, 0.69) 
0.1285 
amWTP for a continuous variable (Size) is simply calculated as the ratio of marginal 
utility of that variable and the marginal utility of the income (negative of βCost). For 
effects-coded variables, mWTP is calculated as an addition to WTP for a wetland 
parcel when the indicated level of the attribute is added relative to the base level of the 
corresponding attribute, ceteris paribus.  
 
b95% confidence intervals (CIs) of mWTP estimates are reported in parentheses.  
 
cP-values from the pair-wise Wald test of equality of mWTP estimates across the 
subsamples (Choice12=1,0), i.e., HO: mWTPXChoice2 = mWTPXChoice12, where 
mWTPXChoice2 is mWTP for an attribute X for the subsample of participants that faced 
two choice tasks (Choice12=0) and mWTPXChoice12 is mWTP for an attribute X for the 
subsample of participants that faced a series of twelve choice tasks (Choice12=1). 
  
Three, two and one asterisk(s) (***, ** and *) indicate significantly different from 
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
2.5.3 Order effects in repeated response survey format  
Hypothesis test results regarding the alternative survey formats above suggested that 
the two formats produced statistically different underlying preference functions. 
However, our results of pair-wise Wald tests of mWTP estimates for the variables did 
not show statistical difference across the response formats. Therefore, we now 
examine responses from the repeated response format or the DCE involving twelve 
choice tasks to explore the pattern of participants’ preferences implied across the 
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sequence of the repeated tasks if we maintain the presumption that individuals’ 
responses are consistent with utility maximization. 
 We will examine both forms of order effects, position-dependent and 
precedent-dependent, by creating a set of variables or interactions representing the 
corresponding effect-type and examining their significance to alter the marginal utility 
of income as well as their effect on the utility of the status quo option across the 
sequence. We focus our analysis of order effects in terms of the effect on the marginal 
utility of income which then translates to the effect on marginal willingness to pay 
(mWTP) and the effect on the utility of the status quo option which will translate to 
the effect on total WTP values for an alternative relative to the status quo option. Prior 
research has focused on carefully designed, dichotomous choice with few attributes. 
This focus allows researchers to identify choice sequences providing scenarios that 
increase (or decrease) utility from one question to the next. But existing studies have 
not adequately explored whether precedent-dependent effects might arise in a complex 
choice experiments that are more typical of modern applications. Yet such applied 
surveys do not allow researchers as much flexibility in designing a survey with choice 
sequences for which trends in utility can be expected to be known with high 
confidence a priori. We address this limitation by using out 2-Choicesurvey data to 
create an independent means to identify the trends in utility offered in a sequence of 
choice questions.  
 
 
 
 118 
 
2.5.3.1 Variables to examine position-dependent order effects  
As already mentioned, 3 sets of 12 choices tasks were created from our 
experimental design procedure from the pool of 36 choice tasks. First we examined 
the percentages of participants choosing the status quo option along the sequence of 12 
choice tasks. Figure 2.2 shows these results by a graphical representation. Figure 2.2 
also shows the percentages of participants choosing the status quo option in the 2-
choice presentation and these are within the ranges of the values from the three sets 
under the 12-choice presentation. Observations from Figure 2.2 suggest that 
percentages of participants choosing the status quo option are consistent in initial tasks 
(Task # 1- Task #3) as well as later tasks (Task # 9 – Task #12) between the sets. 
However, there exists some variation in the responses with respect to the choice of the 
status quo option in the middle tasks (Task #4 -Task # 8). This observation suggests 
that we consider a step-wise, discrete group of choice tasks to examine participants’ 
responses along the sequence, which we examine in the following section.      
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Figure 2.2 Pattern of the choice of the status quo option across tasks between sets 
 
 
In order to examine whether these discrete group of choice tasks impact the 
marginal utility of income as well as the utility of the status quo option across the 
sequence, we created two dummy variables: Position4_8 = 1 for the choice tasks 
occurring in the 4th through 8th position in the sequence and Position9_12 = 1 for the 
choice tasks occurring in the 9th through 12th position in the sequence, with zero 
indicating otherwise respectively. We included interaction terms in the utility 
specification by interacting these dummy variables (Position4_8 and Position9_12) 
with the cost attribute (Costnjt; Table 2.1) and also with the dummy variable 
representing the status quo option (SQj; Table 2.1) to examine the position-dependent 
order effects on the cost sensitivity (and thus mWTP) as well as the effect on the status 
quo utility (and thus total WTP) across the sequence.  
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2.5.3.2 Variables to examine precedent-dependent order effects  
In order to examine whether participants’ responses in the current choice task were 
affected by the type (or nature) of alternatives that appear in the preceding choice 
tasks, collectively termed as precedent-dependent order effects, we created a 
continuous variable that represents the proportion (or the rate) at which the status quo 
option was chosen in the preceding choice task as predicted using the responses from 
the Choice2 subsample data. In order to create this variable, we first estimated a 
conditional logit model using the utility specification represented in Eq. (2) using the 
responses from the Choice2 subsample only (so the interaction terms involving 
Choice12 in Eq. (2) were absent). The estimation results are presented in Manuscript 
2- Appendix B1. Then we predicted the probabilities of each alternative being chosen 
using the estimates from this conditional logit model24. The predicted probability for 
the status quo option was averaged across the participants in the Choice2 subsample, 
producing the predicted probability of the status quo option for each of 36 choice 
tasks. This newly created variable “PrevSQChosen” consists of zeros for the first 
choice task and the estimated probability of the status quo option being chosen in the 
preceding choice task predicted from the Choice2 subsample model for the subsequent 
choice tasks in the sequence. This variable is then interacted with the cost variable 
(Costnjt; Table 2.1) as well as with the dummy variable for the status quo option (SQj; 
Table 2.1) to examine its impact on the marginal utility of income (and thus mWTP) 
and the utility of the status quo option (and thus total WTP).  
                                                
24 Accordingly, we used Eq. (1) with the scale parameter normalized to one. 
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Next, we also created a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a net surplus 
value, the difference between the predicted willingness to pay for the most-valued25 
wetland parcel and the actual cost asked of respondents to buy that parcel in the choice 
task, is higher in the current choice task relative to the preceding task, and zero 
otherwise. In order to generate the net surplus value for the most-valued alternative, 
we used the coefficient estimates from the conditional logit model of the utility 
specification in Eq. (2) using the responses from the Choice2 subsample only; these 
coefficients were used to calculate the total utility of the non-status quo alternative and 
the utility of the status quo option. We then used these utility values (see Manuscript 
2-Appendix B) to estimate total WTP26 values for an alternative relative to the status 
quo option for each participant for the Choice12 subsample participants using their 
socio-demographic characteristics. This process provided total WTP value estimates 
for each non-status quo alternative (Parcel A and Parcel B) for each participant for the 
12 choice tasks she or he faced. Then we calculated the difference between the 
                                                
25 Since we are asking participants to state their most preferred alternative in a task, it 
is certainly relevant for participants to think about the net surplus value they could 
retain by choosing their most preferred alternative and change in that surplus across 
the tasks may affect their responses across the sequence. 
 
26 Total WTP for an alternative wetland parcel relative to the status quo was calculated 
as -1*[U(Alternative)-U(totalSQ)]/βCost, where U(Alternative) is the total utility for a 
non-status quo alternative, U(totalSQ) is the total utility of the status quo option (the 
βSQ adjusted by βZSQ using participants socio-demographic profiles) and βCost is the 
marginal utility of the cost to participants, using the coefficient estimates from the 
conditional logit model of utility specification in Eq. (2) using the Choice2 subsample 
data only (see Manuscript 2-Appendix B). 
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estimated total WTP value for an alternative parcel and the corresponding amount of 
money participants were asked to pay for that alternative, providing us with the net 
surplus value for each non-status quo alternative. We then compared the net surplus 
value for the most-valued alternative in each choice task across the sequence to 
determine whether the potential surplus value in the current choice task is increasing 
or decreasing relative to the preceding choice task. We created a dummy variable 
“IncrSurplus”, which takes the value 1 if the net surplus for the most-valued 
alternative in current choice tasks is increasing relative to the corresponding value in 
the preceding choice task, and the value of 0 otherwise. For the first choice task, this 
variable will take a value of zero. This newly created dummy variable is then 
interacted with the cost variable (Costnjt; Table 2.1) as well as with the dummy 
variable for the status quo option (SQj; Table 2.1) to examine their impact on the 
marginal utility of income (and thus mWTP) and the utility of the status quo option 
(and thus total WTP).        
 
2.5.3.3 Empirical model estimation and the LR tests  
We estimated a panel mixed logit model (Train, 2003; Revelt & Train, 1998; Train, 
1998)27 assuming a linear utility function using the choices from the survey response 
                                                
27 The mixlogit module in Stata (Hole, 2007) was employed to estimate panel mixed 
logit model using “id (participant id)” option to adjust for the potential non-
independence of responses to 12 choice tasks from a survey participant. Only non-
monetary attributes of wetland parcels (Xnjt) and cost to participants (Costnjt) were 
specified as normally distributed random variables. All the other variables and 
interactions were modeled as fixed parameters.  
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format involving twelve choice tasks only. In order to examine the significance of a 
set of variables representing corresponding order effects, we first estimated an 
unrestricted model defined below and tested the parameter restrictions of interest 
against the unrestricted model. Thus, we defined: 
(3) Vnjt=βSQSQj + βZSQZn!SQj + βXXnjt+βCostCostnjt 
+(βCost_P48Position4_8+βCost_P912Position9_12 
+βCost_PrevSQPrevSQChosen+βCost_IncrSurplusIncrSurplus)!Costnjt 
+(βSQ_P48Position4_8+βSQ_P912Position9_12 
+βSQ_PrevSQPrevSQChosen+βSQ_IncrSurplusIncrSurplus)!SQj 
where βSQ, βZSQ represent the coefficients measuring the utility of the status quo option 
(SQj) and adjusting the utility of the status quo option due to participant-specific 
socio-demographic characteristics (Zn); βX represent the coefficients measuring the 
marginal utility of the non-monetary attributes of wetland parcels (Xnjt); βCost 
represents the marginal utility of cost to participants (Costnjt), often known as the 
negative of the marginal utility of income; βCost_P48, βCost_P912 represent the coefficients 
adjusting the marginal utility of cost to participants due to position-specific dummy 
variables, Position4_8 and Position9_12 respectively; βSQ_P48, βSQ_P912 represent the 
coefficients adjusting the marginal utility of the status quo due to position-dependent 
variables, Position4_8 and Position9_12 respectively; βCost_PrevSQ, βCost_IncrSurplus 
represent the coefficients adjusting the marginal utility of cost to participants due to 
precedent-dependent variables,  PrevSQChosen and IncrSurplus respectively;  
βSQ_PrevSQ, βSQ_IncrSurplus represent the coefficients adjusting the marginal utility of the 
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status quo due to precedent-dependent variables, PrevSQChosen and IncrSurplus 
respectively.   
Estimation results of a panel mixed logit model of the utility specification 
represented in Eq. (3) are presented in Table 2.5. This is the unrestricted model against 
which a set of parameter restrictions was tested to examine significance of the 
variables representing the corresponding order and precedent-dependent effects. The 
LR test suggests that the interactions representing position-dependent order effects are 
not statistically different from zero (LR Test: βCost_P48=βCost_P912=βSQ_P48=βSQ_P912=0; 
χ2=4.4446, 4 df, p=0.3492). Next, we conducted a LR by imposing restrictions on the 
interactions involving the precedent-dependent order effects and found a weak 
statistical significance (LR Test:βCost_PrevSQ=βCost_IncrSurplus=βSQ_PrevSQ=βSQ_IncrSurplus=0; 
χ2=7.5036, 4 df, p=0.1116). This weak significance is mostly resulted from the 
relatively stronger significance of the interaction of the precedent-dependent variable 
IncrSurplus with the cost variable and the status quo option (LR Test: 
βCost_IncrSurplus=βSQ_IncrSurplus=0; χ2=4.8884, 2 df, p=0.0868).  
 
Table 2.5 Panel mixed logit model results from repeated survey format 
Variable Coefficient  
(se) [p-value] 
Std. Dev.  
(se of Std. Dev.)  
[p-value] 
Non-random parameters 
SQ  0.5818 (1.2916) [0.652] N/A 
Male!SQ  -0.2006 (0.4906) [0.683] N/A 
Age!SQ -0.0313 (0.0210) [0.137] N/A 
College!SQ -0.4131 (0.6151) [0.502] N/A 
Position4_8!SQ 0.1884 (0.5166) [0.715] N/A 
Position4_8!Cost -0.0247 (0.0239) [0.303] N/A 
Position9_12!SQ 0.4541 (0.5709) [0.426] N/A 
Position9_12!Cost 0.0107 (0.0243) [0.658] N/A 
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PrevSQChosen!SQ -1.6687 (2.7676) [0.547] N/A 
PrevSQChosen!Cost -0.1567 (0.1404) [0.265] N/A 
IncrSurplus!SQ 0.7473 (0.5799) [0.198] N/A 
IncrSurplus!Cost 0.0677 (0.0269) [0.012] N/A 
Random parameters 
Common_Road (n) 0.0754 (0.1303) [0.563] 0.1445 (0.3374) [0.668] 
Heavy_Road (n) 0.2358 (0.1333) [0.077] 0.1942 (0.2937) [0.508] 
Woodland (n) 0.1573 (0.1486) [0.290] 0.4089 (0.2009) [0.042] 
Farmland (n) -0.0462 (0.1474) [0.754] 0.6043 (0.1692) [0.0001] 
Medium_WDiversity (n) 0.3495 (0.1198) [0.004] 0.2371 (0.1940) [0.222] 
High_WDiversity (n) 0.6904 (0.1500) [0.0001] -0.5653 (0.1297) [0.0001] 
Limited_Access (n) 0.0521 (0.1344) [0.698] -0.2570 (0.2732) [0.347] 
Full_Access (n) 0.4569 (0.1771) [0.010] 0.9598 (0.1772) [0.0001] 
Medium_Sustain (n) 0.2162 (0.1190) [0.069] 0.3483 (0.1675) [0.038] 
High_Sustain (n)   1.1284 (0.1582) [0.0001] 0.3207 (0.1980) [0.105] 
Expands (n) -0.2594 (0.1195) [0.030] -0.1604 (0.1986) [0.419] 
Connects (n) 0.6457 (0.1377) [0.0001] 0.4725 (0.1698) [0.005] 
Size (n) 0.0179 (0.0088) [0.043] 0.0493 (0.0071) [0.0001] 
Cost (n) -0.0609 (0.0277) [0.028] 0.1221 (0.0201) [0.0001] 
Model statistics  
Number of observations 2880 
Number of participants  82 
Log-likelihood (LL) -703.56108 
Number of parameters  40 
AIC 1487.122 
BIC 1725.744 
LR(χ2), 14 df (p) 366.35 (p<0.0001) 
 
Table 2.5 presents estimation results of the panel mixed logit model 
represented in Eq. (3) using the responses only from the repeated response survey 
format involving twelve choice tasks. Results show that the mean coefficient estimates 
for most of wetland attribute variables, assumed to be normally distributed, are 
statistically significant except for a few variables (namely the variable representing 
type of road as Common_Road, character of surrounding land- Woodland, Farmland, 
and variable representing a limited public access- Limited_Access) (see Table 2.5). 
All of the non-monetary wetland attribute variables (random) whose mean coefficient 
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estimates are statistically significant have a positive impact on participants’ utility 
except for the variable that represents the role of the wetland parcel as expanding an 
existing protected areas (see Table 2.5), ceteris paribus. Statistically significant 
estimates of standard deviation (SD) for most of the wetland attributes suggest 
heterogeneity in preferences in relation the corresponding attributes. Results also show 
that none of parameters for the fixed variables and interactions are statistically 
significant except for a positive and significant estimate for the interaction of the cost 
variable with IncrSurplus- the variable representing precedent-dependent effect (see 
Table 2.5). This positive coefficient estimate indicates that participants who could 
have a higher predicted net surplus value for the most-valued alternative in the current 
task relative to the preceding task are less cost sensitive than on average and thus have 
a higher WTP than on average, everything else being fixed.       
 
2.6 Conclusions and implications 
In this paper, we examined whether alternative survey formats, i.e., a survey format 
involving two choice tasks compared to the survey format involving a series of twelve 
choice tasks, yield statistically equivalent choice outcomes. In particular, we examined 
whether a set of utility parameters, scale parameters and marginal WTP estimates 
differ across the response formats. Our application involved a SP survey of 
trichotomous choices for protecting wooded wetlands in Rhode Island, USA. Our 
results suggest that the survey format or sequence length results in statistically 
different marginal utility parameters for some attributes as well as the significantly 
different scale parameters. A significantly lower scale parameter for the subsample 
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that faced only two choice tasks indicates higher error variance or increased 
uncertainty or randomness in the two-choice sequence compared to the variance for 
the subsample that faced a series of twelve choice tasks. Nonetheless, we found only a 
weak statistical difference of mWTP estimates across the survey formats when 
compared individually, but found no difference when compared jointly.  
We further examined the responses under the repeated response format to 
explore any form of order effects discussed in the literature. Particularly, we examined 
position-dependent as well as precedent-dependent order effects by generating a set of 
variables or interaction terms representing the corresponding effect type and their 
effect on the marginal utility of cost to participants (and thus marginal WTP) as well 
as on the utility of the status quo option (and thus total WTP) across the sequence. Our 
results suggest evidence of a precedent-dependent effect relating to a potential to 
retain higher net surplus from the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to 
the most-valued alternative in the preceding task may induce participants to be less 
cost-sensitive and thus appear to have a higher WTP due to the precedent-dependent 
effect.   
 Our application using trichotomous choice format of wetland parcel 
preservation provides evidence of precedent-dependent effects. A recent study by 
Scheufele & Bennett (2012), using repeated binary discrete choice experiments, 
examined whether strategic opportunities provided by the order in which choice sets 
are presented affect choice decisions and found evidence of such effects in terms of 
participants’ increased cost sensitivity and thus lowering estimated willingness to pay 
(WTP) estimates if the same or similar level of provision was offered in the previous 
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choice task at a lower cost than if it was not. However, they found that the cost 
sensitivity and thus WTP remains unaffected if the same or similar level of provision 
was offered in the previous choice task at a higher cost. Their results also indicate that 
the cost sensitivity increases (and WTP decreases) as participants progress through the 
sequence of choice tasks. There is also a large number of studies which documented 
order effects of precedent-dependent type, such as starting task effects ( Bateman, 
Day, Dupont, & Georgiou, 2009; Herriges & Shogren, 1996; Ladenburg & Olsen, 
2008) or reference effects (Isoni, 2011; Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). There are 
also studies that documented order effects of position-dependent type such as learning 
effects (Braga & Starmer, 2005; Plott, 1993) or fatigue effects (Bradley & Daly, 1994; 
Savage & Waldman, 2008). Our results, however, did not display any evidence of 
position-dependent order effects. Advanced awareness (or disclosure because 
participants were able to see the repeated choice tasks in a printed survey booklet 
mailed to them) of the repeated format may have mitigated these position-dependent 
orders effects in our application, consistent with the conclusions by Bateman et al. 
(2004) and Scheufele & Bennett (2013). 
We also note one important observation from the previous studies, however, 
that these studies differ substantially in terms of number of choice tasks, choice 
context, experimental design as well as empirical models to estimate preference 
parameters and scale parameters. These differences between the studies could have 
contributed to different results in terms of whether and how these order effects are 
observed in those studies. Nonetheless, it may be worth deeper exploration of orders 
effects- both position-dependent as well as precedent-dependent in multinomial 
 129 
 
response formats. Since our application involved only two lengths of choice tasks, we 
could not test the idea of learning effect in relation to fatigue effect across the 
sequence which we could have done if we had more survey length subsamples such as 
surveys involving four, six or eight choice tasks. Future research could also investigate 
the type of strategic responses or other biases in terms of latent class modeling to learn 
about these behavioral phenomena across the classes of participants represented by 
their distinct preference functions. 
Our results, however, are consistent with the idea that may not be readily 
influenced by position-dependent effects once analysts account for heteroscedasticity. 
However, our evidence that precedent-dependent effects, linked to the potential that a 
sequence of choice questions could offer increasing (or decreasing) net benefits 
influences estimates of the marginal utility of income raises concern about the validity 
of WTP estimates. Survey respondents might view a sequence to which net benefits 
tend to increase as one offering “good deal”, whether this situation triggers a strategic 
behavior of respondents seeking to signal a demand for increasing surplus or avoiding 
“bad deals” may not be resolved by this one study. But the effect found here would 
tend to increase estimates of WTP. Future research may be needed to identify whether 
it is this increased WTP estimate that is or is not closer to true WTP. 
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MANUSCRIPT 2–APPENDIX B 
This appendix provides the estimation results of the conditional logit model of the 
utility specification in Eq. (3) using the responses from the survey involving only two 
choice tasks, so that the interaction terms involving Choice12 were absent. 
 
B1. Conditional logit model results from Choice2 subsample 
Variable Coefficient (se) [p-value] 
Status quo (SQ) -0.5113 (0.6492) [0.431] 
Common_Road .0216 (0.0775) [0.780] 
Heavy_Road -0.1072 (0.0776) [0.167] 
Woodland 0.3418 (0.0803) [0.0001] 
Farmland -0.0037 (0.0804) [0.963] 
Medum_WLDiversity 0.0128 (0.0649) [0.843] 
High_WLDiversity 0.3767 (0.0644) [0.0001] 
Limited_Access -0.0311 (0.0749) [0.678] 
Full_Access 0.3141 (0.0802) [0.0001] 
Medium_Sustain 0.1337 (0.0676) [0.048] 
High_Sustain 0.1746 (0.0699) [0.012] 
Expands -0.0253 (0.0765) [0.740] 
Connects 0.0535 (0.0742) [0.471] 
Size 0.0218 (0.0046) [0.0001] 
Cost -0.0119 (0.0055) [0.031] 
Male!SQ  0.3067 (0.2633) [0.244] 
Age!SQ 0.0178 (0.0094) [0.059] 
College!SQ -0.3633 (0.2748) [0.186] 
Model statistics  
Number of observations 2388 
Number of participants 402 
Log-likelihood value -791.8468 
AIC 1619.69 
BIC 1723.70 
Wald χ2, 18 df (p)  109.45 (p<0.0001) 
Pseudo R2 0.0945 
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3.1 Abstract 
 Benefits from provision of public goods cannot be made exclusive. This non-
exclusive characteristic of the public goods naturally creates an incentive for 
individuals to ‘free-ride’ on others’ contribution, resulting persistently in under-
provision of such goods. Some individuals still contribute towards the private 
provision of such public goods despite the well-known free-rider problem in both 
laboratory experiments as well as actual fund-raising efforts. One relatively pragmatic 
public good institution, that may mitigate the ‘free-riding’ behavior, is an 
individualized price auction (IPA) motivated by Lindahl’s framework for public 
goods. We solicit individualized offers for multiple successive units or a range of 
quantities (or units) of the good under the IPA approach. These multiple successive 
offers generated from the IPA approach are then empirically compared against the 
corresponding offers generated from a voluntary donation institution, both 
incorporating the incentive mechanisms from experimental economics literature 
including a provision point (PP) with a money back guarantee (MBG) and 
proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds beyond the PP. Using a split sample 
approach in a field experiment setting, we ask participants to contribute real dollars 
towards public good projects focused on water quality improvements resulting from 
implementing best manure management practices in local livestock farms in their local 
watershed system. Our results suggest that participants under the voluntary donation 
approach made higher offers, on average, than those under the IPA. Even though 
individuals’ average offers were approximately constant across the available range of 
improvements (or quantities of the good) in water quality under both institutions, we 
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discovered a statistically different pattern of offers. Results from a two-limit tobit 
model further suggest a statistically significant effect of participants’ socio-
demographic profiles on the expected total offers for the public good across the two 
public good institutions. 
 
Key words: Public good provision, individualized price auction, proportional rebate, 
provision point, voluntary donation, best manure management practice, water quality 
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3.2 Introduction 
Valuing public goods and their efficient provision have posed a fundamental challenge 
to both economists and fundraisers because the providers of public goods cannot 
exclude potential beneficiaries who do not pay toward the cost of provision. Thus 
public goods naturally create an economic incentive for individuals to “free-ride” on 
others’ contributions. The game-theoretic prediction in a public good experiment is 
that contributing nothing may be a dominant strategy for an individual (Ledyard, 
1995), no matter how much the others contribute. The total free rider prediction seems 
evidently not true in previous public good experiments. Existence of the “free rider 
problem” obviously cannot be denied in these experiments, but it is also true that a 
change in public good institutions, under which individuals contribute to provide these 
goods, may mitigate the free rider problem. Without any additional change in 
institutional structure, for example, a voluntary donation approach will not produce the 
Pareto28 optimal level of public good provision. But it may be possible to create a 
Pareto improvement by changing the institutional structure, and thus the incentive 
structure, under which individuals make contributions (Groves & Ledyard, 1977; 
Ledyard & Palfrey, 1994).  
One promising and relatively more pragmatic institutional structure is a public 
good auction approach developed by (Swallow, Smith, & Anderson, 2013), hereafter 
referred to as the individualized price auction (IPA)29, which is motivated by Lindahl’s 
                                                
28 Pareto optimal, also known as Pareto efficient, outcome is a state of allocation of a 
public good in which it is not possible to make any individual better off without 
making at least one individual worse off. 
29 The IPA is patented business process, patent number US 8,429,023 B2 sponsored by 
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framework for public goods (Lindahl, 1919). Lindahl’s equilibrium (Lindahl, 1919; 
Samuelson, 1954, 1955) is an efficient equilibrium for public goods and the IPA 
approach, motivated by this framework, can reach a Pareto optimal level of public 
good provision theoretically if each individual were to contribute their full marginal 
value on each unit of the good (Groves & Ledyard, 1977; Walker, 1981) However, 
economic consensus has long held that it may be impossible to generate enough 
funding for the Pareto optimal level of public goods in real situations (Nicholson, 
2005). This consensus among economists has not been well tested in empirical 
framework except Smith & Swallow (2013) and Smith (2012). One of the simple 
institutions most tested in laboratory public good experiments is a voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM).  Our study empirically compares the revenue 
generation potential of the IPA approach compared to voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM) with the provision point (PP) and a money back guarantee (MBG) 
and the proportional rebate (PR) incentive mechanisms.  
We employed a split sample design to compare offers under these two public 
good institutions. We utilized a field application in which participants contributed real 
dollars towards implementing manure management projects in their local watershed. 
Our results suggest that higher offers, on average, are realized under the voluntary 
donation approach than those under the IPA, although average contributions remain 
approximately constant for the available range of improvements in water quality (or 
units of the good) across the public good treatments. Our results also suggest 
                                                                                                                                       
NSF, grant No DEB0621014. 
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heterogeneous contributions across socio-demographic profiles of participants 
between the public good treatments.  
In previous experimental studies of the voluntary donation elicitation, 
participants have been provided with an endowment of experimental dollars and are 
asked to voluntarily provide some of the endowment towards the provision of the 
public good. Participants receive benefits the public good provides net of the cost they 
voluntarily paid. Under this institution, the Pareto optimal level of provision results 
when all participants contribute their full endowment (Davis & Holt, 1993), but the 
dominant strategy for an individual is to contribute nothing, producing a non-
cooperative equilibrium that is not a Pareto optimal level (Ledyard, 1995). However, 
experimental evidence also suggests that many participants contribute to the public 
good, usually 40-60% of endowed experimental dollars, although, conditional on 
everyone else’s contribution, one individual could maximize his or her payoffs by 
contributing nothing (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). Economists have incorporated various 
incentive mechanisms into the voluntary donation institution to mitigate “free-riding” 
behavior. One important modification is a provision point or a threshold, i.e., 
minimum amount of money required to implement the public good (Bagnoli & 
Lipman, 1989; Bagnoli & Mckee, 1991). It is found to induce participants to make 
higher offers than occurs without the provision point (Bagnoli & Mckee, 1991; 
Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992; Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe, 1999; Rondeau, Poe, & 
Schulze, 2005). Under the provision point mechanism, “free-riding” is no longer a 
dominant strategy. Furthermore, a money back guarantee (MBG) ensures participants 
that their offers will be returned if the group is unable to meet the pre-determined 
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provision point. A MBG has been found to generate higher offers than the experiments 
without the MBG (Isaac, Schmidtz, & Walker, 1989; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989; 
Marks & Croson, 1998; Cadsby & Maynes, 1999; Spencer, Swallow, Shogren, & List, 
2009). In case of the excess funds beyond the provision point, a proportional rebate 
(PR) rule, which returns excess funds to the participants in proportion to their original 
offer, imposes a weaker marginal penalty for over-contributions than does a 
mechanism without a rebate (Marks & Croson, 1998) and thus has been found to 
garner higher offers (or at least no lower offers) when used with a provision point and 
a MBG (Marks & Croson, 1998; Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe, 1999; Poe, Clark, 
Rondeau, & Schulze, 2002; Spencer et al., 2009). These previous public goods 
experiments employing a voluntary donation elicitation with the incentive mechanisms 
solicit participants’ offers for a single unit of the public good.  
A long-held consensus among economists that it may be impossible to raise 
enough revenues for efficient provision of public goods has been put into an empirical 
test recently by Smith & Swallow (2013) and Smith (2012) by developing a public 
good auction approach- the IPA. The IPA approach solicits offers on successive 
cumulative units of a public good. For each unit of the good, the IPA establishes many 
individualized prices, one for each participant. An equilibrium quantity of the good, 
for a group of individuals, is determined based on the last unit of the good for which 
the aggregate offers from all individuals on that unit covers or exceeds the delivery 
cost of that unit (Smith & Swallow, 2013). A chief motivation of the IPA is that the 
auctioneer evaluates bids sequentially, so that bidders know in advance that bids on 
each unit must be sufficient to provide that unit in order for the auctioneer to move on 
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to evaluate bids on the subsequent unit, while the payment will be determined by bids 
on that last unit provided. This conditional bid evaluation process may encourage 
participants to offer a sequence of non-increasing bids in hopes of building an excess 
of benefits over costs as the auction delivers a higher number of units. In theory, the 
IPA approach can reach the optimal level of public good provision if each individual 
offers his or her full marginal value on each unit. In this study, we employed the IPA 
approach by incorporating the provision point (PP) with a money back guarantee 
(MBG) and the proportional rebate (PR) of the excess funds, if any, beyond the PP. 
There exists almost no empirical study examining the empirical performance 
of Lindahl’s framework for provision of public goods in experimental settings except 
Smith & Swallow (2013) and Smith (2012). Smith (2012) explored the feasibility of 
implementing the IPA using incentive mechanisms – proportional rebate (PR) and 
pivotal mechanism (PM)30 - by eliciting offers on successive units of the public good, 
thus obtaining individual marginal offer curves. Employing a split-sample design, she 
used laboratory experiments to explore the IPA and also compared the results using 
field experimental settings involving actual implementation of public goods with real 
contribution to pay for provision. Her results suggest that participants were making 
                                                
30 The pivotal mechanism (PM) is adapted from the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke 
mechanism, which employs a provision point (PP) to provide the marginal unit of a 
public good if the sum of the groups’ contributions covers the delivery cost of the 
public good. In this case, a participant is considered to be pivotal on the marginal unit 
if the public good cannot be provided without his or her contribution. Also, 
participants who are considered to be pivotal will pay only the contribution required to 
meet the provision point. 
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offers consistent with decreasing marginal benefits for additional units of the good. 
The IPA may perform better than many public good experiments seen in the literature 
in terms of higher average proportion of induced value offered in the first unit of the 
good in the IPA (Smith, 2013) relative to one-shot single-unit induced value 
experiment. She also compared the marginal offers (or estimates) elicited from the 
IPA with the marginal values (i.e., marginal willingness to pay or mWTP) estimated 
from a discrete choice experiment (DCE) involving binary choices with the incentive-
compatible majority provision rule. This comparison suggested that the marginal 
estimates from the IPA are not statistically different from the mWTP estimates from 
the DCE, which supports the promising result in favor of the IPA process. Yet, the 
empirical performance of the IPA process for the private provision of public goods 
still remains inadequately understood.    
This study empirically compares the performance of the IPA approach in terms 
of revenue generation potential relative to a voluntary donation elicitation for private 
provision of public goods in a framed field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004; List, 
2008). Unlike most previous public good experiments, our study elicits participants’ 
offers on successive and non-uniform discrete units of a public good by employing the 
IPA process. The marginal offers on the successive non-uniform discrete units of the 
good elicited under the IPA approach are empirically compared to the donations 
elicited under a voluntary donation when both approaches use the PP with a MBG and 
the PR of any excess funds beyond the PP. Employing a split sample approach, this 
study utilizes a field application where participants contributed real dollars to provide 
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an ecosystem service regarding water quality in their local watershed system through 
improved manure management practices in local livestock farms.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 outlines the theoretical 
framework. Section 3.4 described the field experimental design and procedures. 
Section 3.5 reports the results and section 3.6 discusses the conclusions and 
implications of the results.   
 
3.3 The conceptual model 
Consider a problem of delivering multiple units of a public good, but when these units 
are only available in discrete packages. This situation could apply to protection of 
water quality by implementing manure management on farms of various sizes.  Then 
consider raising funds for the public good by soliciting donations.  Rather than open-
ended donations, we take a more structured approach of requesting donations for a 
task, where each task j adds qj units of public good to the preceding task, for an 
accumulated provision of Qj in task j, which incorporates all the qk for k <= j 
(Qj=Σjqj).  We will empirically examine the solicitation of donations through a 
sequence of donation tasks, numbering J’, as compared to a sequence of the IPA tasks, 
numbering J = 2J’, covering the same range of total units (QJ’ = QJ) using the more 
structured IPA approach.  
Now, consider a group of N field experiment participants. Each individual 
participant i is provided with a fixed personal budget (B). Each auction participant is 
asked to offer his or her contribution for a collection of units of a public good Qj in 
task j. A task j included a collection of units of a public good and the number of units 
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of the good offered in a task is based on a discrete project that providers can deliver. 
Therefore, each task consists of non-uniform discrete collection of units of the good. 
Participants are asked to make offers for multiple tasks, j=1,2,3, …, J.  
Under the IPA approach, participants choose a “contribution per unit” to buy 
all the units included in a particular task, multiplying the “contribution per unit” offer 
with the total units included in that task equals the total offer for that task. Participants 
faced two types of constraints regarding their decisions to contribute to a particular 
task under the IPA process: (i) their total offer in a task cannot exceed the fixed 
personal budget B and (ii) they could only offer the same or less “contribution per 
unit” in the subsequent tasks than in the preceding task. Unlike other public goods 
institutions examined in a majority of previous experiments, the IPA process in our 
experiments elicited participants’ offers on successive non-uniform discrete collection 
of units of the public good, thus producing a total of J offers on the corresponding J 
tasks. 
Under the voluntary donation approach, participants choose a lump-sum 
amount to offer, any amount between $0 and the fixed personal budget B, for all the 
units of the good included in a particular task. Participants faced only one constraint 
regarding their decisions to contribute to a particular task, i.e., the lump-sum amount 
of donation for a particular task cannot exceed the fixed budget B. Moreover, J tasks 
presented to IPA participants were reduced to J’ (=J/2) by merging successive pairs of 
tasks under IPA to create tasks under the voluntary donation approach. This merging 
of successive pairs of tasks allows a comparison of the IPA to a multi-unit ordinary 
donations approach. While the IPA approach looks at discrete lumps of units, based on 
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price per unit that can be delivered (but the units had to be delivered in packages 
corresponding to on-farm projects), the donations approach just asks for money that 
will be used to carry out as many projects as possible to deliver as many units within a 
given range as possible. Unlike previous experiments using the voluntary donation 
approach, our field experiment participants made a total of J’ lump-sum amounts of 
donations to be used for the corresponding J’ non-uniform discrete sets of units of the 
public good to go as far as possible delivering units within a particular range covered 
in the task. Thus, like common philanthropic donation, payment was not tied to 
specific quantity delivered, except that delivery of within the range of a given tasked 
assured delivery of all units from the preceding task.  
We employed a provision point (PP) mechanism with the MBG, if no units of 
the public good are provided, and proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds beyond 
the PP from offers that apply to the units of the delivered task. The PP mechanism 
requires that the sum of the offers from all participants in a particular task equal or 
exceed the delivery cost of providing the units of the public good in that task. Since 
each participant makes an offer for each task for a total of J IPA tasks (or J’ Donation 
tasks), there will also be the corresponding J (or J’) number of provision points or one 
provision point for each task, denoted by PPj. The implemented level of the public 
good will be the task, hereafter referred to as a binding task, for which the sum of 
offers from all participants is equal to or exceeds the corresponding provision point 
PPj. If no bundle of units of the good is provided i.e., no PPj is met, the MBG ensures 
that participants would receive their fixed budget B back. If a set of units of the good, 
the units of the good in some task j, are provided and result in excess funds collected 
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(based on offers for task j) beyond the corresponding provision point PPj, participants 
would receive the excess funds back in a rebate. The rebate amount will be in 
proportion to their total offer in the binding task j, as defined by the PR rule. 
The payoff function for participant i in the field experiment based on the PR rule is 
given by the following expression:  
(1) Πij*=(B-Oij*)+Vij*+ (Oij*/ΣiOij*) (ΣiOij*-PPj*) for j{1,…,J}, j*=max{j| ΣiOij≥PPj for 
all j≤j* 
     Πij=B only if max j with ΣiOij≥PPj does not exist for j≥1. 
where Πij gives the earning for a participant i in the experiment which is equal to their 
budget net of the total offer in the binding task j (B-Oij) plus the (monetized) benefits 
of the units of the good to participant i denoted by Vij and any rebate in proportion to 
the original total offer Oij in the binding task j beyond the PPj given by last term in the 
first line of Eq. (1). Since the MBG feature is included in our experiments, participants 
receive their full budget B if no collection of units of the good is provided, as given by 
the second line of Eq. (1) above.   
As discussed and illustrated graphically in Swallow (2013), Smith & Swallow 
(2013) and Smith (2012), participants in the IPA framework may have a unilateral 
incentive to make offers reflecting their marginal value in an expectation to retain 
added surplus value if the auction settles on later units. Moreover, the IPA approach 
asks participants about their “price per unit” offer trying to mimic a familiar market 
purchasing decisions, although they were asked about the public good. In sum, the 
IPA approach constituted a framework to induce participants to think in a more 
structured way to decide on their contribution for the public good. A voluntary 
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donation elicitation, on the other hand, asks participants about their lump-sum amount 
of donation for units of the good, which is a less-structured framework for public 
goods. Unlike previous public good experiments employing a voluntary donation 
approach, our field experiments asked a series of donations for the corresponding 
successive non-uniform discrete set of units of the good. Although none of the public 
good institutions in our field experiments is theoretically incentive-compatible, 
incentives embedded in the IPA approach from Lindahl’s framework for public goods 
may suggest that the IPA may garner higher offers than the voluntary donation 
elicitation.       
 
3.4 A field application to water quality ecosystem service in local watershed 
3.4.1 Study background and area 
This study was part of a larger project that aimed to demonstrate a market-like process 
for delivery of ecosystem services by bringing together both sides of the market, i.e., 
the suppliers of ecosystem services and the potential consumer beneficiaries from 
provision of such services (Uchida et al., 2014). In the larger part of the project, a 
spatially-explicit watershed simulation model was developed using the Soil and Water 
Assessment Tool (SWAT)31 to model the relationship between the manure 
management decisions on local livestock farms within a watershed and the change in 
                                                
31 SWAT is a watershed hydrological transport model developed to quantify the 
impact of land management practices on water, sediment, and agricultural chemicals 
using components like weather hydrology, soil temperature and properties, plant 
growth, nutrients, pesticides, bacteria and pathogens and land management (Arnold et 
al., 2012). 
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phosphorus loadings (kg P reduced per year for 20 years) into the Scituate Reservoir 
waters in Rhode Island, USA.     
 Phosphorus is a naturally occurring nutrient that helps plants grow. The natural 
environment in a watershed system can absorb and use phosphorus without pushing 
the natural function of the ecosystem outside its normal character. However, human 
actions also contribute phosphorous to the watershed system via various activities, and 
thus human actions can push the natural system to that threshold or beyond. One such 
prominent, human-induced source of phosphorous to the watershed system is 
pastureland where livestock are raised. A recent limnological study documents 
evidence of phosphorus-driven eutrophication and algal blooms in some portions of 
the reservoir system (ESS Group, Inc., 2011). One way to reduce phosphorus loadings 
from human-induced sources into the reservoir water is to implement manure 
management practices in local livestock farms, which may prevent leaching 
phosphorous from livestock manure by rainwater which drains to the nearest water 
bodies and ultimately to the reservoir system.  
We collaborated with local conservation groups, focus group participants and 
mailings to identify livestock owners who could voluntarily agree to participate in our 
supply side field experiment. Best manure management practices in our project 
involved two types of practices: i) building a manure pad to store livestock manure 
instead of piling manure in nearby woods leaving it exposed to rain; and ii) installing a 
gutter system to redirect rain water off the manure piles to a safer outlet. Phosphorus 
prevented from entering the water bodies through the manure management practices 
reduces the excessive growth of plants, thereby reducing the algal bloom events and 
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thus prevents the surface water quality from deteriorating. In order to derive a supply 
curve for improved water quality, Uchida et al. (2014) conducted a reverse auction 
process to solicit bids for payments from local livestock owners to implement best 
manure management practices on their farms in exchange for compensation.  
 The major objective of the present study is to bring the demand-side 
dimension, meaning potential consumer beneficiaries’ values in terms of willingness-
to-contribute for improved water quality, into a market-like process for improved 
water quality. In order to do so, we conducted field experiments to ask local resident-
volunteers how much they would be willing to contribute for water quality 
improvements in their watershed system. We conducted these demand-side field 
experiments in the context of the Scituate reservoir system, which supplies drinking 
water to residents of the city of Providence and surrounding suburb communities in 
Rhode Island, USA. The reservoir system is composed of six interlinked sub-
watersheds. The town of Scituate constitutes the major part of the watershed system 
including some portions of the towns of Foster and Glocester, Rhode Island, USA. 
The reservoir system does not serve drinking water to the residents of these towns 
directly, but the residents are known to enjoy recreating in the watershed. 
Furthermore, many resident volunteers, who participated in our focus group 
discussions, expressed their sense of being responsible ‘stewards’ of the watershed. 
Some also considered a potential hydrologic linkage between surface water quality 
and ground water sources that provide their own household with drinking water.    
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3.4.2 The public good 
Many ecosystem services, like improved water quality in our study, are public goods 
because the providers (or local livestock owners) of these services cannot require 
potential beneficiaries to pay for these services. The consumer beneficiaries of 
improved water quality in a local watershed system may enjoy the benefits without 
having to pay for those benefits. Therefore, the public good in our field experiment is 
the improvement or protection of water quality in the local watershed system, with the 
unit of the good described as the phosphorus reduction at the reservoir that would have 
resulted from a proportional number of tons of cow manure prevented from entering 
the reservoir directly. Tons of cow manure prevented from entering the reservoir 
represents the units of the good (affecting water quality); these units were chosen to 
present water quality improvements in more familiar terms to the field experiment 
participants as potential donors.   
 
3.4.3 Field experiment participants 
A commercial marketing company, Lighthouse Consulting Group, recruited 
participants for our field experiments. Participants for the experiment were adult 
citizens living in one of the towns of Scituate, Foster and Glocester in Rhode Island, 
USA and were contacted through posting invitation flyers to the town email listserv, 
town websites, local newsletters, and on-the-ground distribution, as well as posters in 
local public places. Contacted individuals were asked to sign up for one of the 
available nights and were offered a $50 participation fee.   
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3.4.4 Experimental procedures 
Participants were gathered in a local community building of the town of Scituate to 
participate in a 2-hour session titled “Water Quality Decision-Making Workshop”. A 
total of three sessions were conducted among which two involved the IPA treatment 
and the remaining one involved the voluntary donation treatment. Each participant 
took part in only one of the three sessions. Participants were requested to avoid talking 
to their friends or neighbors about the workshop and were told multiple sessions 
would be held during a 2-week period. Each session was led by the same experiment 
moderator and involved the same set of experimental procedures to keep information 
provided to participants across the sessions as similar as possible. The only difference 
between the treatments was the description of the corresponding treatment. To 
summarize, each session involved the following steps.  
 
3.4.4.1 Background presentation 
The experiment moderator32 began each session with a scripted PowerPoint 
presentation to provide participants with information on the linkages between manure 
management practices in local livestock farms, phosphorus and the implications for 
the water quality of the reservoir system. The presentation involved illustrations using 
example photographs of water bodies affected by excessive phosphorus loadings, as 
                                                
32 The authors gratefully acknowledge the excellent moderation of the field 
experiments by Carrie A. Gill, Graduate Research Assistant at the Department of 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (ENRE), University of Rhode Island, 
Kingston, Rhode Island, USA (see Manuscript 3-Appendix C2 for additional details).  
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well as structures to be installed, if implemented, as best manure management 
practices. After the background presentation on manure management, phosphorus and 
water quality, participants were told that each would receive $100, in addition to the 
$50 participant fee, with which they could decide between contributing to a collective 
fund to pay for implementing on-farm manure management projects or to take some 
money home to spend on other priorities. A brief question-answer session was allowed 
at the end of the presentation and the moderator carefully answered questions raised to 
maintain neutrality of the information given to the participants, without leading them 
in any direction.  
 
3.4.4.2 Survey instrument 
Each participant was provided with a survey packet that consisted of a survey booklet 
(see Manuscript 3-Appendix C3) and an official envelope of University of Rhode 
Island, Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (ENRE). 
Before participants started making decisions on contributions toward on-farm manure 
management projects, each participant was asked to write their home address on a 
mailing envelope so that the research team could send the remaining portion of their 
$100, if any, to participants based on the outcome of the workshops at the end of all 
sessions to be held in a 2-week period (October 28- November, 12, 2014). The survey 
booklet was developed to solicit participants’ contributions or offers for on-farm 
manure management projects. The booklet contained written instructions for soliciting 
participants’ offers and the experiment moderator read these instructions aloud, along 
with the participants. Participants were provided with a form soliciting their offers for 
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the manure management projects; in the IPA they made six offers (J=6), while in the 
donations workshop, participants made three offers (J’=3).  
In the IPA workshop (treatment group), participants were asked to evaluate a 
series of six “tasks” representing a set of on-farm manure management projects. Two 
or more on-farm projects from participating livestock owners were combined33, by 
preserving the ranking of the projects in terms of cost per kg of P reduced per year for 
20 years so that the most cost-efficient projects appear first in the sequence and the 
least cost-efficient at the end, to form these tasks. IPA participants were asked to make 
a “price per ton” offer for manure management projects, multiplying with the tons of 
cow manure managed by a given task to obtain the total offer for that project in the 
first task. The second task included the manure management from the first task (q1) 
and an additional increment (q2), that could be delivered at the second cheapest cost 
per kg P reduced per year for 20 years, by combining tons of cow manure prevented 
from both the tasks, (so task 2 would deliver a total of Q2 = q1 + q2 kg reduction in P 
loadings) and so on to define tasks 3 through 6 for the IPA. Participants were 
instructed that their total contribution or offer in each task was not allowed to exceed 
                                                
33A farmer or provider of improved water quality implements a fixed-impact project 
and these are ordered by cost per kg of phosphorus loading to the reservoir. In 
practice, we sometimes merged two or more on-farm projects into one discrete on-
farm project, but the main idea for the economics is that the qj increments were fixed 
by the technology of on-farm manure management, which was tied to farm or 
livestock-herd size and location in the watershed and its hydrologic connectivity to 
loadings as modeled by SWAT. 
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their fixed budget of $100.34 In the subsequent tasks, participants were only allowed to 
make equal or less “price per ton” offers on the preceding task.35 Participants were 
provided with a chart to help calculate their total offer corresponding to the chosen 
“price per ton” value in an increment of 10 cents in all tasks (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1 An example task under Individualized Price Auction (IPA) 
 
In the voluntary donation workshop (treatment group), participants were asked 
to evaluate a series of three “tasks” consisting of the same set of on-farm manure 
                                                
34 This limited contributions to funds by the researchers, in compliance with IRB 
approved protocol for research involving human subjects. 
35 Participants were explicitly instructed to make non-increasing bids.  
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management projects as in the IPA workshop. However, as previously described, two 
successive IPA “tasks” were simply merged to construct one donation “task”, thus 
producing a total of three donation “tasks” from the six IPA “tasks”. Participants were 
asked to make a lump-sum donation amount to contribute toward implementing the 
greatest possible number of on-farm projects included in a particular “task” and the 
total donation was not allowed to exceed their fixed budget of $100 in each of the 
three tasks.  
The survey booklet also contained a set of follow-up questions asking 
participants about how they responded to the “tasks” as well as their general opinion 
on various statements about the water quality issues in the surrounding communities 
and local livestock farms using 7-point scale Likert-scale questions from “Strongly 
Agree” to “Strongly Disagree” Finally, the survey booklet contained questions 
soliciting socio-demographic characteristics of participants. 
 
3.4.4.3 Outcome of the workshops 
Participants were told, on the day of their workshop, that the outcome would be 
determined after collecting survey responses from all three sessions. All survey 
responses were collected from all three sessions and gathered at the University of 
Rhode Island. Then the research team evaluated the aggregate offers in a particular 
task from all participants from all three sessions against the cost of delivering the on-
farm manure management projects in that task. Offers in the donations task 1 could be 
applied in aggregate to supplement offers from IPA task 1. If the aggregate amount 
exceeded the cost of providing IPA task 1, we proceeded to evaluate IPA task 2 using 
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offers from IPA task 2 and combining this money again with offers from donation task 
1. Similarly, in evaluating IPA task 3 and, subsequently, IPA task 4, we applied offers 
from donations task 2. We continued this bid evaluation process until we found a task 
in which aggregate offers were not enough to cover the cost(s) of the project(s) in that 
task. In our field experiments, aggregate offers, evaluated by the process described 
above, for IPA task 3 were not enough to cover the cost(s) of the project(s) included in 
that task. Therefore, IPA task 2 (or the corresponding donation task 1) was determined 
as the binding task, and the on-farm manure management projects included in that task 
would be implemented. Participants’ actual payments for the corresponding on-farm 
manure management projects ($100 minus total offer in the binding task) plus any 
rebate amount would also be calculated based on their total offers or donations in the 
binding task.  
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics about experiment participants 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics about the participants across the public 
good treatments. Continuous variables discussed at the bottom of Table 3.1 (except 
Age, Resident (Years) and Income) were constructed using factor analysis approach 
(Milan & Whittaker, 1995). We utilized participants’ responses to attitude statements 
about their views and opinions regarding local livestock farms, water quality and 
quality of life on a 7-point Likert scale to construct continuous factor score variables 
by employing a principal component factor (PCF) with varimax rotation method. The 
rotated factor loadings on each statement presented in Table 3.2 are then used to 
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convert Likert scale responses to “standardized scores” for individual participants by 
the regressions scores method (Milan & Whittaker, 1995) in Stata statistical package. 
A participant who has a high value for Factor One tends to represent the belief that 
local livestock farms should adopt farming practices to reduce nutrient inputs like 
phosphorus to water bodies affecting the water quality; they would be willing to 
support these farmers; and manure management operations in local livestock farms 
should be regulated to improve water quality. Factor Two tends to indicate that a 
participant with a high value for this factor is concerned about water quality in lakes 
and streams near their home because they value water quality even if they do not 
directly use lakes and streams and they believe local livestock farmers in their 
neighborhood are good stewards of the land. A high value for Factor Three for a 
participant seems to suggest the belief that local farms face difficult competition to 
survive in a modern economy and they should receive financial and technical 
assistance to be better environmental stewards. A participant who displays a high 
value for Factor Four seems to be concerned about the water quality in lakes and 
streams for recreational activities such as swimming, fishing, or boating and doesn’t 
believe that the homes that actually drink Scituate reservoir water should pay the costs 
of manure management.     
 
 
 
 
 
 159 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of participants across public good treatments 
 
 
 
Categorical 
variables 
 
 
Description 
Public goods treatments 
Voluntary 
donation 
(N=30) 
Combined 
IPA 
(N=69) 
Pearson 
χ2, 1df 
(p) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
 
Male  1 if a participant is male; 
0 otherwise 
0.43 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.0146 
(0.904) 
Livestock 
owner 
1 if a participant owns a 
livestock; 0 otherwise 
0.07 (0.26) 0.14 (0.35) 1.0964 
(0.295) 
Home owner 1 if a participant owns a 
home; 0 otherwise 
0.83 (0.38) 0.88 (0.32) 0.4716 
(0.492) 
Lawn-
fertilizer user 
1 if a participant fertilizes 
their lawn and garden; 0 
otherwise 
0.65 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50) 1.2642 
(0.261) 
Member 1 if a participant is 
currently affiliated to any 
environmental groups or 
causes; 0 otherwise 
0.13 (0.35) 0.22 (0.42) 1.0140 
(0.314) 
Graduate 
degree 
1 if a participant has a 
graduate degree; 0 
otherwise 
0.13 (0.35) 0.22 (0.42) 0.9526 
(0.329) 
Lakes visitor 1 if a participant visited 
freshwater lakes or 
steams either for personal 
enjoyment or recreations 
in the past 12 months; 0 
otherwise 
0.83 (0.38) 0.79 (0.41) 0.1770 
(0.674) 
Donate 1 if a participant donated 
to environmental causes 
or groups in the past 12 
months; 0 otherwise 
0.37 (0.49) 0.26 (0.44) 1.1299 
(0.288) 
Volunteer  1 if a participant 
volunteered in 
environmental projects or 
causes in the past 12 
months; 0 otherwise 
0.40 (0.49) 0.28 (0.45) 1.5102 
(0.219) 
Continuous 
variables 
Description Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
t-stat, df 
(p) 
Age  Age of participant in 
years 
50.68 
(13.81) 
48.38 
(16.42) 
0.6724, 97 
df (0.5029) 
Resident Number of years a 19.89 23.96 1.1657, 97 
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(Years) participant lived in or 
around towns of Scituate, 
Foster or Glocester  
(15.11) (16.29) df (0.2466) 
Income   Participant’s total 
household income (in 
‘000 dollars) 
84,913.29   
(46,456.98) 
65,624.50  
(41,427.89) 
2.0022, 91 
df (0.0482) 
“Support and 
Regulate 
Farms” 
(Factor One) 
A continuous factor score 
indicating attitude that 
local livestock farms 
should be required to 
adopt farming practices 
to reduce degradation of 
water quality and 
livestock operations 
should be regulated.  
 
0.05    
(0.92) 
 
-0.02    
(1.03) 
0.3283, 92 
df (0.7434) 
“Good 
Stewardship” 
(Factor Two) 
A continuous factor score 
indicating pro-attitude 
toward protecting water 
quality in lakes and 
streams to affect the 
quality of life, local 
livestock farms are good 
stewards and value water 
quality even without 
using directly.  
 
-0.05    
(1.16) 
 
0.02    
(0.93) 
0.3258, 92 
df (0.7454) 
“Assist 
Farms” 
(Factor 
Three) 
A continuous factor score 
indicating a belief that 
local farms face difficult 
competition to survive in 
a modern economy and 
should receive financial 
and technical assistance.  
 
0.33     
(1.26) 
 
-0.13    
(0.85) 
2.0348, 92 
df (0.0448) 
“Water 
quality for 
Recreation” 
(Factor Four) 
A continuous factor score 
indicating a pro-attitude 
for water quality for 
recreational activities 
such as swimming, 
fishing or boating. 
0.36    
(1.12) 
-0.15    
(0.92) 
2.2797, 92 
df (0.0249) 
 
Firstly, we compared the socio-demographic profiles of participants across the 
two IPA sessions using a chi-squared test of independence for categorical variables 
and a two-sample t-test for continuous variables and found no significant difference 
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for all demographic characteristics presented in Table 3.1 (see Manuscript 3- 
Appendix C1). Thus the two IPA session data were combined. Then we also compared 
socio-demographic profiles of participants under this combined IPA participant-
sample with those of the voluntary donation using a chi-squared test of independence 
for categorical variables and a two-sample t-test of mean values of continuous 
variables. The test results suggest that the subsamples (the combined IPA and the 
voluntary donation) are not significantly different from each other in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics except participants in the voluntary donation treatment 
had significantly higher income (at the 5% level of significance) and statistically 
higher and positive average score (at the 5% level of significance) for the factor 
variables “Assist Farms” and “Water Quality for Recreation” than the participants in 
the IPA treatment.  
 
Table 3.2 Varimax rotated factor loadings of Likert-scale statements 
 
Statementsa 
Factor One  
“Support 
and Regulate 
Farms” 
Factor Two 
“Good 
Stewardship” 
Factor 
Three 
“Assist 
Farms”  
Factor Four 
“Water 
Quality for 
Recreation” 
The quality of water in 
lakes and streams near 
my home affects my 
quality of life. 
0.4811     0.6296    -0.0211     0.2019 
I am concerned about 
water quality in lakes 
and streams near my 
home. 
0.3519     0.7492     0.1821     0.1900 
I am concerned about 
water quality in lakes 
and streams near my 
home because they are 
used for recreation, such 
as swimming, fishing, or 
0.1438     0.0695     0.1685     0.8219 
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boating. 
I value water quality in 
lakes and streams near 
my home even if I do 
not use them. 
0.4231     0.6718     0.0649     0.0751 
I believe local livestock 
farms affect water 
quality of lakes and 
streams near my home. 
0.7791     0.2727     0.0276    -0.0095 
I believe local livestock 
farms are a significant 
source of nutrients like 
phosphorus, which 
adversely affects water 
quality in lakes and 
streams near my home. 
0.8586     0.1409     0.0714     0.0625 
Livestock farms should 
adopt farming practices 
that reduce the amount 
of nutrients like 
phosphorus from 
entering lakes and 
streams near my home. 
0.8305     0.1566     0.1424     0.0198 
Livestock farmers in my 
neighborhood are good 
stewards of the land. 
-0.2489    0.6268     0.2592    -0.2221 
I would be willing to 
support local livestock 
farmers that improve 
their farming practices 
in order to improve 
water quality. 
0.4780     0.4251     0.3563     0.0198 
Local livestock farmers 
should receive financial 
and technical assistance 
so that they can be better 
environmental stewards. 
0.2036     0.1211     0.7917     0.0864 
I believe local farms 
face difficult 
competition to survive in 
a modern economy. 
-0.0289   0.4099     0.6589     0.1621 
I believe homes that 
actually drink Scituate 
Reservoir water should 
pay the costs of manure 
management. 
0.2579    -0.3408   0.4776    -0.5262 
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I believe manure 
management operations 
in local livestock farms 
should be regulated. 
0.6271    -0.0792     0.3509     0.3754 
Eigen Value 4.8291 1.5817 1.2955 1.0485 
aSurvey participants rated each statement using a seven-point Likert-scale varying 
from Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7). Numbers in bold represent varimax 
rotated highest factor loading (normalized to mean 0 and SD 1) for a given statement 
indicating agreement for positive coefficient and vice versa. Total variation explained 
by the four factors is 67.34%. 
 
3.5.2 Participants’ contributions across the tasks  
We first examined participants’ average contribution across the tasks under the two 
public good treatments. Participants in the donations-based Workshop donated, on 
average, about $53 in the first task and about $58 in the third task. These average 
donations are higher after excluding $0 donors, ranging from $66 in the first task to 
$75 in the sixth task and are in increasing order, although statistically insignificant, 
across the tasks. Likewise, participants in the IPA-based Workshop contributed, on 
average, about $29 in the first task, slightly increased the mean contributions in the 
second task and then decreased in the subsequent tasks to $28 in the sixth task. After 
excluding $0 contributors, the pattern of average contributions across tasks in the IPA 
workshops remains the same, but higher in magnitude, ranging from $41 in the first 
task to $39 in the sixth task. Two-sample t-test results36 suggest that the average 
                                                
36 Since the even-numbered IPA tasks correspond to equivalent Donation tasks, we 
compared mean contributions between Donation task 1 and IPA task 2 (t-stat= 2.4029, 
97 df, p= 0.0182), Donation task 2 and IPA task 4 (t-stat= 2.9332, 97 df, p=0.0042), 
and Donation task 3 and IPA task 6 (t-stat=3.6238, 97 df, p=0.0005). 
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donations from donations-based Workshop are significantly higher than the mean 
contributions from the IPA workshops. These results remain unchanged37 after 
excluding $0 contributors.  
Figure 3.2 shows the average contribution across tasks in both donations-based 
and IPA-based workshops. These results suggest that the average contributions tended 
to be relatively constant, although there is a slight increase across the three successive 
tasks in donations-based Workshops, while average offers from participants in the 
IPA-based Workshop showed a slight decrease across the six successive tasks; these 
trends, however, are not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 3.2 Average contribution across tasks 
 
                                                
37 Test results after excluding $0 contributors are as follows: Donation task 1 and IPA 
task 2 (t-stat=1.9830, 62 df, p= 0.0518), Donation task 2 and IPA task 4 (t-stat= 
2.6574, 62 df, p=0.0042), and Donation task 3 and IPA task 6 (t-stat= 3.2609, 62 df, 
p= 0.0018). 
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Moreover, we examined mean values of “Per unit” contribution across the 
tasks. “Per unit” contributions are always significantly higher across the tasks in 
donations-based workshops relative to the IPA-based workshops. “Per unit” 
contributions sharply decreased, in both treatment groups, after the first task and 
remain constant in the subsequent tasks as represented in Figure 3.3. This is because 
the tons of cow manure managed sharply increased from IPA task 1 to task 2 (from 
about 16 to 75 tons), but mean values of total contribution across the tasks were 
approximately constant.  
 
Figure 3.3 Average "per-unit" contribution across tasks 
 
 
We also examined the proportion of participants contributing $1-33, $34-66 
and $67-100, between the two Workshop-types, and found a statistically significant 
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difference on the proportions across the treatments.38 These results are shown 
graphically in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4 Amount of contribution 
 
 
We further examined whether participants follow a particular pattern of 
contribution across the tasks, classifying each participant as having made a constant 
offer across tasks, increased their offer on successive tasks, decreased their offer, or 
exhibited a mixed pattern (sometimes increasing their offer between tasks and other 
times decreasing their offer) (Figure 3.5). Participants in the donations-based 
                                                
38 Since the even-numbered IPA tasks correspond to equivalent Donation tasks, we 
compared the number of participants contributing an amount within a selected range 
between Donation task 1 and IPA task 2 (Pearson χ2=7.853, 2 df, p= 0.0197), 
Donation task 2 and IPA task 4 (Pearson χ2=20.342, 2 df, p<0.0001), and Donation 
task 3 and IPA task 6 (Pearson χ2=16.809, 2 df, p<0.0001). 
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Workshop were more likely to exhibit a constant or increasing pattern in their offers 
(Pearson χ2=11.456, df 3, p=0.0095; Figure 5).39  
 
Figure 3.5 Pattern of contribution across tasks 
 
 
Although participants had an overall different pattern of contribution across 
tasks, both public good treatments produce constant contributions for a range of 
improvement in water quality. Participants’ total contributions in the first task were 
not significantly different from the total contributions in the subsequent tasks in both 
                                                
39 We only considered even-numbered IPA tasks and the corresponding Donation 
tasks to examine the pattern of contribution across the tasks. The significance 
disappears when we included participants who donated $0 (23% in donations 
workshop) or contributed $0 (36% in combined IPA session) for all of the three even-
numbered IPA tasks (Task 2, 4, and 6) and the corresponding Donation tasks (Pearson 
χ2=5.061, df 3, p=0.1674; Figure 3.5) 
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treatment groups, implying that the rule requiring “contribution per unit” in successive 
tasks to be less than or equal to the “contribution per unit” in the preceding task in the 
IPA treatment may not have influenced the contributions. 
 
3.5.3 Two-limit tobit regression model results 
Since the participants were only allowed to choose a total offer amount between $0 
and $100, we estimated a two-limit tobit regression (Tobin, 1958; Long, 1997; 
Davidson & MacKinnon, 2003; Maddala & Lahiri, 2010; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; 
Wooldridge, 2012) to model participants’ total offers as a linear function of tons of 
cow manure managed (or equivalently quantities or units of the public good) and a set 
of socio-demographic variables. Both the quantities of the good and the set of socio-
demographic characteristics were allowed to vary across the subsamples (the 
combined IPA and the voluntary donation) to examine the effect of these variables on 
the expected total offers across the treatments. The empirical model40 employed in the 
Tobit regression model is given by: 
(2)  Oij= α + αIPAIPA + (β+ βIPA!IPA)!Qj + (δ+ δIPA!IPA)!Zi , 
where Oij is the total offer by participant i in task j in which certain tons of cow 
manure are prevented from entering the reservoir water by on-farm manure 
management projects, denoted by Qj (or equivalently total units of the good provided 
in reduction of kg P loadings); αs represent the intercept terms for the two treatments; 
βs represent the slopes of the tons of cow manure managed (or the quantities or units 
                                                
40 We used a “vce (cluster)” option in Stata packages to estimate standard errors to 
account for non-independent offers from a single participant.  
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of the public good); δs represent coefficients measuring the effect of participant-
specific characteristics (Zi) on the total offers; IPA is a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 for participants under the IPA approach and the value of 0 for participants under 
voluntary donation approach.  
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results of the empirical two-limit tobit model 
described in equation (2). Model 1 utilizes observations on each participant from all 
six tasks from the IPA treatment and all three tasks from the donation treatment, 
whereas Model 2 utilizes observations on each participant excluding IPA tasks 1 and 2 
and the corresponding Donation task 1. We first estimated an unrestricted model using 
the pooled data (combined IPA and Donation Workshops) of the specification 
represented in Eq. (2) above and conducted a series of Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests to 
examine the significance of parameter estimates. A LR test suggests that a set of 
regression coefficients estimated from the Donation treatment is statistically different 
from the corresponding estimates from the IPA treatment (LR Test: αIPA=βIPA=δIPA=0; 
χ2=123.2408, 10 df, p<0.0001 using Model 1 data, and χ2=87.2641, 10 df, p<0.0001 
using Model 2 data). These significantly different estimates are the result of the effect 
of socio-demographics and environmental attitude variables on the expected 
contributions across the treatments (LR Test: δIPA=0; χ2=96.7984, 8 df, p<0.0001 
using Model 1 data, and χ2=72.2697, 8 df, p<0.0001 using Model 2 data). The 
Donation and IPA treatments have statistically equivalent coefficients on the 
quantities of cow manure managed (LR Test: βIPA=0; χ2=0.2034, 1 df, p=0.6519 using 
Model 1 data, and χ2=0.1448, 1 df, p=0.7036 using Model 2 data), meaning expected 
contributions tend to be constant for a range of tons of cow manure managed by on-
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farm manure management projects, ceteris paribus. The intercept term, that is 
expected contribution when all other variables are evaluated at 0, in Model 1 for 
donation treatment is positive and significantly higher than the intercept term for the 
IPA (which is statistically equivalent to 0; see Table 3.3). However, this significance 
of the intercept term for donation treatment disappears in Model 2 which utilized 
participants’ offers by excluding the observations from IPA tasks 1 and 2 and the 
corresponding Donation task 1.   
 
Table 3. 3 Two-limit Tobit model results 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variable Coefficient (se) Variable Coefficient (se) 
Donation  Donation  
Intercept (α) 87.6455** 
(35.6971) 
Intercept (α) 51.0924 
(49.7455) 
Quantity (β) -0.061085 
(0.09022) 
Quantity (β) 0.3303 (0.3455) 
Socio-demographics 
(δ) 
 Socio-demographics 
(δ) 
 
Lawn-fertilizer user -41.2058* 
(21.1998) 
Lawn-fertilizer user -42.5594* 
(25.144) 
Member 34.2613 
(38.3443) 
Member 45.0304 
(39.2665) 
Lakes visitor -29.80505 
(26.4775) 
Lakes visitor -39.4927 
(35.1467) 
Donate  -22.7804 
(18.4909) 
Donate  -23.5887 
(19.0661) 
Volunteer  -45.9575** 
(20.4231) 
Volunteer  -53.5137***    
(19.8988) 
Income  0.0004819 
(0.0003182) 
Income  0.0006166*   
(0.0003742) 
“Support and 
Regulate Farms” 
-53.5092*** 
(14.2463) 
“Support and Regulate 
Farms” 
-56.8636***   
(16.1375) 
“Good Stewardship” -11.1662* 
(5.7645) 
“Good Stewardship” -14.6913** 
(7.3543) 
IPA  IPA  
Intercept (α + αIPA) 1.0685 (20.2063) Intercept (α + αIPA) 20.0294 
(24.3240) 
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Quantity (β + βIPA) 0.02243 
(0.04287) 
Quantity (β + βIPA) -0.2134 
(0.1878) 
Socio-demographics 
(δ +δIPA) 
 Socio-demographics 
(δ +δIPA) 
 
Lawn-fertilizer user -34.5038*** 
(13.0819) 
Lawn-fertilizer user -35.5039***   
(13.4867) 
Member -36.01815* 
(19.6696) 
Member -38.7542* 
(19.9292) 
Lakes visitor 33.42931** 
(16.8636) 
Lakes visitor 33.4078* 
(17.7317) 
Donate  38.0785** 
(18.2499) 
Donate  40.5951** 
(18.5147) 
Volunteer  -5.4388 
(16.1173) 
Volunteer  -1.6875 
(16.7685) 
Income  0.0001973 
(0.0001413) 
Income  0.0001867   
(0.0001432) 
“Support and 
Regulate Farms” 
-18.4831*** 
(7.1565) 
“Support and Regulate 
Farms” 
-17.9655** 
(7.2775) 
“Good Stewardship” -34.0249*** 
(8.7719) 
“Good Stewardship” -34.2368*** 
(9.0543) 
Model statistics 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -1405.6484 
Number of observations: 468 
Number of participants: 78 
F (19, 449) = 4.48, p-value <0.0001 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1145 
Sigma: 40.70765a 
Model statistics 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -920.63103 
Number of observations: 312 
Number of participants: 78 
F (19, 293) = 4.12, p-value <0.0001 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1186 
Sigma: 41.04164 a 
a”Sigma” is the estimated standard error of the regression and is comparable to the 
root mean squared error that would be obtained in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression.  
 
The estimation results presented in Table 3.3 clearly suggest that participants’ 
socio-demographic characteristics and environmental attitude variables significantly 
affected expected total contributions for water quality improvements and there also 
exists heterogeneity in expected total contributions based on participants’ socio-
demographic profiles across the public good treatments. Participants who fertilize their 
lawn and garden significantly decreased their expected total contribution compared to 
the participants who do not fertilize their lawn; the direction and magnitude of effect is 
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the same in both public good treatments, all other things holding fixed. Likewise, 
participants who would be willing to support local farms to adopt best farming 
practices and would favor regulating manure management operations in the farms 
(“Support and Regulate Farms) as well as those who are generally concerned about 
water quality in their neighborhood and view local farmers as good stewards of the 
land (“Good Stewardship”) tended to contribute less (significant effect in both 
treatments groups), ceteris paribus.  Furthermore, participants who are currently 
affiliated with any environmental groups or causes (significant effect in the IPA group 
only) as well as those who volunteer in environmental projects or causes (significant 
effect in Donation groups only) showed a significant reduction in the expected total 
contribution, all other things remaining unchanged. However, participants who visited 
freshwater lakes or steams either for personal enjoyment or recreation or who donate 
to environmental groups or causes, significantly increased their contribution; both 
effects are significant in IPA group only.  
 
3.5.4 Additional analysis 
Table 3.4 presents participants’ responses to follow up questions regarding how they 
responded to contribution-allocation tasks for on-farm manure management projects. 
We conducted a chi-squared test of independence between participants’ responses to 
the degree of agreement to qualitative statements between the two public good 
treatments and found no significant difference except for the fourth statement (Table 
3.4; χ2=8.7208, df=4, p=0.0685). This suggests a significantly different pattern of 
responses to the statement asking participants whether they thought that their 
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contribution would be sufficient to implement the projects; a higher percentage of 
participants under donation (about 52%) than those under the IPA (about 28%) were 
neutral and a higher percentage of participants under IPA (about 33%) than those 
under the donation (about 14%) disagreed with this statement. Although we do not 
have any measures to examine whether their responses were truthful or not, the results 
suggested that higher percentages of IPA participants were more skeptical about 
whether their contributions would be sufficient to implement the on-farm manure 
management projects than the participants under voluntary donation.  
 
Table 3. 4 Participants' responses to follow up questions on tasks     
 
Statements 
Degree to which participants agree or disagree with 
following statements 
[% Donation participants] {% IPA participants} 
Strongly 
agree (%) 
Agree 
 (%) 
Neutral 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Strongly 
disagree (%) 
(1) The decisions were 
difficult.  
[3.45]  
{11.76} 
[44.83] 
{29.41} 
[31.03] 
{30.88} 
[17.24] 
{23.53} 
[3.45] 
{4.41} 
(2) The decisions were 
relevant to my concerns 
about water quality in 
lakes and rivers in my 
neighborhood. 
 [13.79] 
{21.21} 
 
[55.17] 
{46.97} 
 
[17.24] 
{15.15} 
 
[13.79] 
{15.15} 
 
[0.00] 
{1.52} 
 
(3) My decisions were 
influenced by my 
perception about what 
others in the room would 
do. 
 [3.33] 
{1.47} 
 
[6.67] 
{4.41} 
 
[6.67] 
{2.94} 
 
[73.33] 
{79.41} 
 
[10.00] 
{11.76} 
 
(4) My donation would 
be sufficient to 
implement the water 
quality projects listed in 
each task. 
[13.79] 
{5.97} 
 
[20.69] 
{32.84} 
 
[51.72] 
{28.36} 
 
[13.79] 
{28.36} 
 
[0.00] 
{4.48} 
 
(5) I was trying to keep 
my total donation near a 
constant value of the 
budget ($100).  
 [10.34] 
{10.29} 
 
[27.59] 
{23.53} 
 
[27.59] 
{27.94} 
 
[31.03] 
{35.29} 
 
[3.45] 
{2.94} 
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(6) I was trying to keep 
my total donation near a 
certain percentage of the 
budget ($100).  
 [13.79] 
{14.71} 
 
[31.03] 
{30.88} 
 
[20.69] 
{20.59} 
 
[31.03] 
{29.41} 
 
[3.45] 
{4.41} 
 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions and implications 
The well-known free-rider problem persistently results in under-valuation and thus 
under-provision of public goods in both laboratory experiments and fund-raising 
efforts in the field. Economists have been testing various public good institutions to 
identify institutions that may mitigate free-riding behavior pervasive in these 
experimental settings. One relatively pragmatic institution is a newly established 
individualized price auction (IPA) motivated by Lindahl’s framework for public 
goods. Empirical performance of the IPA process in generating revenues for private 
provision of public goods has not been well tested except Smith & Swallow (2013). 
Our field experiments implemented the newly established individualized price auction 
(IPA) to solicit offers on multiple successive and non-uniform sets of units of the 
public good incorporating incentive mechanisms from experimental economics 
literature such as the provision point (PP) with a money back guarantee (MBG) and 
proportional rebate (PR) of any excess contributions beyond the PP to mitigate free-
riding behavior. Contributions generated under this IPA approach were then compared 
with the contributions generated under a less-structured voluntary donation elicitation. 
Employing a spilt sample approach, we asked participants in a framed field 
experiment to pay real dollars into a collective fund, which would be used to pay 
livestock owners to implement on-farm manure management projects. Under both 
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public good institutions, participants were asked to make an offer on successive units 
of the public good, a lump-sum amount under the donation approach and “price per 
unit” offer under the IPA. Our results suggest that participants under the voluntary 
donation approach made higher total offer, on average, than participants under the 
IPA. However, total contributions across the tasks were statistically equivalent within 
both treatment groups, suggesting that participants’ contributions were constant across 
a range of water quality improvements (or quantities of the public good). Moreover, 
we modeled participants’ total contributions as a linear function of the tons of cow 
manure managed (or quantities of the public good) and a set of socio-demographic 
characteristics and discovered statistically significant heterogeneous effect of 
participants’ characteristics on the total contributions between the treatment groups.  
 Our results contrast with the expectations that the IPA approach might garner 
relatively higher contributions than the traditional voluntary donations. While neither 
approach is incentive compatible, Smith (2012) previously showed that marginal value 
estimates obtained from the IPA approach may be consistent with marginal 
willingness to pay (mWTP) estimated from a discrete choice experiment involving 
binary choices that bear direct financial consequences under an incentive-compatible 
provision rule. Our field experiments produced higher contributions, on average, from 
the less-structured donation approach relative to the more-structured IPA. The simpler, 
more straightforward Donations worked better in this field setting. This may be 
because there was a lot for participants to understand about phosphorus, manure-
management on farms, and water quality outcomes in addition to the rules (for 
example, participants had to make non-increasing offers in the subsequent tasks) of the 
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IPA approach. Moreover, our field experiments produced statistically equivalent 
average contributions for a range of quantities (or units of the good) across the tasks. 
This may be due to the fact that the magnitude of tons of cow manure managed 
changed very little between tasks, except from IPA task 1 to IPA task 2 where tons of 
cow manure managed sharply increased from about 16 tons to 75 tons. These small 
increments from one task to the next would imply small changes in protection of water 
quality in the reservoir. Participants may have concluded there was a large potential 
for variation in impact such that they just decided a relatively constant contribution 
was likely enough to have a measurable impact with little change in impact.  Or 
perhaps the changes in ranges across the tasks were just not big enough to matter in 
the scope of the $100 budget. Although the experiment moderator clearly described 
the linkages between phosphorus in the watershed system, manure management, and 
the ultimate impact on water quality, a “loosely” defined public good “product” may 
have influenced participants’ contributions. Uncertainty associated with the complex 
natural process about phosphorus and its connection with the actual impact on water 
quality may have also impacted participants’ thought process while making 
contributions, but we do not have any measures to identify whether this uncertainty 
played a role in our field experiment.  
 The two-limit tobit regression results suggest that there exists statistically 
significant heterogeneity in expected total contribution across the socio-demographic 
and environmental attitude profiles of the participants between the two public good 
institutions. For example, members of environmental groups (statistically significant 
effect in IPA group only) and volunteers in environmental groups or causes 
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(statistically significant effect in Donation group only) tended to contribute less. This 
may mean environmental groups were not favorably inclined to the IPA approach 
raising money in a manner that is more like a common commodity; and volunteers 
may feel that they have already contributed through their time. Likewise, participants 
who would be willing to support local farms to adopt farming practices and would 
favor regulating manure management practices in the farms, and who are generally 
concerned about the water quality and view local farmers in their neighborhood as 
good stewards of the land seemed to make lower offers under both approaches. 
However, participants who visit lakes or streams for recreational activities and who 
donate to environmental groups or causes offered higher contributions (significant 
effect in the IPA group only). Overall, these results suggest that participants in the two 
public good institutions responded differently to offer solicitations for improved water 
quality, and the institutions themselves appear to have influenced their response. This 
result might signal heterogeneity in how people will react under novel markets for 
ecosystem services, suggesting research will be needed to better understand for which 
groups novel approaches will best mitigate free-riding behavior. The result is 
analogous to Kafle et al.’s (2014) results regarding whether supplemental government 
funding stimulates crowding in or crowding out of contributions to watershed 
management.         
One speculation the authors may put forward is that participants in donations-
based Workshop may be motivated by personal ‘altruistic’ interest or simply social 
motivations for doing ‘good things’ for the surrounding environment in the 
neighborhood and may have donated without particular regard for the quantity of 
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manure management. However, participants in the IPA-based Workshops may be 
making decisions more thoughtfully because they were put into a framed mindset of a 
regular ‘market purchasing situation’ by asking the “price per unit” offer. Our IPA 
experiment asked participants to consider “Price per unit” first and then allowing them 
to evaluate the total contribution in a task. Future studies may explore whether asking 
participants a maximum total offer they would be willing to contribute and then 
allowing then to see the corresponding “price per unit” that the maximum contribution 
implied could garner higher offers. 
Finally, we note that our study is an example of research to develop novel 
approach that may (or may not) improve the potential for integration of donor-
beneficiaries in future (and evolving) markets for ecosystem services. As such, we 
encourage others to pursue such topics, noting its consistency with Portney’s (2004) 
obligation of the “policy economist”, to contribute directly to creation of potential 
policy (or market-based) alternatives.    
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MANUSCRIPT 3 – APPENDIX C 
This appendix provides additional information on participants’ socio-demographic 
profiles across the two IPA sessions, background presentation for experiment 
participants and a sample survey booklet.  
 
C1. Participants’ socio-demographic profiles across the two IPA sessions   
The following table presents the descriptive statistics about participants across the two 
IPA sessions. 
Descriptive statistics of participants across public good treatments 
 
 
 
Categorical 
variables 
 
 
Description 
IPA sessions 
IPA session 
1 (N=26) 
IPA 
session 2 
(N=43) 
Pearson 
χ2, 1df 
(p) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
 
Male  1 if a participant is male; 
0 otherwise 
0.31    
(0.47) 
0.49    
(0.510 
2.1710 
(0.141) 
Livestock 
owner 
1 if a participant owns a 
livestock; 0 otherwise 
0.08)    
(0.27) 
0.19    
(0.39) 
1.5570 
(0.212) 
Home owner 1 if a participant owns a 
home; 0 otherwise 
0.81    
(0.40) 
0.93    
(0.26) 
2.3737 
(0.123) 
Lawn-
fertilizer user 
1 if a participant fertilizes 
their lawn and garden; 0 
otherwise 
0.42    
(0.50) 
0.59    
(0.49) 
1.7843 
(0.182) 
Member 1 if a participant is 
currently affiliated to any 
environmental groups or 
causes; 0 otherwise 
0.27    
(0.45) 
0.19    
(0.39) 
0.5793 
(0.447) 
Graduate 
degree 
1 if a participant has a 
graduate degree; 0 
otherwise 
0.23    
(0.43) 
0.21    
(0.41) 
0.0439 
(0.834) 
Lakes visitor 1 if a participant visited 
freshwater lakes or 
steams either for personal 
enjoyment or recreations 
in the past 12 months; 0 
0.88    
(0.33) 
0.74    
(0.44) 
1.9757 
(0.160) 
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otherwise 
Donate 1 if a participant donated 
to environmental causes 
or groups in the past 12 
months; 0 otherwise 
 0.19    
(0.40) 
0.30    
(0.46) 
1.0171 
(0.313) 
Volunteer  1 if a participant 
volunteered in 
environmental projects or 
causes in the past 12 
months; 0 otherwise 
 0.27    
(0.45) 
0.28    
(0.45) 
0.0079 
(0.929) 
Continuous 
variables 
Description Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sample 
Mean 
(SD) 
t-stat, df 
(p) 
Age  Age of participant in 
years 
46.35    
(14.79) 
49.60    
(17.39) 
0.7965, 67 
df (0.4285) 
Resident 
(Years) 
Number of years a 
participant lived in or 
around towns of Scituate, 
Foster or Glocester  
18.21    
(14.81) 
27.43    
(16.32) 
2.3520, 67 
df (0.0216) 
Income   Participant’s total 
household income (in 
‘000 dollars) 
62,499.50    
45,276.93 
67,762.66    
39,058.99 
0.4962, 62 
df (0.6215) 
“Support and 
Regulate 
Farms” 
A continuous factor score 
indicating attitude that 
local livestock farms 
should be required to 
adopt farming practices 
to reduce degradation of 
water quality and 
livestock operations 
should be regulated.  
 
-0.19    
(0.99) 
 
0.08    
(1.06) 
1.0563, 65 
df (0.2947) 
“Good 
Stewardship” 
A continuous factor score 
indicating pro-attitude 
toward protecting water 
quality in lakes and 
streams to affect the 
quality of life, local 
livestock farms are good 
stewards and value water 
quality even without 
using directly.  
 
0.18    
(1.02) 
 
-0.08    
(0.87) 
1.1273, 65 
df (0.2638) 
“Assist 
Farms” 
A continuous factor score 
indicating a belief that 
local farms face difficult 
competition to survive in 
a modern economy and 
 
0.03    
(0.94) 
 
-0.23    
(0.78) 
1.2552, 65 
df (0.2139) 
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should receive financial 
and technical assistance.  
“Water 
quality for 
Recreation” 
A continuous factor score 
indicating a pro-attitude 
for water quality for 
recreational activities 
such as swimming, 
fishing or boating. 
-0.16    
(0.93) 
-0.13    
(0.92) 
0.1239, 65 
df (0.9017) 
 
C2. Background presentation slides and the core scripts   
I gratefully acknowledge an excellent moderation of all the field experiments as well 
as the receipt of the presentation slides and the written scripts included below by 
Carrie A. Gill, graduate research assistant at the department of Environmental and 
Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island. The example presentation 
slides and the scripts were used for the IPA based workshops. For Donation workshop, 
the information and content of the survey were exactly same except the description of 
Donation treatment and necessary corrections accordingly. 
 
Background (by Carrie A. Gill, Dept of ENRE, URI) 
Each session began with a scripted PowerPoint presentation that was designed 
to give participants a common review and understanding of the linkages between P, 
manure management, and water quality. This presentation used simple illustrations 
and clear language, including photographs of a range of potential manure management 
projects. We were careful about differences in connotation and denotation for our 
word choices and directly addressed preconceptions and nuances. To ensure 
understanding, the presenter addressed questions from participants prior to explaining 
instructions soliciting individuals’ donations or contributions to pay for on-farm 
manure management projects. 
In addition to the PowerPoint presentation, participants were provided with a 
booklet to review as instructed by the moderator. This booklet contained written 
instructions for soliciting voluntary contributions under the approach used for that 
Workshop (IPA or donations), and these instructions were reviewed orally by the 
moderator as well. The booklet also included a form soliciting offers of contributions; 
in the IPA workshops individuals made six offers, while in the donations workshops 
individuals made three offers. Finally, the booklet included a follow-up survey 
soliciting socio-demographic characteristics of the individual. 
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All participants were told that there were other Workshops being held in a 2-
week period (Oct. 28 – Nov. 12, 2013) and results would be determined by the 
combined choices of participants in these Workshops. 
 
 
 
Presentation slides (by Carrie A. Gill, Dept of ENRE, URI) 
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        Note: This is NOT a real bill. This was used for illustration purpose only. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 191 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Presentation script (by Carrie A. Gill, Dept of ENRE, URI) 
Our project aims to learn how RI residents who live or work in the Scituate Reservoir 
area, like you, value water quality. In order to figure that out, we’re going to hold an 
economic auction to implement actual manure management projects in the Scituate 
Reservoir watershed that will maintain good local water quality. 
When we talk about water quality, we’re referring to how clean the water is. 
Clean water is easy to treat to turn it into safe drinking water. It’s safe for you, your 
children, and your pets to come into contact with. And its aesthetically pleasing. 
 One reason why water quality may be bad is phosphorus. You might 
recognize phosphorus from bags of fertilizer that you use on your lawn and garden. 
Phosphorus is a nutrient, which means it’s essential for plants to grow. However, too 
much phosphorus means lots of growth. 
A while ago, a group of scientists performed an experiment in a lake in a 
freshwater Canada. They divided the lake in half and added phosphorus to one side. 
The additional phosphorus caused little plants to grow in the water. We know these 
plants as algae. One additional pound of phosphorus in a freshwater lake will cause 
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300 to 500 pounds of wet algae to grow. While algae are natural, too much algae 
means that water is difficult to treat, could be unsafe or toxic for contact, and becomes 
murky. In other words, too much phosphorus means too much algae, which in turn 
means poor water quality. 
You may have seen the impact of algae in water bodies around RI. For 
example, signs that warn against swimming and fishing, or news stories warning about 
toxic algae blooms.  
In the Scituate Reservoir System, 68% of phosphorus in the Scituate Reservoir System 
is from naturally occurring, uncontrollable sources. The other 32% is from human 
sources. This includes agriculture and crops, livestock that graze on pastures, and 
residential sources like garden fertilizer and septic systems. Our project is only 
focusing on the phosphorus that comes from pastures. 
Livestock like cows graze on pasture. What they eat contains phosphorus. And 
as you know, what goes in must come out, and that contains phosphorus, too. One ton 
of manure contains about 5 pounds of phosphorus. An average cow produces about 80 
pounds of manure every day. That adds up to 15 tons per year per cow. When manure 
is scattered over the land, the plants can use the phosphorus in it to grow. However, 
the common practice is for livestock owners to make big manure piles. The plants 
around the big manure piles can’t use all the phosphorus in the manure. And, when it 
rains, this excess phosphorus washes into the soil and surface water and makes its way 
through streams and rivers into the reservoir water. And why is excess phosphorus bad 
for water quality? Because it causes too much algae to grow.  
We can reduce the phosphorus that enters the reservoir water through better 
manure management on local livestock farms. There are two ways. First, we can store 
animal manure properly. Like I mentioned, the current practice is for livestock owners 
to gather manure into a big pile. There are no regulations governing this practice. 
However, big manure piles lead to excess phosphorus in reservoir water. A better way 
to store manure is on a concrete pad. The concrete acts as a barrier that the phosphorus 
can’t cross between the manure and the soil. 
The second good manure management practice is to prevent rainwater from 
getting on the manure. Practically speaking, this means installing gutters around 
animal sheds. and places where manure can pile up. 
Local livestock owners have reached out to URI because they feel responsible 
for water quality and want to be better environmental stewards. These livestock 
owners are your neighbors and friends. Many feel that local farmers are integral to the 
unique rural and historic culture of the Scituate area. 
Being a farmer is hard. It’s lots of work and its difficult to make ends meet. 
The farmers that have reached out to us want to implement concrete pads and gutters 
but they can’t afford the cost, which can range from a couple hundred to a couple 
thousand dollars. The projects that these farmers want to implement are the projects 
that we’ll see in the auction coming up. There, you’ll have the option to contribute 
some money to getting some, all, or none of these projects actually implemented. 
  All the livestock owners involved in our project are located in the Scituate 
Reservoir System. Local water scientists have reported that most reservoirs here still 
have good water quality, while a couple have already shown signs of degradation and 
algae blooms. Once a water body shows signs of degradation, it gets increasingly 
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difficult and costly to restore back to having good quality. (If asked - this is because 
feedback systems start, which release even more phosphorus into the water.) The more 
we can prevent phosphorous from getting into the reservoir--through better manure 
management, for example--the longer we can prevent the system from degrading, and 
hence preserve the good water quality. 
We want to know how much you’d be willing to contribute to local manure 
management projects, in order to reduce phosphorus in reservoir water and preserve 
good water quality. Some people may have other priorities and may not want to 
contribute any money, while others might be completely indifferent. Still others might 
consider water quality to be top priority and want to contribute a lot. Some people are 
in the middle. Whatever your values are, we want to know. There are no right or 
wrong answers and all of your responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
Now, we’ll go over how the auction works and then how we choose which 
projects will actually get implemented. My colleagues and I were talking about how 
much we’re asking of you during this two hours and decided that we needed to 
compensate you more. So, congratulations, you’ve earned yourselves another $100 for 
participating tonight. Imagine opening up your wallet to see a crisp $100 bill in there. 
Yes, we are actually giving you another $100. Take a second to think about what 
you’re going to use your hard earned money for. On page __ we’ve provided two fill 
in the blank sentences. The first states what you will spend your money on (or save it 
for). The second states what cause or charity you will donate your money to, if you’re 
so inclined. Take a minute to jot down your thoughts.  
One thing you can do with your hard earned money is contribute to manure 
management projects in our auction. We’ve talked to actual local livestock owners 
who want to install concrete pads and gutters. Local experts from the Northern Rhode 
Island Conservation District have visited these farms and have deemed these projects 
appropriate for reducing phosphorus in the reservoir. These farmers have signed 
contracts with us promising to implement these projects by the end of next year if 
there is a big enough contribution from the auction to cover the costs of the projects. 
Some, all, or none of these projects will actually be implemented because of your 
decisions tonight. 
All projects in the auction are projects that the farmers want to implement. If 
some projects do get implemented, that does not mean that all farmers will have to 
implement these projects, too.  
And just because you might contribute something tonight, that does not mean 
that others will be forced to contribute. The images here are representations of the 
actual projects but they don’t show the real thing. And, we’re not going to give you 
most of the details about the actual projects either. That’s because we want to know 
how much you value the reduction in phosphorus from manure management, not how 
much you’d like to contribute to your neighbor Fred’s project down the road. 
We’ve taken all these projects, figured out how much phosphorus from manure 
they’d reduce, and ranked them from most cost effective to least cost effective. We’re 
going to present them in our auction from most cost effective to least so that you get 
the most bang for your buck out of your contribution. This auction will consist of a 
series of tasks, which will include one or several projects. In each task, you’ll see a 
table and two fill-in-the-blank sentences. We want to know how much you’d be 
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willing to contribute per ton of cow manure reduction for the project or projects in 
each task. 
This isn’t a math test, so the table is here to help you out. You choose how 
much you want to contribute per ton, and then the table does the math to tell you how 
much your total contribution would be and how much you’d end up taking home. So 
your job is to circle the row in the table that best represents what you want to 
contribute to the project or projects in the task. 
The sentences are here to help you understand how much you’re contributing. We 
encourage you to fill in the blanks. 
You can contribute a maximum of $100 to each task. This does not change, regardless 
of how much you contribute in previous tasks. In the end we’re only going to choose 
one task and implement only those projects in that task. 
So let’s see an example of how this works in practice. The first task includes 
the most cost effective project, because - remember - we want to get the most bang for 
your buck. You’ll see that this project reduces phosphorus from 15.7 tons of cow 
manure. You might want to contribute your entire budget - your hard earned $100 - to 
this project. You might have other things in mind for you $100 and not want to 
contribute anything. For the sake of this example, let’s say you contribute an even $1 
per ton. We can write that in our first fill in the blank sentence. Therefore, your total 
contribution would be $1 per ton times 15.7 tons, or $15.70. That means that you’d be 
guaranteed to take home $84.30, or your $100 minus your contribution. 
The next task includes the same project from task 1 and the most cost effective 
project from the remaining projects. Since we have two projects now, the tons of cow 
manure reduced has increased. Again, you’re considering how to spend your $100. We 
want to know how much you’d contribute per ton for these two projects. But here’s 
the catch, you can only contribute the same or less per ton as you did in the previous 
task. 
In task 1, we said we’d contribute $1 per ton. That means that in task 2 we can 
only contribute $1 per ton or less. Can we contribute $1.20? NO! 
So let’s circle our contribution for this task and fill in the blanks. For this task, we’ll 
contribute $1 per ton again. That means my total contribution is $74.90 and I’d be 
guaranteed to take home $25.10.  
Okay, let’s see how this plays out in our next task. Now we have the same two 
projects from task 2 and the most cost effective project from the remaining projects. 
You’ll see that tons of cow manure has increased again. Remember, our rule is you 
can only contribute the same or less per ton as the previous task. Last task we 
contributed $1 per ton. Can we contribute $1.10 here? NO! 
Let’s say we’ll contribute 50 cents per ton here. That makes the total contribution 
$38.95 and the guaranteed take home $61.05. For the next task, what would be the 
amount per ton that I must contribute the same or less as? That’s right, I must 
contribute the same or less as the previous task. If in task 3 I contribute 50 cents per 
ton, in task 4 I must contribute 50 cents per ton or less. Good.  
For each project, we know how much the cost is to implement that project. We 
need to figure out if the total contribution of everyone, including you, everyone around 
you, and everyone who participates in this workshop over the next two weeks, is 
enough to cover the costs of the project. So for task 1, there might be a small cost and 
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large contribution. If the total contribution is larger than the cost, then we look at the 
next task. For task 2, we had two projects, so the cost has gone up. If everyone’s total 
contribution exceeds the cost, then we continue. For task 3, let’s say the cost of these 
projects is not covered by everyone’s total contribution. Then we stop. 
So we’ve looked at three tasks. We choose the task that has the most projects 
and where everyone’s total contribution exceeds the costs of the projects. In our 
example, that would be task 2. These are the projects that are actually going to be 
implemented. 
So if you contributed to this task, what does that mean for you? We’re only 
going to take what we need from you, out of your individual contribution, to 
implement these projects. You’ll get the rest of your contribution back in the form of a 
rebate. We’ll add up your rebate and how much out of your $100 you did not 
contribute to the chosen task and write you a check. We’re going to put this check in 
the mail in the envelope that you addressed in the beginning of the workshop. If you 
do not receive something from us within 15 business days of today, even if we do not 
owe you any money, please contact Dr. Uchida. 
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C3. A sample survey booklet (IPA workshop)   
Water Quality Decision-Making 
Workshop 
 
 
 
 
 
Water Quality Project Auction 
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Water Quality Project Auction - Instructions 
This auction includes several tasks, which ask how much you would pay for a water 
quality project(s) that would reduce phosphorus in a given amount of cow manure per 
year from entering the reservoir water.  
 
The goal of each task is to figure out how much you would be willing to contribute to 
a project that would reduce a given amount of cow manure per year from delivering 
phosphorus to the reservoir water. We will tell you in the task description how many 
tons of cow manure per year are prevented from entering the reservoir water if a 
particular project or set of projects were to be implemented. We will then ask you to 
write down how much money you would be willing to pay to prevent the phosphorus 
in each ton of cow manure each year from entering the reservoir water.  
 
We will be giving you $100, which you can either take home or contribute to the 
projects in each task. This $100 is in addition to your $50 compensation for 
participating tonight. Even if you contribute all of the $100 to water quality projects, 
you will still take home $50. Take a minute now to think about how you might spend 
$100 if you were to take it all home tonight.  
 
If I took $100 home, I likely would spend it on ______________________________. 
 
If I were to donate part of this money to a non-profit group, I would consider the 
group or cause: (Please write “none” if you don’t think you would donate.)  
 
____________________________________________________________________. 
 
In each task you can contribute some, all, or none of your $100 budget to reduce 
phosphorus from a given amount of cow manure from entering the reservoir water. 
You have a budget of $100 for each task, regardless of how much money you 
contributed in previous tasks. We will figure out how much of the $100 you will 
actually contribute to water quality projects based on your contribution and 
contributions by everyone else, as was explained in the presentation. Your 
contribution in each task will have real consequences - water quality projects will be 
implemented depending on how much money you and everyone else contribute. Only 
write down how much you really would be willing to contribute to reduce the given 
amount of cow manure from entering reservoir water. 
 
How we determine how much money you actually contribute 
 
After you have completed all the tasks, our research team will collect your responses. 
For each task, we will add up how much everyone would be willing to contribute to 
reduce a given amount of cow manure. Everyone includes you, everyone in this 
session, and everyone in another session on a different date.  
 
We will add up everyone’s contribution for the first task to see if you and everyone 
else contributed enough money in total to cover the cost of the first project. If this total 
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contribution is enough to cover the cost of the first project, then we will consider the 
second task. We will stop when the total contribution for a task is not enough to cover 
the costs of the project(s) in that task. The task with the largest number of projects 
where the total contribution is enough to cover the costs of all projects in that task that 
will then actually be implemented. 
 
The projects are real projects. All, some, or none of these projects might be 
implemented depending on how much money you and everyone else contribute. 
Your contribution, along with everyone else’s contribution, will actually go to a local 
large animal owner to pay for a concrete pad or a gutter system. 
 
Your total contribution may not be needed, in total, to cover the costs of the project(s) 
chosen. If this is the case, you will only pay some of your contribution in proportion 
to how much you were willing to pay. For example, if you were willing to pay $90 in 
the task that was chosen for implementation but we only required 90% of everyone’s 
total contributions, then you would only pay $81, which is 90% of $90 and you will 
receive your contribution that is not required as a rebate. 
 
At the end of this session tonight, you will receive $50 cash for your participation. 
After we determine how many projects can be implemented based on your and 
everyone’s decisions at URI, we will mail you a check for the portion of your $100 
budget that you did not contribute to the projects chosen plus any rebate if applicable. 
If you do not receive a check from the University of Rhode Island within 15 business 
days from today, please contact Prof. Emi Uchida (emi@uri.edu; 401-874-4586) 
immediately.  
 
 
Water Quality Project Auction - Tasks 
 
In this water quality project auction, each task asks how much you would pay to 
prevent phosphorus in a given amount of cow manure per year from entering the 
reservoir. 
 
For your information, a 1000-pound cow produces an average of 14.6 tons of cow 
manure each year.  
 
You have a budget of $100 for each task, regardless of how much money you 
contributed in previous tasks. 
 
Please consider how much you would be willing to pay to reduce each ton of cow 
manure in each task. Please remember that for each subsequent task, you can only 
contribute the same or less per ton than you contributed in the previous task.  
 
You may circle the pre-calculated row or write down your own per-ton allocation and 
the total allocation for the project at the bottom of the page. 
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Task 1:  
 
This task includes one water quality project, which would reduce phosphorus in 15.70 
tons of cow manure per year from entering the reservoir.   
 
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater 
than $100. 
 
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project 
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row.  
 
Price 
per Ton 
Tons of Cow Manure 
Reduced each year 
Your Total 
Contribution 
You would take 
home 
$0.00  15.70 $0.00 $100.00 
$0.50  15.70 $7.85 $92.15 
$1.00  15.70 $15.70 $84.30 
$1.50  15.70 $23.55 $76.45 
$2.00 15.70 $31.40 $68.60 
$2.50  15.70 $39.25 $60.75 
$3.00  15.70 $47.10 $52.90 
$3.50  15.70 $54.95 $45.05 
$4.00 15.70 $62.80 $37.20 
$4.50  15.70 $70.65 $29.35 
$5.00  15.70 $78.50 $21.50 
$5.50  15.70 $86.35 $13.65 
$6.00  15.70 $94.20 $5.80 
$6.40  15.70 ~$100.00 ~$0.00 
    
 
I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 15.70 tons of cow manure 
per year from entering the reservoir.  
 
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is 
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.            
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Task 2:  
This task includes the water quality project from Task 1 and one additional project, 
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 74.90 tons of cow manure per 
year (15.70 tons from Task 1 plus 59.20 tons from the additional project) from 
entering the reservoir water.  
 
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater 
than $100. 
 
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project 
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton 
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but 
must not be larger. 
 
Price per 
Ton 
Tons of Cow Manure 
Reduced each year 
Your Total 
Contribution 
You would take 
home 
$0.00  74.90 $0.00 $100.00 
$0.10  74.90 $7.49 $92.51 
$0.20  74.90 $14.98 $85.02 
$0.30  74.90 $22.47 $77.53 
$0.40 74.90 $29.96 $70.04 
$0.50  74.90 $37.45 $62.55 
$0.60  74.90 $44.94 $55.06 
$0.70  74.90 $52.43 $47.57 
$0.80 74.90 $59.92 $40.08 
$0.90  74.90 $67.41 $32.59 
$1.00  74.90 $74.90 $25.10 
$1.10  74.90 $82.39 $17.61 
$1.20  74.90 $89.88 $10.12 
$1.34  74.90 ~$100.00 ~$0.00 
    
 
I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 74.90 tons of cow manure 
per year from entering the reservoir.  
 
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is 
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented. 
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Task 3:  
 
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 2 and one additional project, 
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 77.90 tons of cow manure per 
year (74.90 tons from Task 2 plus 3.00 tons from the additional project) from entering 
the reservoir water.  
 
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater 
than $100. 
 
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project 
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton 
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but 
must not be larger. 
 
Price per 
Ton 
Tons of Cow Manure 
Reduced each year 
Your Total 
Contribution 
You would take 
home 
$0.00  77.90 $0.00 $100.00 
$0.10  77.90 $7.79 $92.21 
$0.20  77.90 $15.58 $84.42 
$0.30  77.90 $23.37 $76.63 
$0.40 77.90 $31.16 $68.84 
$0.50  77.90 $38.95 $61.05 
$0.60  77.90 $46.74 $53.26 
$0.70  77.90 $54.53 $45.47 
$0.80 77.90 $62.32 $37.68 
$0.90  77.90 $70.11 $29.89 
$1.00  77.90 $77.90 $22.10 
$1.10  77.90 $85.69 $14.31 
$1.20  77.90 $93.48 $6.52 
$1.29  77.90 ~$100.00 ~$0.00 
    
 
 
I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 77.90 tons of cow manure 
per year from entering the reservoir.  
 
 
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is 
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.            
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Task 4:  
 
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 3 and one additional project, 
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 81.10 tons of cow manure per 
year (77.90 tons from Task 3 plus 3.20 tons from the additional project) from entering 
the reservoir water.  
 
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater 
than $100. 
 
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project 
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton 
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but 
must not be larger. 
 
Price per 
Ton 
Tons of Cow Manure 
Reduced each year 
Your Total 
Contribution 
You would take 
home 
$0.00  81.10 $0.00 $100.00 
$0.10  81.10 $8.11 $91.89 
$0.20  81.10 $16.22 $83.78 
$0.30  81.10 $24.33 $75.67 
$0.40 81.10 $32.44 $67.56 
$0.50  81.10 $40.55 $59.45 
$0.60  81.10 $48.66 $51.34 
$0.70  81.10 $56.77 $43.23 
$0.80 81.10 $64.88 $35.12 
$0.90  81.10 $72.99 $27.01 
$1.00  81.10 $81.10 $18.90 
$1.10  81.10 $89.21 $10.79 
$1.20  81.10 $97.32 $2.68 
$1.24  81.10 ~$100.00 ~$0.00 
    
 
 
I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 81.10 tons of cow manure 
per year from entering the reservoir.  
 
 
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is 
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented. 
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Task 5:  
 
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 4 and one additional project, 
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 84.90 tons of cow manure per 
year (81.10 tons from Task 4 plus 3.80 tons from the additional project) from entering 
the reservoir water.  
 
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater 
than $100. 
 
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project 
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton 
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but 
must not be larger. 
 
Price per 
Ton 
Tons of Cow Manure 
Reduced each year 
Your Total 
Contribution 
You would take 
home 
$0.00  84.90 $0.00 $100.00 
$0.10  84.90 $8.49 $91.51 
$0.20  84.90 $16.98 $83.02 
$0.30  84.90 $25.47 $74.53 
$0.40 84.90 $33.96 $66.04 
$0.50  84.90 $42.45 $57.55 
$0.60  84.90 $50.94 $49.06 
$0.70  84.90 $59.43 $40.57 
$0.80 84.90 $67.92 $32.08 
$0.90  84.90 $76.41 $23.59 
$1.00  84.90 $84.90 $15.10 
$1.10  84.90 $93.39 $6.61 
$1.18  84.90 ~$100.00 ~$0.00 
    
 
 
I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 84.90 tons of cow manure 
per year from entering the reservoir.  
 
 
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is 
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented. 
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Task 6:  
 
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 5 and one additional project, 
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 88.70 tons of cow manure per 
year (84.90 tons from Task 5 plus 3.80 tons from the additional project) from entering 
the reservoir water.  
 
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater 
than $100. 
 
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project 
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton 
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but 
must not be larger. 
 
 
Price per 
Ton 
Tons of Cow Manure 
Reduced each year 
Your Total 
Contribution 
You would take 
home 
$0.00  88.70 $0.00 $100.00 
$0.10  88.70 $8.87 $91.13 
$0.20  88.70 $17.74 $82.26 
$0.30  88.70 $26.61 $73.39 
$0.40 88.70 $35.48 $64.52 
$0.50  88.70 $44.35 $55.65 
$0.60  88.70 $53.22 $46.78 
$0.70  88.70 $62.09 $37.91 
$0.80 88.70 $70.96 $29.04 
$0.90  88.70 $79.83 $20.17 
$1.00  88.70 $88.70 $11.30 
$1.10  88.70 $97.57 $2.43 
$1.13  88.70 ~$100.00 ~$0.00 
    
 
 
I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 88.70 tons of cow manure 
per year from entering the reservoir.  
 
 
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is 
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented. 
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Follow Up Questions 
Please indicate by placing an (X) under the appropriate column the degree to which you 
agree or disagree with each of the statements below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statements 
Strongly 
A
gree 
A
gree 
N
eutral 
D
isagree 
Strongly 
D
isagree 
The decisions were difficult. 
           
The decisions were relevant to 
my concerns about water quality 
in lakes and rivers in my 
neighborhood.           
My decisions were influenced by 
my perception about what others 
in the room would do.            
My contribution would be 
sufficient to implement the water 
quality projects listed in each 
task.            
I was trying to keep my total 
contribution near a constant value 
of the budget ($100).           
I was trying to keep my total 
contribution near a certain 
percentage of the budget ($100).      
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Your Opinion on Local Farms and Water Quality 
Please indicate by placing an (X) under the appropriate column the degree to which 
you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. 
 
Statements 
Strongly 
A
gree 
A
gree 
Som
ew
hat 
A
gree 
N
eutral 
Som
ew
hat 
D
isagree 
D
isagree 
Strongly 
D
isagree 
The quality of water in lakes and streams near 
my home affects my quality of life.               
I am concerned about water quality in lakes 
and streams near my home.               
I am concerned about water quality in lakes 
and streams near my home because they are 
used for recreation, such as swimming, 
fishing, or boating.               
I value water quality in lakes and streams near 
my home even if I do not use them.               
I believe local livestock farms affect water 
quality of lakes and streams near my home.               
I believe local livestock farms are a 
significant source of nutrients like 
phosphorus, which adversely affects water 
quality in lakes and streams near my home.               
Livestock farms should adopt farming 
practices that reduce the amount of nutrients 
like phosphorus from entering lakes and 
streams near my home.               
Livestock farmers in my neighborhood are 
good stewards of the land.               
I would be willing to support local livestock 
farmers that improve their farming practices 
in order to improve water quality.               
Local livestock farmers should receive 
financial and technical assistance so that they 
can be better environmental stewards.               
I believe local farms face difficult competition 
to survive in a modern economy.               
I believe homes that actually drink Scituate 
Reservoir water should pay the costs of 
manure management.        
I believe manure management operations in 
local livestock farms should be regulated.        
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Your Background 
 
This section asks about your social and demographic characteristics. Your answers 
will help us interpret our results and support environmental managers and decision 
makers. All information you provide will be kept completely confidential. 
 
1. What is your gender?  ☐ Male  ☐ Female 
  
2. What is your age?   ____________ years  
 
3. Do you own a livestock(s) or a farm animal(s) (e.g., cows, horse, sheep, goat, 
pigs, chickens)?  
 
☐  Yes  ☐  No 
 
4. Is your home…    
☐  Owned by you or someone in your household with a mortgage or 
loan? Include home equity loans. 
☐  Owned by you or someone in your household free and clear (without 
a mortgage or loan)? 
☐  Rented? Skip to question 6 
☐  Occupied without payment of rent? Skip to question 6 
 
5. If you own your home:  
  How many times per year do you fertilize your lawn and garden? 
  ☐  Never ☐  Once ☐  Twice   ☐  Three times or more 
each year 
 
  When do you fertilize your lawn and garden? Check all the apply 
  ☐  Never ☐  Spring ☐  Summer   ☐  Fall ☐  Winter 
 
6. When did you move into your home? Month:_________Year: _______ 
 
7. How long have you lived in your current town?  __________ years 
 
8. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? 
☐  Some high school or less  
☐  High school diploma 
☐  GED or alternative credential 
☐  Some college credit, but less than 1 year of college credit 
☐  1 or more years of college credit, no degree   
☐  Associate’s degree (for example: AA or AS) 
☐  Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA or BS)  
☐  Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) 
☐  Professional degree (for example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD) 
 ☐  Doctorate degree (for example: PhD, EdD) 
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9. Have you ever been negatively affected by farming or livestock operations in 
your neighborhood? 
☐  Yes  ☐  No 
 
10. Are you currently affiliated with any environmental group or organization? 
☐  Yes  ☐  No 
 
11. Approximately how many days did you visit freshwater lakes or streams for 
either personal enjoyment or recreation in the past 12 months? Please write 0 if 
you do not visit freshwater lakes or streams for personal enjoyment or 
recreation.   
  
__________ days per year 
 
12. Approximately how much did you donate to environmental causes or groups in 
the past 12 months? Please write 0 if you do not donate to environmental 
causes or groups. 
 
$ __________ per year 
 
13. Approximately how many days did you volunteer in environmental projects or 
causes in the past 12 months? Please write 0 if you do not volunteer in 
environmental projects or causes. 
 
__________ days per year 
 
14. What was your total household income before taxes in the past 12 months? 
☐  $24,999 or less  
☐  $25,000 to $49,999 
☐  $50,000 to $74,999 
☐  $75,000 to $99,999 
☐  $100,000 to $124,999  
☐  $125,000 to $149,999 
☐  $150,000 or more 
 
15. Have you ever experienced a failed septic system? 
☐  Yes  ☐  No 
 
16. Approximately how many times did you test the quality of your home’s 
drinking water in the past 12 months? 
 
  ☐  None ☐  Once ☐  Twice   ☐  Three times or more  
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Please write down any comments you have about the Water Quality 
Decision-Making Workshop in the space provided. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The findings of empirical research presented in this dissertation (manuscripts 1 and 2) 
provide an important insight regarding methodological issues, relating to incentives 
and the effect on value estimates due to a provision rule as well as consistency of 
stated preferences across the repeated response format, under a discrete choice 
experiment method for valuing environmental goods and services. These results may 
convey important methodological learning to valuation researchers for future 
consideration while developing such surveys. The preference models developed could 
be used by local environmental managers to integrate values for the ecosystem 
restoration projects and wetland preservation into their decision-making processes 
regarding the environmental policies that affect the use and management of these 
natural resources. Furthermore, the results from the public good experiments 
(manuscript 3) could provide useful insights to research analysts regarding potential 
ways to improve the public good institutions in the future, as well as learning in terms 
of what may work and what may not, to generate private offers to provide local public 
goods. Also, the results that the less-structured public good institution performed 
better than the more-structured institution may emphasize the need to design simple 
(in terms of implementation) public good institutions. Overall this dissertation 
research contributes to both DCE literature as well as the public good experiments 
literature to further our understanding in terms of examining ways to assess better 
estimates of values for the goods and services that cannot be traded in common 
commodity markets and important insights towards creating novel markets for the 
ecosystem services.  
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In Manuscript 1, I empirically examined whether the value estimates produced 
by real-money field experiments using a DCE survey with an incentive compatible 
provision rule were equivalent to the corresponding estimates from the DCE with a 
non-incentive compatible provision rule, and I found that the value estimates are 
statistically equivalent. This result is consistent with previous studies examining the 
provision rules using dichotomous choices, but this study broadens this conclusion for 
trichotomous choice elicitation which is the most commonly used DCE elicitation 
format. This result relays an important message to valuation researchers that the 
absence of theoretically predicted incentive compatibility in trichotomous choice 
questions may not be a caveat of concern in such stated preference studies generally, 
as implied by our results finding statistically similar underlying preference functions 
across the rules. Strategic behavior under a non-incentive compatible rule predicted by 
theory may not come out sharply in case of novel environmental choice settings which 
may require higher-order thinking. That is, the absence of incentive compatibility may 
not be sufficient to lead respondents in DCE’s to respond strategically.  Our study also 
utilized an opportunity to combine real, immediately implementable choice scenarios 
as well as hypothetical scenarios that extended the range of attribute levels covered in 
real choices and the comparison of preferences across the two suggested that the 
preferences were statistically equivalent. This may be due to a spillover effect of real 
scenarios over the hypothetical ones. This result also implied that future DCE studies 
could utilize this insight and include some real scenarios whenever possible to create a 
more consequential choice context.  
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 In Manuscript 2, I empirically investigated whether the stated preferences 
across a series of choice scenarios in a DCE are stable, as the repeated response format 
could induce incentives that may lead to non-truthful responses as predicted by theory 
and also backed up by empirical evidence of systematic change in expressed 
preferences across the sequence of choices. Our comparison of preferences and value 
estimates under DCE studies involving two choice scenarios and a series of twelve 
scenarios suggest statistically different underlying preference functions across the two 
survey length formats. Further exploration of pattern of response across the sequence 
of choices in the repeated survey format suggests evidence of precedent-dependent 
effects relating to a potential to retain higher net surplus from the most-valued 
alternative in the current task relative to the most-valued alternative in the preceding 
task may induce participants to be less sensitive to cost and thus appear to have a 
higher WTP across the sequence. Our exploration of precedent-dependent effect in 
trichotomous choice elicitation involved choice scenarios with more attributes than 
previously appeared in the literature.  Such a result may be problematic for future 
applications of stated-preference surveys that have assumed the multiple-attributes of 
a DCE might lead respondents to adopt a truth-telling strategy throughout a sequence 
of choices. Examining a change in predicted net surplus for the most-valued 
alternative across the sequence under multinomial response format, I think, is a novel 
way of looking at increasing or decreasing utility sequence, than previously was 
employed in dichotomous choice setting with much simpler targeted DCE surveys. 
 In Manuscript 3, I empirically examined participants’ offers to provide 
ecosystem-service public good elicited under a more-structured public good institution 
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based on Lindahl’s framework known as Individualized Price Auction (IPA) relative 
to a less-structured voluntary donation elicitation employing incentive mechanisms 
from experimental economics literature, including a provision point (PP) with a 
money-back guarantee (MBG) and a proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds 
beyond the PP. In our framed field experiment setting, a less-structured voluntary 
donation garnered higher offers compared to the more-structured IPA. This result 
emphasizes the need to design simple (in terms of implementation) public good 
institutions to generate private contributions to provide public goods.  
